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COMPENSATION FOR DISEASE UNDER
THE MINNESOTA WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW
by KENNETH F. KIRWINt
Occupational disease has proven to be a difficult concept in Minnesota
workers' compensation law. Compensability depends upon many factors,
including risk, causation, and determining what is a disease and how it
relates to employment. In this Article, Professor Kirwin traces the evolu-
tion of compensation for disease in Minnesota and offers the reader impor-
tant insights into the statute's multiple requirements. The length of the
occupational disease statute is itself a source of diftulty and confusion.
Professor Kirwin reveals to the reader a straightforward, simpified ap-
proach to its interpretation.
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I.. INTRODUCTION
"My Lords, I have found the construction of [the occupa-
tional disease provision] so difficult that after perusing it again
and again I am not sure that even now I can accurately state its
effect."
Lord Wrenbury, in Blatchford
v. Saddon & Founds, [1927]
A.C. 461, 477.
Two workers, each pursuing separate employments, contracted
tuberculosis from exposure to an infected co-worker. According to
the Minnesota Supreme Court, the occupational disease statute
supported an award of compensation for one worker and denied
an award for the other. ' Because the statute is lengthy and confus-
ing, an apparently inconsistent result should not be too much of a
surprise.
1. Compare Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. 220,84 N.W.2d 606 (1957) (uphold-
ing workers' compensation coverage for tuberculosis as occupational disease) with Parle v.
Henry Boos Dental Laboratories, Inc., 278 Minn. 207, 153 N.W.2d 344 (1967) (reversing
workers' compensation award because tuberculosis not occupational disease).
[Vol. 6
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COMPENSA TIOA FOR DISEASE
Such a result also demonstrates the importance of a thorough
understanding of compensation for disease. This Article under-
takes to provide some of that understanding and illuminate some
of the areas of confusion. To accomplish this, compensation for
disease 2 is analyzed under both the "occupational disease ' 3 and
"personal injury' 4 provisions of the Minnesota workers' compensa-
tion law.
5
The Article first looks into the historical background 6 and ra-
tionale 7 of compensation for work-related disease. A detailed con-
sideration of compensability of work-related disease under the
occupational disease provision follows, looking at the judicial con-
struction of the occupational disease definition" and undertaking a
detailed analysis of that definition. 9 The Article next turns to
compensation for work-related disease under the law's "personal
injury" definition, 10 a second method for compensating disease
that is distinct from the occupational disease provision. 1 Thereaf-
ter is considered the statute's presumption in favor of certain dis-
eases contracted by firefighters and peace officers.12 Finally, some
conclusions and recommendations are proffered.'
3
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DISEASE COMPENSATION
A. Early Response to Work-Related Disease
Recognition that conditions under which persons labor could ef-
fect serious damage upon human bodies long antedated the en-
lightened findings and fulminations of LeGrand Powers, an early
2. See notes 362-78 infta and accompanying text.
3. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(15) (1978 & Supp. 1979).
4. Id. § 176.011(16) (1978).
5. Id. §§ 176.011-.82 (1978 & Supp. 1979), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1980, ch.
384, § 2, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 100, 100 (West), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1980,
ch. 385, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 102 (West), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1980, ch.
389, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 104 (West), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1980, ch. 392,
1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 107 (West), as amended by Act of Mar. 31, 1980, ch. 414, § 2,
1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 130, 130 (West), as amended by Act of Apr. 11, 1980, ch. 556,
§ 12, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 715, 721 (West).
6. See notes 14-59 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 60-85 i'nfra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 101-47 infia and accompanying text.
9. See notes 148-378 zhfta and accompanying text.
10. See notes 379-431 ftnha nd accompanying text.
11. Compare MINN. STAT. § 176.011(15) (1978 & Supp. 1979) (occupational disease
definition) with id. § 176.011(16) (1978) (personal injury definition).
12. See notes 432-46 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 447-62 inifa and accompanying text.
1980]
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Minnesota reformist and activist Commissioner of Law Statistics,
who in 1891 launched an investigation into health risks of factory
workers in the state.' 4 As far back as the time of the ancient
Greeks, for example, one may find reports revealing remarkable
insight into matters such as lung disease resulting from the dust of
quarry and pottery work and poisoning derived from the mine and
foundry. 1 5 Nearer to the present, a medical treatise published in
1700 discoursed upon diseases peculiar to seventy-five occupa-
tions. 1 6 In nineteenth-century England, literature such as Sir Ed-
win Chadwick's famous Report . ..on an Enqui' Into the Sanitaly
Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain directed attention
to the deleterious occupational health effects of the Industrial
Revolution. 17
The common law, however, offered little recourse for the af-
flicted. 18 Thus, the Michigan court reported in 1914, "We are not
able to find a single case where an employee has recovered com-
pensation for an occupational disease at common law."' 9 Clearly
the difficulty of demonstrating causal proof in an era when medi-
cal knowledge was yet rudimentary played a significant role in this
record.20 Beyond that, the common-law defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk unquestionably proved to be
formidable obstacles to relief.21 Their dynamism is illustrated in a
pair of Minnesota decisions from the 1930s. In one, a steel worker
14. See 4 W. FOLWELL, A HISTORY OF MINNESOTA 454 (1930).
15. See G. FFRENCH, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 2 (1974).
16. B. RAMAZZINI, DE MORBIs ARTIFICUM DIATRIBA (1700); see Note, Master and
Servant-Occupational Diseases, 22 MINN. L. REV. 77, 77 n.2 (1937). Bernardino Ramaz-
zini, who has been called the founder of industrial medicine, see 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA MACROPAEDIA Health and Safety Laws 693, 696 (1974), is credited with
adding the question, "What is your occupation?" to the preparation of case histories re-
quired by medical practice. See 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA MICROPAEDIA Ramazzin,
Bernardino 404 (1974).
17. See 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA MACROPAEDIA Health and Safety Laws 693,
696 (1974).
18. See IB A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 41.20 (1980).
19. Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Works, 182 Mich. 157, 161-62, 148 N.W.
485, 486 (1914). But see Clark v. Banner Grain Co., 195 Minn. 44, 261 N.W. 596 (1935)
(damages for grain elevator worker's bronchial asthma from chemical fumes); Donnelly v.
Minneapolis Mfg. Co., 161 Minn. 240, 201 N.W. 305 (1924) (overruling demurrer to
worker's action for bronchitis from dust); Banks, Employer's Liabiliy for Occupational Dis-
eases, 16 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 60, 61-62 (1943) (30 states recognize, two deny common-
law liability for occupational disease).
20. See Note, supra note 16, at 78.
21. See Bohlen, The Common Law Right ofActionfor Occupational Disease in Pennsylvania,
63 U. PA. L. REV. 183, 185, 188-89 (1915).
[Vol. 6
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COMPENSATION FOR DISEASE
who contracted a disease by inhaling noxious fumes was denied
common-law recovery on grounds of contributory negligence.
22
The court found that he had disregarded company safety regula-
tions.23 In the other case, a miner who became ill from working in
ice-cold water was held to have assumed the risk of harm as a mat-
ter of law. 24 There was no remedy in tort, the court said, because
the harmful effect of saturation with ice-cold water "must be ap-
parent to even an ignorant and illiterate person."'25 Perhaps the
principal reason for the law's laggardness in responding to work-
related disease was the lack of public outrage resulting from a ba-
sic faith in the virtues of unregulated enterprise 26 and from a pre-
vailing stoic acceptance of illness and death.
27
Even with the Industrial Revolution, reform was slow in com-
ing. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of Germany in 1884 instituted
a system of compulsory workers' compensation. 28  In 1897,
England introduced a no-fault workers' compensation statute to
replace common-law remedies29 but not until 1906 did Parliament
finally amend this law to make compensable a list of occupational
diseases. 3
0
B. Mnnesota s Statutory Response to Work-Related Disease
The appalling discoveries of LeGrand Powers' investigations
failed to incite the Minnesota Legislature to act in the nineteenth
century.31 The English experience, however, proved instructive.
As the toll of industrial injuries mounted and the woeful inade-
quacy of applying the law's fault principle became obvious, Amer-
ican legislatures started considering and passing workers'
compensation laws.32 Minnesota did so in 1913. 3 3
22. Cedergren v. Minnesota Steel Co., 188 Minn. 331, 247 N.W. 235 (1933). The
disease, tranverse myelitis, was not covered by the occupational disease schedule then in
existence. Act of Mar. 15, 1921, ch. 82, § 67(9), 1921 Minn. Laws 90, 128 (repealed 1943).
23. 188 Minn. at 334, 247 N.W. at 236.
24. Jurovich v. Interstate Iron Co., 181 Minn. 588, 233 N.W. 465 (1930).
25. Id. at 589, 233 N.W. at 465.
26. See IB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 41.20, at 7-355.
27. See G. FFRENCH, supra note 15, at 2-3 (1974).
28. See S. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS 5 (1944); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 5.10, at 34 (1978).
29. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37.
30. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 58, § 8, sched. 3.
31. See 4 W. FOLWELL, supra note 14, at 454-55.
32. The first state laws to survive constitutional challenge were enacted in 1911. See
Riesenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 35 MINN. L. REV. 525, 525-26
(1951). Seegeneral'y 1 A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 5.20 (1978).
33. Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, 1913 Minn. Laws 675.
1980]
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Minnesota, albeit shortsightedly, followed the English exam-
ple 34 by incorporating in the initial statute compensation for inju-
ries "by accident" only.3 5 Thus, the Minnesota statute failed to
cope with the gradual development of disease. 36 For a disease to
be compensable under the statute, not only was causal connection
to the risks of employment a necessary element to be proved, but
the "accident" test had to be met as well. Moreover, the drafters
of the Minnesota law made certain that the narrow scope of the
accident test was appreciated by defining "accident" to mean "an
unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently
. . .and producing at the time, injury to the physical structure of
the body."
3 7
While the term "accident" nevertheless was construed liberally
to include some diseases, 38 the limitations imposed by the Legisla-
ture were such that many other diseases were determined to be
outside the statute. For example, typhoid fever contracted from'
34. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, § 1.
35. Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, § 9, 1913 Minn. Laws 675, 677 (repealed 1953). In
so doing, Minnesota was in accord with other American states, see 1B A. LARSON, supra
note 18, § 37.10, although Massachusetts did not include a "by accident" requirement in
its 1911 act, cf. Hurle's Case, 217 Mass. 223, 104 N.E. 336 (1914) (optic neuritis from long
exposure to coal gas is a compensable "personal injury" within the worker's compensation
statute), and California deleted its accident requirement in 1915. See lB A. LARSON,
supra, § 41.20, at 7-355 & n.16.
36. In this, the Minnesota law conformed to the acts of other states, although Califor-
nia and Wisconsin quite early specified coverage for "disease." lB A. LARSON, supra note
18, § 41.20, at 7-355; cf Wenrich v. Industrial Comm'n, 182 Wis. 379, 196 N.W. 824
(1924) (fact that employee's infirm condition predated occupational disease amendment
did not preclude recovery when disease manifested itself after amendment).
37. Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, § 34(h), 1913 Minn. Laws 675, 693 (repealed 1953).
This definition of "accident," with the words "and occupational disease as defined in
paragraph (n)" added in 1943, Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 633, § 2, 1943 Minn. Laws 969,
970, remained in the law until it was repealed in 1953. Act of Apr. 24, 1953, ch. 755, § 83,
1953 Minn. Laws 1099, 1156.
38. See, e.g., Ueltschi v. Certified Ice & Fuel Co., 201 Minn. 302, 276 N.W. 220 (1937)
(heatstroke from working on three very hot days); Adler v. Interstate Power Co., 180
Minn. 192, 230 N.W. 486 (1930) (gas poisoning from inhalation of coal fumes); State exrel.
Rau v. District Court, 138 Minn. 250, 164 N.W. 916 (1917) (sunstroke during afternoon's
work). See generally W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 927 (1943), in which
it is observed:
There has been no uniformity in [the] decisions. They have varied from the
judicial observation that "an accident does not happen all day" to an award of
compensation for an "accident" which required several years for it to culminate
in bronchial asthma, it being held accidental in the sense that it was unintended
and unexpected.
Id. at 508 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 6
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germs in drinking water at work was held noncompensable for fail-
ing to meet the accident definition. 39 In another case, a hard-
working stonecutter whose muscles atrophied following tremen-
dous strain from operating a defective machine was denied the
benefits of compensation because the circumstances did not in-
clude a "violent rupture or collapse of some physical structure or
function of the body."'40 Finally, the court held that an employee's
pneumoconiosis from dust at work was not an accidental injury
because "[a]ccidents do not and cannot take years in the happen-
ing."
4 1
The apparent injustice of decisions like these was rectified par-
tially in 1921 by an amendment explicitly compensating victims of
occupational disease. 42 Despite the effort, however, two problems
remained. First, rather than draft a general all-encompassing in-
39. State ex rel. Faribault Woolen Mills Co. v. District Court, 138 Minn. 210, 164
N.W. 810 (1917). The court pointed out that since no deleterious effects resulted until the
germs multiplied enormously and no symptoms were discernible until a week after infec-
tion, the inception of the disease was neither sudden nor violent. Id. at 211, 164 N.W. at
811. The court also noted that the disease did not result from an event that produced
"injury to the physical structure of the body" at the time it happened, as required by the
statute's definition of "accident." Id.
40. Young v. Melrose Granite Co., 152 Minn. 512, 516, 189 N.W. 426, 428 (1922); cf.
Donnelly v. Minneapolis Mfg. Co., 161 Minn. 240, 201 N.W. 305 (1924) ("chronic bron-
chitis with chemical poisoning" from flax straw not accident).
41. Golden v. Lerch Bros., 211 Minn. 30, 37, 300 N.W. 207, 211 (1941).
42. Act of Mar. 15, 1921, ch. 82, § 67, 1921 Minn. Laws 90, 126 (repealed 1943).
Subsection I specified that an employee's "disablement ...resulting from an occupa-
tional disease . . . shall be treated as the happening of an accident" under the statute, and
subsection 2 provided compensation for disability or death caused by an occupational
disease. See id. § 67(l)-(2), 1921 Minn. Laws at 126.
In addition to the provisions discussed in note 45 infra and accompanying text, the
1921 Act included the following: an employee disabled by occupational disease but able
to work for less wages at another occupation received "a percentage of full compensation
proportionate to the reduction in his earning capacity," id. § 67(2), 1921 Minn. Laws at
126; an employee who at the time of employment falsely represented in writing that he
had not previously suffered from the disease was denied compensation, id. § 67(4), 1921
Minn. Laws at 126; employers could receive contribution from previous employers based
upon a time in service apportionment, id. § 67(5), 1921 Minn. Laws at 126; an employee
need notify or make a claim only upon the last employer, id. § 67(6), 1921 Minn. Laws at
126; upon request, a claimant had to identify previous employers, id. § 67(7), 1921 Minn.
Laws at 126; and, nothing in the section affected the rights of an employee to recover
compensation for a disease not covered by the section if the disease was an accidental
personal injury under the Act. Id. § 67(10), 1921 Minn. Laws at 126.
These provisions, with the subsequent changes described in note 47 inbfa, remained in
the compensation act until 1973, when all of them were repealed except for subsection 1
which was changed to refer to disablement from occupational disease as a personal injury
rather than as the happening of an accident. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 643, §§ 11-12, 1973
Minn. Laws 1584, 1593-94 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.66(1) (1978)).
1980)
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clusion clause, as California did in 1917, 43 the legislators opted for
a more limited approach. They adopted the English practice of
extending coverage only to a scheduled list of diseases.44 Second,
obviously concerned over problems of proof and potential abuse,
the Legislature coupled the schedule with an arbitrary time limit
requiring the contraction of disease within twelve months before
the subsequent disablement. 45 If more than twelve months had
43. See IB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 41.20 at 7-355 n.17.
44. Act of Mar. 15, 1921, ch. 82, § 67(9), 1921 Minn. Laws 90, 128. The schedule of
diseases was first used in England in 1906. See Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 6
Edw. 7, c. 58, § 8, sched. 3. This method was first adopted in the United States by New
York in 1920. See IB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 41.20, at 7-355. Like the New York
provision, Minnesota's schedule included two columns. The first column listed 23 types of
disease (a 24th category was added in 1939, see Act of Apr. 20, 1939, ch. 306, 1939 Minn.
Laws 429). The second column described an occupational process. To be compensable,
the disability or death had to be caused by an enumerated disease contracted in the speci-
fied corresponding process. The disease had to be "due to the nature of" the correspond-
ing process in which the employee was engaged and contracted the disease, Act of Mar.
15, 1921, ch. 82, § 67(2), 1921 Minn. Laws 90, 126, but if the employee "at or immediately
before the date of disableinent, was employed in [the] process" the disease was "presump-
tively . . . deemed to have been due" to its nature. Id. § 67(8), 1921 Minn. Laws at 126.
For example, an employee could be compensated for disability from "Glanders" if con-
tracted from "[clare or handling of any equine animal or the carcass of any such animal"
or disability from "[i]nflammation of the synovial lining of the wrist joint and tendon
sheaths" if contracted from "[mlining." Id. § 67(9), 1921 Minn. Laws at 126.
Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 18 N.W.2d 535 (1945), Kvernstoen v. Nel-
son, 212 Minn. 102, 2 N.W.2d 560 (1942), Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, 1
N.W.2d 378 (1941), and Funk v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 192 Minn. 440, 256 N.W.
889 (1934), appear to be the only Minnesota Supreme Court cases construing the sched-
ule. See Note, supra note 16, at 97 n. 109.
By specifying diseases, naturally, some occupational diseases were still outside the
statute. In Donnelly v. Minneapolis Mfg. Co., 161 Minn. 240, 244, 201 N.W. 305, 307
(1924), the court held that those afflicted by unlisted occupational diseases continued to
have their "long-existing common law right."
45. Act of Mar. 15, 1921, ch. 82, § 67(3), 1921 Minn. Laws 90, 127. This requirement
was modified slightly in 1943 to permit silicosis and asbestosis to have been contracted
within three years before disablement, see Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 633, § 4(3), 1943 Minn.
Laws 969, 971, in 1949 to have the time run from "last exposure" rather than contraction
in silicosis and asbestosis cases, see Act of Apr. 20, 1949, ch. 500, § 1, 1949 Minn. Laws 838,
838, and in 1955 to add a presumption of firefighters' timely contraction of myocarditis,
coronary sclerosis, pneumonia, or its sequel. See Act of Mar. 21, 1955, ch. 206, § 2, 1955
Minn. Laws 302, 303. The latter presumption was subsequently extended to police of-
ficers and members of the highway patrol, conservation officer service, and state crime
bureau. See Act of May 25, 1967, ch. 905, §§ 3(3), 9, 1967 Minn. Laws 1962, 1964, 1967
("game wardens" changed to "conservation officers"); Act of May 6, 1963, ch. 497, § 2,
1963 Minn. Laws 731, 732 (game warden service and crime bureau); Act of Feb. 19, 1959,
ch. 20, § 2, 1959 Minn. Laws 44, 45 (highway patrol); Act of Apr. 29, 1957, ch. 834, § 2,
1957 Minn. Laws 1183, 1184 (police). See also notes 52-59 infra and accompanying text.
The law defined "disablement" as the act of becoming "disabled from earning full
wages at the work at which the employee was last employed." Act of Mar. 15, 1921, ch.
[Vol. 6
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elapsed, the disease was not compensated.
In 1943 the Minnesota Legislature altered the occupational dis-
ease provisions by eliminating the schedule 46 and fashioning a defi-
nition of occupational disease.47 Minnesota, which can be proud
82, § 67(1), 1921 Minn. Laws 90, 126. This definition remained in the law until 1973. See
Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 643, § 11, 1973 Minn. Laws 1584, 1593.
The law did not, however, define "contracted," and much litigation occurred over the
application of that term. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 258 Minn. 221, 103
N.W.2d 397 (1960) (coronary sclerosis); Kalmes v. Kahler Corp., 258 Minn. 105, 103
N.W.2d 203 (1960) (tuberculosis); Corcoran v. P.G. Corcoran Co., 245 Minn. 258, 71
N.W.2d 787 (1955) (pulmonary berylliosis); Yaeger v. Delano Granite Works, 236 Minn.
128, 52 N.W.2d 116 (1952) (silicosis); Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, 1
N.W.2d 378 (1941) (coronary sclerosis). The rule evolved that the disease was "con-
tracted" from when it "first manifest[ed] itself so as to interfere with bodily functions." See
258 Minn. at 110, 103 N.W.2d at 207; 245 Minn. at 265, 71 N.W.2d at 792; 236 Minn. at
133, 52 N.W.2d at 119; 211 Minn. at 354, 1 N.W.2d at 380. This still left problems in
determining the necessary degree of interference. See 258 Minn. at 225-26, 103 N.W.2d at
400-01. The Anderson court undertook to ameliorate these problems by specifying that the
disease "interfere with bodily functions to such an extent that the employee can no longer
substantially perform the duties of his employment." Id. at 226, 103 N.W.2d at 401.
In 1973 the Legislature prudently got rid of the requirement that one must contract
the disease within a particular time before disablement, and specified that in case of injury
by occupational disease the employee need only "give notice to the employer and com-
mence his action within two years after the employee has knowledge of the cause of such
injury and the injury has resulted in disability." Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 643, §§ 10, 12,
1973 Minn. Laws 1584, 1593, 1594. The time limit was later increased to three years. Act
of June 4, 1975, ch. 359, § 17, 1975 Minn. Laws 1168, 1186 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 176.151(4) (1978)).
46. Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 633, § 6, 1943 Minn. Laws 969, 973.
47. Id. § 3, 1943 Minn. Laws at 970. Section 3 also included a provision specifying
that "[pirior legislative enumerations of occupational disease shall not entitle any em-
ployee afflicted with such disease to a presumption that the same is in fact an occupational
disease." Id. This latter provision remained in the law until it was repealed in 1953. Act
of Apr. 24, 1953, ch. 755, § 83, 1953 Minn. Laws 1099, 1156.
Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 633, 1943 Minn. Laws 969 made no changes of substance in
the 1921 provisions referred to in notes 42 and 45 supra except to change the reduction in
earning capacity compensation to two-thirds of the difference between the wage before
and after disablement for not longer than 25 weeks, id. § 4(2), 1943 Minn. Laws at 970;
allow silicosis or asbestosis to have been contracted within three years before disablement,
id. § 4(3), 1943 Minn. Laws at 970; and allow apportionment among employers in certain
circumstances to be based upon exposure as well as time in service, id. § 4(5), 1943 Minn.
Laws at 970.
The 1943 Act also inaugurated a number of new provisions. These included provi-
sions requiring apportionment when disease or death resulted from the combined effects of
occupational disease and non-compensable disease or infirmity, 1d. § 7, 1943 Minn. Laws
at 973; excluding occupational disease compensation for employee refusal to use safety
appliances, obey safety rules, or perform a statutory duty, id.; presuming, absent "conclu-
sive evidence," that silicosis or asbestosis was not due to employment unless, during the ten
years preceding disablement, the employee was exposed to silica or asbestos dust for not
less than five years, the last three of which had to be within Minnesota, id. § 8, 1943 Minn.
Laws at 973; dispensing with apportionment in certain cases of silicosis or asbestosis com-
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of having been an early proponent of workers' compensation in
plicated with tuberculosis, id.; authorizing an order to remove an employee with occupa-
tional disease from medically inadvisable and unduly hazardous employment, with
retraining and up to 25 weeks of compensation as if the employee were disabled, 1d.; au-
thorizing approval of an employee's waiver, as an alternative to forced change of occupa-
tion, of full compensation for aggravation of occupational disease, id. § 9, 1943 Minn.
Laws at 975; specifying times for notice and claim, i. § 10, 1943 Minn. Laws at 975;
excluding partial disability compensation from silicosis or asbestosis unless partial disabil-
ity followed a compensable period of total disability, id.; putting a dollar limit on compen-
sation for total disability or death from silicosis or asbestosis, ia.; limiting each party to
taking testimony of only one physician in a compensation hearing on occupational disease,
id. § 11, 1943 Minn. Laws at 976; authorizing investigation to determine whether an em-
ployee should be permitted to continue in hazardous employment, id. § 12, 1943 Minn.
Laws at 977; providing for pre-employment, annual, and post-employment medical exam-
ination of employees exposed to the hazard of silicosis or asbestosis, id. § 13, 1943 Minn.
Laws at 978; requiring inspection of and regulations to be established for places of em-
ployment posing occupational disease hazards, ia. § 14, 1943 Minn. Laws at 979.
The 1943 Act also included new provisions for medical boards to resolve medical
issues in occupational disease cases. Id. § 11, 1943 Minn. Laws at 976; see NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT 51 (1972) (Recom-
mendations 2.15, 2.16); Solomons, Workers' Compensation for Occupational Disease Vitns. Fed-
eral Standards and Threshold Problems, 41 ALB. L. REV. 195, 226 (1977), reprinted in 4
WORKMEN'S COMP. L. REV. 11, 42 (1979). Under the Minnesota statute, a three-doctor
medical board was assembled from a panel of 15 doctors by each party selecting a doctor
and the two doctors selecting a third. Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 633, § 11, 1943 Minn.
Laws at 976. The medical board could examine the employee, hear witnesses, and make
such other examinations as it deemed necessary. Id. at 977.
The medical board's most significant responsibility was to determine whether the
employee was affected with an occupational disease within the meaning of the statute and
the approximate dates of contraction and disablement, and the compensation court was to
adopt these determinations as its decision. Id. The medical board was given a number of
other functions under the 1943 Act's other new provisions described previously in this
footnote. See id. § 7, 1943 Minn. Laws at 973 (determining occupational disease's percent-
age of contribution to disease or death); id. § 9, 1943 Minn. Laws at 975 (recommending
approval of employee's waiver of full compensation for aggravation); id. § 12, 1943 Minn.
Laws at 977-78 (recommending and participating in investigation of whether employee
should be permitted to continue in hazardous employment).
The Minnesota Supreme Court held all these grants of responsibility to medical
boards unconstitutional in Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co., 220 Minn. 318, 19 N.W.2d 795
(1945). It found due process violated by the Act's failure to require the medical board to
file a transcript of the evidence upon which its findings were based, in that this frustrated
the right of review of whether the findings had sufficient evidentiary foundation. Id. at
325-28, 19 N.W.2d at 799-800. The court did not strike down the whole 1943 Act, but
merely those parts relating to the creation and functions of medical boards. Id. at 328-29,
19 N.W.2d at 800-01.
Apart from the presumptions regarding diseases of certain government employees dis-
cussed in the first paragraph of note 45 supra and in notes 52-59 infa and accompanying
text, the Legislature made a number of changes of some substance in the occupational
disease provisions during the 30 years after 1943. See Act of Apr. 28, 1947, ch. 612, § 1,
1947 Minn. Laws 1105, 1105 (replacing 25-week limit on compensation for reduction in
earning capacity with reference to statute's temporary partial disability provision); id. § 2,
1947 Minn. Laws at 1106 (requiring last five, rather than three, years of exposure to be in
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America, has no reason to be pretentious about the draftmanship
of this provision, which remains fundamentally intact to this day.
48
Although the clear legislative intention "was to broaden the scope
and enlarge the field within which . . . occupational risks were to
be covered, '49 the definition can justly claim to be among the less
lucid, and indeed more exasperatingly prolix, portions of the entire
compensation law. This definition apparently was crafted with a
view toward tight limitation and control of disease compensation
with causal requirements exceeding those for personal injury com-
pensation. The blurry distinction between injury and disease was
further obscured in 1953 when the Legislature eliminated the "ac-
cident" requirement for personal injury recovery.50
Minnesota to avoid presumption that silicosis or asbestosis not due to employment) (re-
stored to three years by Act of Apr. 20, 1949, ch. 500, § 5, 1949 Minn. Laws 838, 840); Act
of Apr. 28, 1947, ch. 612, § 3, 1947 Minn. Laws 1105, 1107 (increasing dollar limit on
compensation for total disability or death from silicosis or asbestosis); id. § 4, 1947 Minn.
Laws at 1108 (removing restriction of each party to one physician's testimony); id. § 5,
1947 Minn. Laws at 1108 (requiring employer to pay all rather than half of annual silico-
sis or asbestosis examination cost); Act of Apr. 20, 1949, ch. 500, § 1, 1949 Minn. Laws
838, 838 (changing time before considered disabled to run from last exposure rather than
contraction in silicosis and asbestosis cases); Act of Apr. 18, 1951, ch. 454, 1951 Minn.
Laws 679, 679-80 (specifying that "[i]n all cases except silicosis or asbestosis unless the
employer shall have actual notice" as condition to duty to give notice within time speci-
fied, replacing one year for claim requirement with reference to general time-for-claim
provision, and removing dollar limit for compensation for disability or death from silicosis
or asbestosis); Act of Feb. 21, 1957, ch. 34, 1957 Minn. Laws 49 (adding presumption that
tuberculosis contracted by nurse in certain situations is occupational disease, defining
"contracts tuberculosis," and making exceptions from time limitations); Act of May 20,
1971, ch. 422, § 11, 1971 Minn. Laws 719, 726 (increasing maximum on benefits to em-
ployee ordered removed from employment from 25 to 104 weeks).
In 1973 all these special provisions on occupational disease were repealed, Act of May
24, 1973, ch. 643, § 12, 1973 Minn. Laws 1584, 1594, the provision specifying that disable-
ment resulting from an occupational disease be treated "as the happening of an accident"
was changed to make it be regarded "as a personal injury," and the "disablement" defini-
tion was omitted, id. § 11, 1973 Minn. Laws at 1593 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.66(1)
(1978)).
48. See MINN. STAT. § 176.011(15) (1978 & Supp. 1979). Except for the 1955 addi-
tion to the first sentence of the words "and shall include undulant fever," see Act of Apr.
21, 1955, ch. 652, 1955 Minn. Laws 985, and for the additions and extensions of the pre-
sumption discussed in notes 52-59 infra nd accompanying text, no substantive changes
have been made in this provision since 1943.
49. Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 221, 21 N.W.2d 612,
616 (1946) (dictum).
50. Act of Apr. 24, 1953, ch. 755, § 1(16), 1953 Minn. Laws 1099, 1101. The desira-
bility of eliminating the "accident" requirement had just recently been indicated in Rie-
senfeld, supra note 32, at 539.
Minnesota was one of the earlier states to dispense with the "accident" requirement
and is currently joined by seven other states in this respect. See I B A. LARSON, supra note
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Despite the occupational disease definition's sorry lack of preci-
sion, the Legislature has, except for cosmetic changes, 5' seen fit to
revise the definition only by adding a special presumption for a
few diseases-"myocarditis, coronary sclerosis, pneumonia or its
sequel"-contracted within an explicit list of occupations. 52 Ini-
tially limited to firefighters,5 3 the list has since been expanded to
include police 54 and members of the highway patrol,55 conserva-
tion offficer service, 56 and state crime bureau.57  Later amend-
ments added sheriffs and full-time deputy sheriffs, 58 and forest
officers of the Department of Natural Resources. 59
III. RATIONALE FOR DISEASE COMPENSATION
The opinions frequently say that occupational disease provisions
should be construed liberally to effect their legislative objectives.60
18, § 37.10 & n.1 (referring to California, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Texas).
Although the accident requirement was deleted in 1953, it was not until 1973 that the
provision specifying that disablement resulting from an occupational disease be treated
"as the happening of an accident" was amended to "as a personal injury." Act of May 24,
1973, ch. 643, § 11, 1973 Minn. Laws 1584, 1593 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.66(1)
(1978)).
51. See Act of Mar. 21, 1955, ch. 206, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws 302, 302 ("The words
'occupational disease' means" to " 'Occupational disease' means"); Act of June 4, 1975,
ch. 359, § 23, 1975 Minn. Laws 1168, 1189 ("workmen's" to "workers' "); Act of June 7,
1979, ch. 3, § 29, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1256, 1270 ("such" to "the" at two points in
second sentence).
52. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(15) (1978 & Supp. 1979).
53. See Act of Mar. 21, 1955, ch. 206, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws 302, 302. This had the
same effect as a provision added to the former occupational disease schedule by Act of
Apr. 20, 1939, ch. 306, 1939 Minn. Laws 429, in effect only until the schedule was replaced
by the occupational disease definition. Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 633, § 3, 1943 Minn.
Laws 969, 970; see Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 18 N.W.2d 535 (1945).
54. See Act of Apr. 29, 1957, ch. 834, § 1, 1957 Minn. Laws 1183, 1183.
55. See Act of Feb. 19, 1959, ch. 20, § 1, 1959 Minn. Laws 44, 44.
56. See Act of May 6, 1963, ch. 497, § 1, 1963 Minn. Laws 730, 730 ("game warden
service"); Act of May 25, 1967, ch. 905, §§ 3, 9, 1967 Minn. Laws 1962, 1964, 1967 ("game
wardens" changed to "conservation officers").
57. Act of May 6, 1963, ch. 497, § 1, 1963 Minn. Laws 730, 730.
58. Act of June 4, 1969, ch. 936, § 2, 1969 Minn. Laws 1804, 1805.
59. Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 29, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1256, 1270 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 176.011(15) (1978 & Supp. 1979)). For the text and a discussion of the
presumption, see notes 432-46 inhfa and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. 220,228, 84 N.W.2d 606, 612 (1957);
Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 223, 21 N.W.2d 612, 616
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Interpretation of these provisions, therefore, requires an under-
standing of those objectives.
In one sense, the primary aim of disease compensation reflects
the broad inclusionary principles61 of workers' compensation as a
whole. 62 As a remedial measure designed to overcome the eco-
nomic insecurity and distress thrust upon workers saddled with oc-
cupational disability and left without adequate legal redress
within a fault-based tort system, 63 workers' compensation favors
relief for disabled victims by including them in a substitutional no-
fault scheme. 64 Underlying this no-fault scheme is a social policy
determination that the individual economic burdens are handled
most equitably as a cost of doing business to be spread among the
consuming public. 65 Furthermore, the scheme promises secondary
benefits of encouraging safer conditions at the workplace, relieving
charities and government from financial drain for care of the vic-
tims, and reducing litigation.
66
A corollary to these concepts is an inclusionary interest that de-
mands similar treatment for disease and accidental injury.67 Based
upon resistance to arbitrary distinctions, this interest favors inclu-
sion of disease within a compensation scheme that already covers
other injury. A hypothetical query by the Idaho court illustrates
this interest well. The court questioned why one worker, killed
while driving an employer's auto because several years of grinding
by rocks had worn the tires down until they blew out, should be
61. See Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 221, 21 N.W.2d
612, 616 (1946), quotedin Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. 220, 228, 84 N.W.2d 606, 611
(1957), in which the court said, "The obvious purpose of the 1943 act was to broaden the
scope and enlarge the field within which such occupational risks were to be covered."
62. See 3 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 38, § 925, at 499 (underlying theory for compen-
sating work accidents applies as well to diseases arising out of and caused by conditions of
employment); Beers, Compensation for Occupational Diseases, 37 YALE L.J. 579, 579 (1928)
(basis for compensation for occupational disease and for accident is same).
63. See notes 14-27 supra and accompanying text.
64. See I A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 2.20 (1978); Riesenfeld, supra note 32, at 529-32.
65. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 2.20 (1978); 2 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 38,
§ 925, at 499; Beers, supra note 62, at 579; Riesenfeld, supra note 32, at 529.
66. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U.S., ANALYSIS OF WORKER'S COMPENSA-
TION LAws 3 (1979); S. HOROVITZ, supra note 28, at 2, 6, 8.
67. See 3 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 38, § 925, at 499 (same underlying theory applies
to both "whether or not [the] diseases are strictly what are known as occupational dis-
eases"); Beers, supra note 62, at 581 ("no sound difference in principle between an incapac-
ity or death which has its roots in occupation and one resulting from accident"); cf.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT 50
(1972) (Recommendation 2.14) ("arising out of and in the course of employment" test
should be used to determine coverage of both injuries and diseases).
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treated better than another worker killed by tuberculosis because
silica dust had ground on his lungs until they gave out. 68
On the other hand, an exclusionary interest favoring greater re-
striction on compensation for disease than for non-disease injury is
evident in most states' statutes. Although only ten states have defi-
nitions69 of occupational disease longer than Minnesota's, 70 all but
four states71 have provisions that, at least on their face, impose
68. Beaver v. Morrison-Knudson Co., 55 Idaho 275, 295, 41 P.2d 605, 613 (1934).
The court used this rationale to support a liberal reading of an "accident" requirement.
For Minnesota's approach under its former accident requirement, see notes 37-41 supra
and accompanying text.
69. Definitions are distinguished from schedules. Nine states still employ schedules,
but in eight of them the schedule is not exclusive-compensation is provided for a disease
falling within a general definition of occupational disease as well as one specifically
named. See GA. CODE ANN. § 114-803 (1973); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 617.440, .450 (1977);
N.Y. WORK. CoMp. LAW §§ 3, 39 (McKinney 1965 & Cum. Supp. 1979-1980); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-53 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.68 (Page 1973 & Supp. 1979); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1208 (Purdon 1962 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 28-34-1(c), -2 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-26 to -27 (1974). Only Vermont ap-
pears to cling to an exclusive schedule. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1002, 1019 (1967).
For discussion of the exclusive schedule in force in Minnesota from 1921 to 1943, see notes
42-46 supra and accompanying text.
70. Minnesota's definition of occupational disease contains 197 words. See MINN.
STAT. § 176.011(15) (1978 & Supp. 1979) (first four sentences). Compare d with ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-901(9)(c), 23-901.01 (Supp. 1971-1979) (206 words); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 81-1314(a)(5)(7) (1976) (207 words); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-803 (1973) (232
words); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-10 (Burns 1974) (223 words); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 287.067(l) (Vernon 1965) (226 words); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-02(8)(a), -02(9)(a)-
(c) (1960 & Supp. 1979) (235 words); S.C. CODE § 42-11-10 (1962) (263 words); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-26 to -27 (1974) (580 words); VA. CODE § 65.1-46 (1973) (244 words);
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978) (855 words).
71. These states are California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. See CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3208 (West Supp. 1980) ("injury" includes "any injury or disease arising out
of the employment"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.01(l)(c) (West 1973) ("injury" includes
"mental or physical harm to an employee caused by accident or disease"); id.
§ 102.03(1)(e) (employer liable when "accident or disease causing injury arises out of his
employment"). ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.36(d) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1980-1981),
provides in relevant part:
In this Act the term "Occupational Disease" means a disease arising out of
and in the course of the employment or which has become aggravated and ren-
dered disabling as a result of the exposure of the employment. Such aggravation
shall arise out of a risk peculiar to or increased by the employment and not
common to the general public.
A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment if there is appar-
ent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal
connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the
occupational disease. The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected
but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin or aggravation in a
risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a
rational consequence.
An employee shall be conclusively deemed to have been exposed to the
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more requirements for compensating occupational disease than for
personal injury generally. Seven states' requirements are so mini-
mal that they probably result in no practical differences.2 But the
remaining states' provisions at least seem to be aimed at making a
difference. Several states require the disease to be "due to causes
and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a partic-
ular trade, occupation, process or employment. ' 73 Three states re-
quire the disease to be "peculiar to the occupation in which the
employee was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary
hazards of employment. ' 74 Another requires it to be "peculiar to
a particular industrial process, trade, or occupation and to which
an employee is not ordinarily subjected or exposed outside of or
hazards of an occupational disease when, for any length of time however short,
he or she is employed in an occupation or process in which the hazard of the
disease exists ....
Id. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-31 (West 1959) provides:
For the purposes of this article, the phrase "compensable occupational dis-
ease" shall include all diseases arising out of and in the course of employment,
which are due to causes and conditions which are or were characteristic of or
peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, process or employment, or which dis-
eases are due to the exposure of any employee to a cause thereof arising out of
and in the course of his employment.
Id. (emphasis added).
72. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265(13) (1972) (disease must arise "naturally" out of
the employment); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301(4) (1979) (exposure must have "oc-
curred during employment"); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 386-3 (1968) (disease must be "proxi-
mately caused by or resulting from the nature of the employment") (emphasis added);
MD. WORK. COMP. CODE ANN. art. 101, § 22(a) (1979) (disease must be "due to the
nature of the occupation or process in which he was employed"); ia'. § 67(13) (disease must
be "contracted as the result of" employment); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § I (West
1971) (disease must be "caused by the nature or circumstances of the employment"); N.Y.
WORK. COMp. LAW § 39 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (disease must be "due to the
nature of the . . . employment"); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802 (1977) (disease must be one
"to which an employee is not ordinarily subjected or exposed other than during a period
of regular actual employment"); Wyo. STAT. § 27-12-102(a)(xii)(a) (1977) (does not in-
clude "communicable disease unless the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
nature of the employment"); cf. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 36-501, 13 (West 1968) (same as
Alaska).
73. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-34-1(c) (1970); see IDAHO CODE § 72-102(17)(a) (West Cum.
Supp. 1979) (substantially same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1979) (substantially
same); cf. ME. REV. STAT. Ann. tit. 39, § 183 (1964) (substantially same except omits "and
peculiar"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 3(10) (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (same except speci-
fies "or peculiar") (emphasis added). Additional language in the North Carolina provi-
sion, "excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally exposed
outside of the employment," does not seem to go beyond what is required for personal
injury generally. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1979) (emphasis added).
74. S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 62-8-1(4) (1978); see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-
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away from his employment. ' 75 One state requires "proximate"
causation, 76 two require "direct" causation, 77 and three others re-
quire both. 78 Still another excludes an "[o]rdinary disease of life to
which the general public is exposed outside of the employment. '79
The other twenty-two states, although usually at less length than
75. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.68(BB) (Page Supp. 1979).
76. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.08.140 (1962) (must arise "naturally and proxi-
mately out of employment"); cf. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 386-3 (1968) (must be "proxi-
mately caused by or resulting from the nature of the employment") (emphasis added).
77. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-7 (1972) ("direct causal connection between the
work performed and the occupational disease"). IOWA CODE ANN. § 85A.8 (West Cum.
Supp. 1979) sets forth a long definition, but none of the specifics other than the direct
cause requirement appears to differ from requirements for coverage of personal injury
generally:
Occupational disease shall be only those diseases which arise out of and in
the course of the employee's employment. Such diseases shall have a direct
causal connection with the employment and must have followed as a natural
incident thereto from injurious exposure occasioned by the nature of the employ-
ment. Such disease must be incidental to the character of the business, occupa-
tion or process in which the employee was employed and not independent of the
employment. Such disease need not have been foreseen or expected but after its
contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the
employment and to have resulted from that source as an incident and rational
consequence. A disease which follows from a hazard to which an employee has
or would have been equally exposed outside of said occupation is not compensa-
ble as an occupational disease.
Id.
78. These states are Montana, Nevada, and Tennessee. MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 92-1305 (Cum. Supp. 1979) is a lengthy provision, but only clauses (1) and (3) seem to
go beyond what is required for personal injury generally:
Occupational diseases shall be deemed to arise out of the employment only
if:
(1) There is a direct causal connection between the conditions under
which the work is performed and the occupational disease;
(2) The disease can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the
work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment;
(3) The disease can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate
cause;
(4) The disease does not come from a hazard to which workmen would
have been equally exposed outside of the employment;
(5) The disease is incidental to the character of the business and not in-
dependent of the relation of employer and employee.
Id. NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.440 (1977) is substantially identical, except for adding, "The
disease need not have been foreseen or expected, but after its contraction must appear to
have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that
source as a natural consequence." Id. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1101 (Cum. Supp. 1979) is
substantially the same as the Nevada provision. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-2-27(28) (1974) is
substantially the same as the Nevada provision except that it goes beyond what is required
for personal injury generally by requiring in clause (4) that the disease not be "of a charac-
ter to which the employee may have had substantial exposure outside of the employment."
Id. (emphasis added).
79. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1979) ("except
where such diseases follow as an incident to an 'Occupational Disease' or 'Injury' ").
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Minnesota, set forth combinations of these or other require-
ments.80
In his treatise, Professor Larson discusses several possible reasons
for this trend toward statutory exclusion of some disease.8" One
possibility derives from the premise that, because compensation is
a substitute for fault liability, it ought not compensate that which
in the past was thought to be outside the realm of potential fault
relief.8 2 A second concern was that occupational disease was so
generalized and extensive a problem that a workers' compensation
system could not deal with it effectively.8 3 A third rests upon a
cost-benefit analysis that questions the social gain derived from
liberal compensation. Because certain occupations have a heavy
incidence of disease, relief might place an intolerable burden on
the compensation system.
84
Each of these points is subject to rebuttal. First, the idea that
occupational disease was not compensable at common law proved
to be erroneous,8 5 and an erroneous idea is a poor basis for legal
consequences. Second, the workers' compensation system has
proven equal to the task of administering compensation for work-
related disease. Finally, it is intolerable to put the burden of em-
ployment-caused disease on workers rather than to assess it upon
industry to be added to the cost of the industry's product and
passed on to consumers.
IV. COMPENSATION UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE DEFINITION
A. General
The Minnesota workers' compensation law does not provide
compensation for occupational disease directly. Rather, in addi-
80. In addition to the 11 states' statutes cited in note 70 supra, see ALA. CODE § 25-5-
110 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-60-110 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.151 (West Cum.
Supp. 1979), as amended by Act of May 11, 1979, ch. 79-40, § 11, 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
327 (West); KAN. STAT. ANN. §44-5a01(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 342.620(2) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1031.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.401(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(3), (4)
(1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281:a(V) (1977 & Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 1208(n) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1002, 1019 (1967).
81. See lB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 41.20.
82. See id. at 7-354; notes 18-27 supra and accompanying text.
83. See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 41.20, at 7-354 to -355.
84. See id. at 7-355.
85. See note 19 supra.
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tion to death benefits,8 6 it provides compensation for medical
treatment required by8 7 and disability produced by88 "personal in-
jury."8 9 "Personal injury," in turn, includes:
(1) "injury arising out of and in the course of employment," 9
(2) "personal injury caused by occupational disease," 9 1 and
(3) "the disablement of an employee resulting from an occu-
pational disease."
'92
Putting aside number (1) for the moment, an employee proceed-
ing under (2) or (3) would have to show:
(1) that the employee had an "occupational disease," and
(2) that the occupational disease caused personal injury or
disablement.
93
86. See MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1) (1978) (employer liable for compensation in case of
death arising out of and in the course of employment); id. § 176.111 (Supp. 1979) (death
benefits).
On the face of the statute, compensation for death is not conditioned upon meeting
the "personal injury" or "occupational disease" definition. In Morgan v. State, 281
N.W.2d 710 (Minn. 1979), the court, in affirming a denial of compensation to a widow
who claimed her husband's death was partially caused by work-incurred asbestosis, did
not focus upon the personal injury or occupational disease definitions, but affirmed the
finding that "the death ... did not arise out of and in the course of his employment," id.
at 711, on the ground that "relator did not sustain her burden of proving causal relation
between employee's work activities and his death." Id. at 712.
From 1921 until 1973, the compensation law, in addition to providing that an em-
ployee's disablement resulting from an occupational disease be treated as the happening of
an accident, specified entitlement to compensation for disability or death caused by an
occupational disease. See Act of Mar. 15, 1921, ch. 82, § 67(1)-(2), 1921 Minn. Laws 126,
126-27, as amended by Act of May 24, 1973, h. 643, §§ 11-12, 1973 Minn. Laws 1592, 1594
(amending subdivision 1 to specify personal injury rather than the happening of an acci-
dent and repealing subdivision 2) (partially codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.66(1) (1978)).
87. See MINN. STAT. § 176.135(1) (Supp. 1979) (employer to furnish treatment "rea-
sonably required . . . to cure and relieve from the effects of the injury"). See also id.
§ 176.102 (Supp. 1979) (rehabilitation); id. § 176.137 (1978) (remodeling residence for
handicapped employee).
88. See id. § 176.101 (1) (Supp. 1979) (compensation for "injury producing temporary
total disability"). No "injury producing" reference is made in subdivisions 2, 3, or 4 con-
cerning temporary partial, permanent partial, and permanent total disability. See id.
§ 176.101(2)-(4) (1978 & Supp. 1979).
89. See id. § 176.021(1) (1978) (employer liable for compensation in case of personal
injury).
90. Id. § 176.011(16) (1978). This provision goes on to specify, inter aia, that personal
injury "does not cover an employee except while engaged in, on, or about the premises
where his services require his presence as a part of such service at the time of the injury
and during the hours of such service." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. § 176.66 (1978).
93. Assuming that "disablement" is the same as "disability," it would have to be
shown in any event for disability compensation, see note 88 supra and accompanying text,
[Vol. 6
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The Minnesota statute gives "occupational disease" a long,94 con-
fusing,95 and seemingly contradictory96 definition:
"Occupational disease" means a disease arising out of and in
the course of employment peculiar to the occupation in which
the employee is engaged and due to causes in excess of the
hazards ordinary of employment and shall include undulant fe-
ver. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is
equally exposed outside of employment are not compensable,
except where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupa-
tional disease, or where the exposure peculiar to the occupation
makes the disease an occupational disease hazard. A disease
arises out of the employment only if there be a direct causal
connection between the conditions under which the work is
performed and if the occupational disease follows as a natural
incident of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by
but not for medical treatment under MINN. STAT. § 176.135 (1978 & Supp. 1979). See
Stephen v. Miles Constr. Co., 240 Minn. 307, 311-12, 60 N.W.2d 801, 803-04 (1953).
From 1921 until 1973, the compensation law contained a definition of "disablement,"
defining it as the act of becoming "disabled from earning full wages at the work at which
the employee was last employed." Act of Mar. 15, 1921, ch. 82, § 67(1), 1921 Minn. Laws
1594, 1594 (repealed 1973).
Regarding the causal connection between the occupational disease and the compen-
sable result-personal injury, disability, or death--see notes 222-50 infra and accompany-
ing text. See also Ulve v. Bemidji Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 267 Minn. 412, 127 N.W.2d 147
(1964), upholding a determination that after an employee's allergic dermatitis occupa-
tional disease was cured, his continuing disability because of allergy to many substances
was not caused by the occupational disease but by inherent sensitivity.
94. Only ten states have definitions of occupational disease longer than Minnesota's.
See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
95. The inclusion of undulant fever (added by Act of Apr. 21, 1955, ch. 652, § 1, 1955
Minn. Laws 985, 985) is particularly curious. Undulant fever, also known as brucellosis, is
an infectious disease characterized by fever, sweating, weakness, and aching that may per-
sist for months or years. It is transmitted to man from lower animals. BLAKISTON'S
GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 225 (3d ed. 1972); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 199
(4th unabridged lawyers' ed. 1976). Notwithstanding the flat statement, " 'Occupational
disease' . . . shall include undulant fever," it seems a claimant would have to show the
undulant fever otherwise qualified under the statute.
96. At first blush, the requirement that the disease be peculiar to the occupation and
the requirement that the disease be recognized as a hazard characteristic of and peculiar
to the occupation seem inconsistent with the provision that ordinary diseases of life are
compensable if the exposure is peculiar to the occupation.
In Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 21 N.W.2d 612 (1946),
the court concluded its opinion, devoted to construction of the occupational disease defini-
tion, with the following quotation from Professor Williston: "When one intention appears
in one clause in an instrument, and a different, conflicting intention appears in another
clause in the same instrument, that intention should be given effect which appears in the
principal or more important clause." Id. at 223, 21 N.W.2d at 617. This language still
appears in the latest edition of Professor Williston's treatise. 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 624, at 822 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961).
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the nature of the employment. An employer is not liable for
compensation for any occupational disease which cannot be
traced to the employment as a direct and proximate cause and
is not recognized as a hazard characteristic of and peculiar to
the trade, occupation, process, or employment or which results
from a hazard to which the worker would have been equally
exposed outside of the employment.
9 7
Looking at the definition, one would gain the impression that
when the 1943 Legislature 98 decided to replace the previous sched-
ule approach 99 with the current definition approach, it looked at
the statutes of other states using definitions and liked them all!l ° °
The definition seems to include everything but the kitchen sink.
B. Judicial Construction of the Occupational Dzsease Defnition
Few cases have made meaningful attempts to clarify the defini-
tion's words and phrases. Some opinions merely have quoted the
definition without elaboration. 10 1 Others have quoted 10 2 or em-
phasized 0 3 specific clauses within the definition, also without elab-
oration. Some attempt has been made, however, to illuminate the
meaning of the occupational disease definition.
97. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(15) (1978 & Supp. 1979) (hereinafter called "the defini-
tion"). Subdivision 15 goes on to provide a presumption of occupational disease for speci-
fied diseases of certain public employees. See notes 52-59 supra and accompanying text
and notes 432-46 intra and accompanying text.
98. See Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 633, § 3, 1943 Minn. Laws 970, 970 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 176.011(15) (1978 & Supp. 1979)).
99. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
100. Compare MINN. STAT. § 176.011(15) (1978 & Supp. 1979) with notes 69-80 supra
and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Jensen v. Kronick's Floor Covering Serv., 309 Minn. 541, 542-43, 245
N.W.2d 230, 232 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding compensation for carpet layer's carpal
tunnel syndrome from repetitive minute trauma); Sinclair v. Frye, 18 Minn. Workmen's
Comp. Dec. 93, 94 (1955) (compensation for electrical maintenance man's ischemic neuri-
tis from working in cold water).
102. See, e.g., Schwartz v. City of Duluth, 264 Minn. 514, 517-18, 119 N.W.2d 822, 824
(1963) (upholding coverage of fireman's coronary thrombosis from stress) (quoting sub-
stantially all of first three sentences).
103. See, e.g., Scott v. Southview Chevrolet Co., 267 N.W.2d 185, 187-88 (Minn. 1978)
(upholding compensation for car starter's pulmonary emphysema from exhaust fumes)
(italicizing first part of third and fourth sentences regarding direct and proximate causa-
tion); Atkins v. Page Bros., 24 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 503, 508 n. 1 (1968) (personal
injury but not occupational disease coverage for business manager's coronary sclerosis
from stress) (underlining second sentence regarding ordinary diseases of life and fourth
sentence's words "characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or em-
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Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co., 104 decided in 1945, was the first case
arising under the 1943 definition to come before the Minnesota
Supreme Court.10 5 Finding occupational disease coverage as a
matter of law for a shipyard worker's bursitis or synovitis from
working with his knee on cold steel plates while operating an air
gun, the court said:
[T]he legislature provided that, to establish an occupational
disease, the evidence must disclose (1) that it arose out of and
in the course of employment; (2) that it was peculiar to the
occupation in which the employee was engaged; and (3) that it
was due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employ-
ment. Under the statutory definition, ordinary diseases of life
to which all members of the general public are equally exposed
outside of employment are not compensable except where they
follow as an incident to an occupational disease, or where the
exposure peculiar to the occupation makes such disease an oc-
cupational disease hazard.
Here, it would seem that . . . relator's disability readily falls
within the above statutory requirements. Both medical experts
testified that there was a direct causal connection between the
disease and the employment. Certainly the court may take ju-
dicial notice that bursitis or synovitis is not one of the ordinary
diseases of life to which all members of the general public are
equally exposed. It is equally clear that the disease is due to
causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment. The
medical experts further testified that the disease was peculiar to
any occupation wherein either the knees or the elbows of a
worker were required to come in constant contact with cold,
hard surfaces, and that bursitis of various kinds was becoming
more and more common to shipyard workers; and, in particu-
lar, that relator's disability was brought about by the manner
in which he was required to work, which was peculiar to his
occupation. 106
A year later, in Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc.,107 the
court again found occupational disease coverage as a matter of
law, this time for a machinist's dermatitis from spun glass insula-
tion dust permeating ship hulls in which he worked. The em-
ployee sued the employer at common law for negligence, claiming
the occupational disease definition did not apply because there
104. 220 Minn. 318, 19 N.W.2d 795 (1945).
105. See id. at 330, 19 N.W.2d at 801.
106. Id. at 330-31, 19 N.W.2d at 801-02.
107. 221 Minn. 215, 21 N.W.2d 612 (1946).
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was no "exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment" in
that "the cause was in another and entirely separate department
with which our employe had no connection.' 1 0 8 The trial judge
agreed, saying, "Neither plaintiff nor those engaged in his particu-
lar trade contributed to the production of the irritating mate-
rial." 10 9 But the supreme court, throwing out the common-law
action, disagreed, saying:
[I]t is evident that plaintiff contracted dermatitis while at his
usual work on his employer's premises and within the scope of
his employment; also that his affliction was caused by exposure
to spun glass dust while so engaged.
The mere fact that plaintiff did not contribute to the produc-
tion of the irritating material and did not actually work upon it
does not negative defendant's liability under the compensation
act to compensate him for the disability thus incurred. His af-
fliction arose out of and in the course of his employment.
The obvious purpose of the 1943 act was to broaden the
scope and enlarge the field within which such occupational
risks were to be 'covered. We think the logical conclusion to be
drawn is that the provision "arising out of and in the course of
employment peculiar to the occupation in which the employee
is engaged and due to causes in excess of the hazards ordinary
of employment" refers to the hazards to which plaintiff was ex-
posed in doing his work. Were this not so, it would be difficult
to find an adequate reason for the adoption of the statute."10
The court then quoted from Connecticut cases construing a stat-
ute requiring the disease to be "peculiar to the occupation"'I (like
Minnesota's statute' 1 2), as not requiring "that the disease must be
one which originates exclusively from the particular kind of em-
ployment in which the employee is engaged, but rather. . . that
the conditions of that employment must result in a hazard which
distinguishes it in character from the general run of occupa-
tions,"' 13 and, further, as not precluding compensation merely
108. Id. at 220, 21 N.W.2d at 615.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 221, 21 N.W.2d at 615-16.
111. The Connecticut statute defined occupational disease as one "peculiar to the oc-
cupation in which the employee was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary
hazards of employment as such." See id. at 222, 21 N.W.2d at 616; CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-275 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
112. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-275 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) with MINN.
STAT. § 176.011(15) (Supp. 1979).
113. Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 222, 21 N.W.2d 612,
[Vol. 6
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"because the risk is one which has not become generally recog-
nized or because only employees unusually susceptible will suffer
from [the disease]."
' "14
Finally, the Sandy court concluded:
[Pilaintiff contracted an occupational disease in the line of his
work because of "a hazard characteristic of and peculiar to the
trade, occupation, process or employment" in which he was en-
gaged; the glass dust was the "direct and proximate cause" of
his ailment; and, obviously, it was not a "hazard to which the
workman would have been equally exposed outside of the em-
ployment." Therefore, so it seems to us, plaintiffs cause comes
directly within the provisions of the 1943 act.
We have said time and again that the compensation law is
remedial and, as such, should be given a liberal interpretation
to the end that its purpose may thereby be attained." 5
In the 1957 case of Gray v. City of St. Paul," 6 the court upheld
occupational disease coverage for a police officer's tuberculosis
contracted after completing eight squad car shifts with a fellow
officer later determined to have been suffering from a reactivated
case of tuberculosis. The court first agreed with the employee's
contention that -the definition
does not prohibit ordinary diseases of life, but only ordinary
diseases of life to which the general publ'c is equally exposed outside of
employment; that therefore a so-called ordinary disease might
very well be occupational if it meets the other requirements of
the definition and if it can be shown that the general public was
not equally exposed outside of the employment to the particu-
lar disease under consideration. "17
Then, after extensively reviewing the authorities and the medi-
cal evidence regarding the "superinfection" aspects of prolonged
616 (1946) (quoting Glodenis v. American Brass Co., 118 Conn. 29, 40, 170 A. 146, 150
(1934)).
114. Id. at 222, 21 N.W.2d at 616 (quoting LeLenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 128 Conn.
499, 505, 24 A.2d 253, 256 (1942)).
115. Id. at 223, 21 N.W.2d at 616. The court further stated:
Applicable here is what the Supreme Court of the United States recently said:
"The policy as well as the letter of the law is a guide to decision," and the process
of interpretation "misses its high function if a strict reading of a law results in the
emasculation or deletion of a provision which a less literal reading would pre-
serve."
Id. (quoting Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404, 409 (1945)).
116. 250 Minn. 220, 84 N.W.2d 606 (1957).
117. Id. at 226, 84 N.W.2d at 610 (emphasis in original).
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exposure in enclosed spaces," 8 the court found the situation to
square with the definition's causation and peculiarity require-
ments:
Here the conditions of the employment proximately caused
Gray to become infected with tuberculosis and therefore his dis-
ease was under the circumstances and in fact a natural incident
of his employment. It was the special work environment differ-
ing from the ordinary exposure on the part of policemen
wherein lay a hazard of contracting the disease far in excess of
the hazard to which the ordinary policeman employee may be
exposed. Since we think that this was a hazard distinguishable
in character from the general run of occupations or that of the
policeman ordinarily, therefore officer Gray's tuberculosis as
contracted was in fact "peculiar to his occupation." '"19
The court addressed the argument that its construction left no
sound reason for the enactment of Minnesota Statutes section
251.051, providing compensation for tuberculosis contracted by a
police officer "whose duties within the scope of his employment as
a police officer bring him in contact or did bring him in contact
with persons afflicted with tuberculosis,"'' 20 after the facts of Gray
arose, by saying:
The fact that the foregoing provision was enacted. . . is not
controlling of the decision law in this state which holds that it is
not required that a disease to be within the definition of an
occupational disease should be one which arises solely out of
the particular kind of employment in which the employee is
engaged, but that it is enough if it is due to causes in excess of
the ordinary hazards of that particular kind of employment.' 2 1
The Gray court also spoke generally of the occupational disease
118. See id. at 232, 84 N.W.2d at 614.
119. Id. at 234, 84 N.W.2d at 615.
120. Act of Apr. 5, 1955, ch. 240, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws 500, 500 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 251.051 (1978)); cf. MINN. STAT. § 251.041 (1978) (derived from Act of Apr. 28,
1947, ch. 616, § 1, 1947 Minn. Laws 1116) (providing similarly for certain publicly em-
ployed nurses and institutional employees). Regarding the operation of the latter provi-
sion, see Peterson v. State, 234 Minn. 81, 47 N.W.2d 760 (1951), overruledon othergrounds,
Kalmes v. Kahler Corp., 258 Minn. 105, 103 N.W.2d 203 (1960).
121. 250 Minn. at 235, 84 N.W.2d at 616. It is not apparent why the court here and in
the previous quotation seemingly construed the words in the first sentence of the defini-
tion, "due to causes in excess of the hazards ordinary of employment," to require hazards
exceeding those ordinary for claimant's particular kind of employment, as opposed to
hazards exceeding those that are ordinary for all types of employment in general. If the
Legislature had meant that, it would have referred to "hazards ordinary of the employ-
ment." Cf Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 316, 101 N.W.2d 200, 203 (1960) ("due
to causes in excess of the hazards of that employment") (emphasis added).
[Vol. 6
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definition, adopting a three-part formulation that had been urged
by one of the parties in Sandy:1
22
The purpose and intent of the legislature must have been to
liberalize the approach in consideration of occupational dis-
eases intending to cover those (1) arising out of the employ-
ment, (2) where there is found to be a direct causal connection
between the conditions under which the work is performed and
the disease, and (3) that if the disease follows as a natural inci-
dent of the work and as a result of the exposure occasioned by
the nature of the employment, it may be classed as an occupa-
tional disease.
. . . [W]e think it clear that the legislature has been in ac-
cord with this court's interpretation of the occupational disease
provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Law as announced
both in the Hunter and Sandy cases which provide and estab-
lish a liberal construction of those provisions. Legislative acqui-
escence therein has resulted in constituting our present
occupational disease provision free from further amendments
since the advent of the Hunter and Sandy cases.1
23
122. See Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. at 220, 21 N.W.2d at
615.
123. Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. at 234-35, 84 N.W.2d at 615-16. Compare id
with MINN. STAT. § 645.17(4) (1978) (derived from Act of Apr. 28, 1941, ch. 492, § 17,
1941 Minn. Laws 907, 912), which provides:
In ascertaining the intention of the legislature the courts may be guided' by
the following presumptions:
(4) When a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the
legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same con-
struction to be placed upon such language ....
Even before section 645.17(4)'s enactment, the court had held that the Legislature's reen-
actment of language construed by the court adopted the court's construction even though
there was "little room for doubt that the construction diametrically opposed the purpose
of the lawmakers." See Carmody v. City of St. Paul, 207 Minn. 419, 423-25, 291 N.W.
895, 897-98 (1940) (reenactment of key language in section 176.135(1) adopted court's
construction regarding employee's right to select doctor); cf McCourtie v. United States
Steel Corp., 253 Minn. 501, 510, 93 N.W.2d 552, 559 (1958) (Legislature's 1953 reenact-
ment of language in section 176.061(4) manifested intent that court's "common activities
of the employees test" be applied). See also MINN. STAT. § 482.09(10) (1978) (derived from
Act of Mar. 1, 1957, ch. 65, § 1, 1957 Minn. Laws 78, as amended by Act of Apr. 24, 1959,
ch. 579, § 3, 1959 Minn. Laws 934, as amended by Act of Apr. 9, 1974, ch. 406, § 73, 1974
Minn. Laws 747, 756), which provides:
[Tihe revisor of statutes, to the extent that personnel and availability of appro-
priations permit, shall:
(10) Report to the legislature by November 15 of each even numbered
year any statutory changes recommended or discussed or statutory deficiencies
noted in any opinion of the supreme court of Minnesota filed during the two-
year period immediately preceding September 30 of the year preceding the year
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Ten years after Gray, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided a
factually similar case, but reached a different result. In the 1967
case of Parle v. Henry Boos Dental Laboratories, Inc.,'124 the court held
as a matter of law that the disease was not an occupational disease.
The court reversed an award for tuberculosis contracted by associ-
ating with tuberculous co-workers in a large, well-ventilated labo-
ratory.1 25 Claimant associated with two of the co-workers only
sporadically--during coffee breaks, at lunch, and on the eleva-
tors-but she worked in the same area ten or twenty feet from a
third infected co-worker.1 2 6 The court first distinguished Gray as
follows:
Unlike the working conditions which confronted Officer Gray
which required that he be closely confined for long periods of
time in immediate proximity to an infected employee, Mrs. Os-
monson's work area was in a large well-ventilated laboratory
where she sat some distance from other employees. Her disabil-
ity resulted entirely from exposure to an infected employee and
was in no way connected with the hazards inherent in the em-
ployment. 1
27
Apparently not satisfied with thus distinguishing Gray, the court
proceeded to say:
Our decision in the Gray case reflects a solicitous legislative
concern for police officers because they are more likely to be
exposed to a stratum of society which is peculiarly susceptible
to disease than is the public generally. [Footnote: "Minn. St.
251.051."] The ruling in that case is limited to the unusual cir-
cumstances which there existed.1
28
It is hard to see how the Gray decision reflected a "solicitous
legislative concern for police officers" in light of the fact that sec-
tion 251.051 was enacted after Gray's facts arose.129 Furthermore,
the Gray court had to contend with the argument that enactment
of section 251.051 militated against the court holding the occupa-
tional disease definition applicable to Officer Gray.130 It is not ap-
in which the session is held, together with such comment as may be necessary to
outline clearly the legislative problem reported.
124. 278 Minn. 207, 153 N.W.2d 344 (1967).
125. Id. at 207-08, 153 N.W.2d at 344.
126. Id. at 208, 153 N.W.2d at 344.
127. Id. at 210, 153 N.W.2d at 346.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See notes 120-21 supra and accompanying text.
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parent why the Parle court gave such grudging treatment to the
Gray case decided only ten years earlier.
The nub of the Parle opinion was the following:
The facts of the instant case do not permit a finding that Mrs.
Osmonson's disability resulted from a disease "recognized as a
hazard characteristic of and peculiar to the trade," or from a
cause "in excess of the hazards ordinary of employment" within
the meaning of § 176.011, subd. 15. There was no evidence
that the nature of her duties or the conditions under which she
was required to work had any connection with her contracting
tuberculosis. Her disability resulted from an exposure which
might as readily have occurred outside of her employment. It
was not peculiar to her occupation.'
3'
Again, seeing the need for additional justification, the Parle
opinion quoted at length from a New York case 32 that denied
compensation on similar facts. The quotations included not only
statements such as, "No peculiarity of claimant's job induced the
disease or heightened the chance of infection,"'' 3 3 but statements
indicating that an occupational disease must result from "gener-
ally recognized hazards incident to a particular employment"' 34
and that the disease "must be one which is commonly regarded as
natural to, inhering in, an incident and concomitant of, the work
in question. There must be a recognizable link between the dis-
ease and some distinctive feature of the claimant's job, common to
all jobs of that sort."' 35 The Parle court stated that it found the
New York court's reasoning persuasive and reversed the award of
compensation. 136
The Parle court's result, and its distinguishing of the facts in
Gray,1 37 are appropriate but its embracing of the New York deci-
sion's language is questionable. The language indicating that the
hazard must be generally recognized or commonly regarded as an in-
cident of the employment is inconsistent with language from the
131. 278 Minn. at 210, 153 N.W.2d at 346.
132. Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., 298 N.Y. 285, 82 N.E.2d 785 (1948).
133. Parle v. Henry Boos Dental Laboratories, Inc., 278 Minn. at 211, 153 N.W.2d at
347 (quoting Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., 298 N.Y. 285, 288-90, 82 N.E.2d 785,
786-87 (1948)).
134. Id. (quoting Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., 298 N.Y. 285, 290, 82 N.E.2d
785, 788 (1948)).
135. Id. at 211, 153 N.W.2d at 346 (quoting Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., 298
N.Y. 285, 286, 82 N.E.2d 785, 786 (1948)).
136. See id. at 212, 153 N.W.2d at 347.
137. See text accompanying notes 127 and 131 supra.
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Connecticut case 138 quoted with approval in Hunter, Sandy, and
Cray,' 3 9 inconsistent with some of the Minnesota court's results, 14 °
and unwarranted by the words of Minnesota's occupational dis-
ease definition. 141 The language requiring the disease to be linked
with a feature of the claimant's job that is "common to all jobs of
that sort" is inconsistent with Sandy's result, in that exposure to
spun glass insulation dust was by no means common to all machin-
ists. 142
Finally, a 1975 compensation court 14 3 decision provides some
further elaboration upon the occupational disease definition. In
FehIt'ng v. Dayton Rogers Manufacturing Co., 1 4 4 the compensation
court held that an employee's hearing loss from factory noise was
an occupational disease so that time for notice of the claim was
governed by the two-year (now three-year) occupational disease,
45
rather than the ninety-day (now 180-day) personal injury provi-
138. LeLenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 128 Conn. 499, 505, 24 A.2d 253, 256 (1942).
According to the Connecticut court:
There is nothing in the terms of our statutory definition of an occupational dis-
ease which suggests that to fall within it a disease must be one which is a usual or
generally recognized incident of the employment . . . . Further, occupational
diseases ordinarily incapacitate only a small proportion of the employees sub-
jected to the risk and if this were not so economic considerations would require a
change in conditions to obviate the risk or an abandonment of the employment.
Id.
139. See note 114 supra; notes 206-07 infra and accompanying text.
140. See notes 212-14 rnfia and accompanying text.
141. See note 205 thfa and accompanying text.
142. For further discussion, see notes 163-75 infra and accompanying text.
143. "Compensation court" is used throughout this Article to refer to the entity de-
nominated "Industrial Commission" from 1921 to 1967, "Workmen's Compensation
Commission" from 1967 to 1975, "Workers' Compensation Board" from 1975 to 1976, and
"Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals" from 1976 to present. See Act of Mar. 15,
1921, ch. 82, § 66, 1921 Minn. Laws 90, 126 ("Industrial Commission"); Act of May 27,
1967, ch. 1, § 7, 1967 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1991, 1993 ("Workmen's Compensation Com-
mission"); Act of June 2, 1975, ch. 271, § 3, 1975 Minn. Laws 742, 746 ("board"); Act of
June 4, 1975, ch. 359, § 23, 1975 Minn. Laws 1168, 1189 ("workers' "); Act of Apr. 3, 1976,
ch. 134, § 78, 1976 Minn. Laws 316, 345 ("Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals")
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.011, subd. 6(1) (1978)).
144. 28 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 35 (1975).
145. See MINN. STAT. § 176.151(4) (1978), which provides:
In the case of injury caused by x-rays, radium, radioactive substances or
machines, ionizing radiation, or any other occupational disease, the time limitations
otherwise prescribed by Minnesota Statutes 1961, Chapter 176, and the acts
amendatory thereof, shall not apply, but the employee shall give notice to the
employer and commence his action within three years after the employee has
knowledge of the cause of such injury and the injury has resulted in disability.
Id. (emphasis added) (The period was extended from two to three years by Act of June 4,
1975, ch. 359, § 17(2d), 1975 Minn. Laws 1168, 1186.).
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sion. 146  Fehhng quoted the occupational disease definition and
said:
Thus, from the statute itself, we see that one of the characteris-
tics common to "occupational disease" is that it is peculiar to
the occupation. Another common element is that an occupa-
tional disease is something that naturally and reasonably can
be expected to result to the employee in that type of employ-
ment. And as a corollary, all of the employees within the same
environment are generally equally exposed to the same hazard.
Also, any occupational disease is generally something that de-
velops gradually over a long period of time instead of suddenly
and violently ...
[A]lthough counsel for the insurer argues that occupational
hearing loss occurring over a long period of time constitutes a
personal injury because of the constant trauma effected by the
continuing noise waves, it is clear that occupational loss of
hearing has most of the characteristics listed, supra, for disease
and more logically falls within that classification. 47
Although these cases construing the occupational disease defini-
tion do not engage in detailed analysis of the statute's various pro-
visions, some insight into the meaning of occupational disease is
provided. By applying the- definition to the facts and circum-
146. See MINN. STAT. § 176.141 (Supp. 1979), which provides:
Unless the employer has actual knowledge of the occurrence of the injury or
unless the injured worker, or the dependent or someone in behalf of either, gives
written notice thereof to the employer within 14 days after the occurrence of the
injury, then no compensation shall be due until notice is given or knowledge
obtained. If the notice is given or the knowledge obtained within 30 days from
the occurrence of the injury, no want, failure, or inaccuracy of a notice shall be a
bar to obtaining compensation unless the employer shows that he was prejudiced
by such want, defect, or inaccuracy, and then only to the extent of the prejudice.
If the notice is given or the knowledge obtained within 180 days, and if the
employee or other beneficiary shows that his failure to give prior notice was due
to his mistake, inadvertence, ignorance of fact or law, or inability, or to the
fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit of the employer or agent, then compensation
may be allowed, unless the employer shows that he was prejudiced by failure to
receive the notice, in which case the amount of compensation shall be reduced
by a sum which fairly represents the prejudice shown. Unless knowledge is ob-
tained or written notice given within 180 days after the occurrence of the injury
no compensation shall be allowed, except that an employee who is unable, be-
cause of mental or physical incapacity, to give notice to the employer within 180
days from the injury shall give the prescribed notice within 180 days from the
time the incapacity ceases.
Id. (The period was extended from 90 to 180 days by Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 342, § 19,
1977 Minn. Laws 697, 711, and the exception in the last sentence was added by Act of
June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 47, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1256, 1286.).
147. Fehling v. Dayton Rogers Mfg. Co., 28 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 38 (cita-
tions and footnotes omitted).
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stances involved in each case, the court gives some idea of what is a
compensable occupational disease. The cases are clarified further
when their effects are examined in the following detailed consider-
ation of the statute.
C Analysis of the Occupational Disease Defnition
With sentences and clauses enumerated, the definition looks like
this:
(1) "Occupational disease"
(a) means a disease
(i) arising out of and in the course of employment
peculiar to the occupation in which the em-
ployee is engaged and
(ii) due to causes in excess of the hazards ordinary
of employment and
(b) shall include undulant fever.
(2) Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is
equally exposed outside of employment are not compensa-
ble, except
(a) where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupa-
tional disease, or
(b) where the exposure peculiar to the occupation makes
the disease an occupational disease hazard.
(3) A disease arises out of the employment only
(a) if there be a direct causal connection between the
conditions under which the work is performed 48 and
(b) if the occupational 149 disease follows as a natural in-
cident of the work as a result of the exposure occa-
sioned by the nature of the employment.
148. It seems the words "and the disease" should have been included at this point.
This was suggested by the employee in Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221
Minn. 215, 220, 21 N.W.2d 612, 615 (1946), and the court so construed this provision in
Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. 220, 234, 84 N.W.2d 606, 615 (1957). The fact that
the statute is grammatically improper, or missing necessary words, however, does not
mean that the definition is without force and cannot be applied. See MINN. STAT.
§ 645.18 (Supp. 1979):
Grammatical errors shall not vitiate a law. A transposition of words and
clauses may be resorted to when a sentence is without a meaning as it stands.
Words and phrases which may be necessary to the proper interpretation of a law
and which do not conflict with its obvious purpose and intent nor in any way
affect its scope and operation may be added in the construction thereof.
149. It seems the word "occupational" should not have been included at this point. It
is not included in the formulation discussed in Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. 220,
234, 84 N.W.2d 606, 615 (1957).
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(4) An employer is not liable for compensation for any occu-
pational1 50 disease
(a) which
(i) cannot be traced to the employment as a direct
and proximate cause and
(ii) is not recognized as a hazard characteristic of
and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process,
or employment or
(b) which results from a hazard to which the worker
would have been equally exposed outside of the em-
ployment. 
15'
Apart from part (1)(a)(i)'s "in the course of employment" re-
quirement, 1 5 2 part (1)(b)'s curious reference to undulant fever,
15 3
and part (2) (a)'s coverage of ordinary diseases of life that follow as
an incident of an occupational disease, 154 all the definition really
says is that a disease is an occupational disease if (1) the employ-




It seems fair to read the definition as requiring "the employ-
150. Query whether the word "occupational" should have been included at this point.
151. The above is a quotation of Minnesota's occupational disease definition, MINN.
STAT. § 176.011(15) (1978 & Supp. 1979), with the sentences broken up into paragraphs
and subparagraphs, each numbered separately. Subsequent references in this Article to
specific "parts" of the definition will refer to this organization, for example, part (1)(a)(i).
This will enable the reader to identify that portion of the definition being discussed by the
author in the following pages of this Article.
152. There is not a requirement in the occupational disease definition, as there is in the
"personal injury" definition, that the employee be "engaged in, on, or about the premises
where his services require his presence as a part of such service at the time of the injury
and during the hours of such service." MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1978).
153. See note 95 supra.
154. Many other states' statutes also allow compensation for ordinary diseases of life
that follow as an incident of an occupational disease. See IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-10(a)
(Burns 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.067(1) (Vernon 1965); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980) (adds "or 'injury' "); VA. CODE § 65.1-46
(1973); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978); cf. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8)(a) (1960 &
Supp. 1979) (adds "and in its inception is caused by a hazard to which an employee is
subjected in the course of his employment"); S.C. CODE § 42-11-10 (1977) ("as a comphsa-
tion and a natural incident") (emphasis added). See generally 1 A. LARSON, supra note 18,
§§ 13.00-.11 (1978) (employer liability for subsequent effects of compensable injury).
155. Compare the three-part formulations adopted by the court in Hunter v. Zenith
Dredge Co., 220 Minn. 318, 330-31, 19 N.W.2d 795, 801 (1945) and Gray v. City of St.
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ment" to increase the risk of and proximately cause the disease. 156
The statute's other references-"occupation,"' 157 "trade,"'' 58 and
"process"'' 59 -seem identical in meaning, and the words "the condi-
lions under which the work is performed"' 160 or "the nature of the
employment"'16' really are no more restrictive than the term "em-
ployment."1
62
The cases show that the focus should be upon the employee's
particular employment, with all of its conditions and incidents, not
upon broad occupational categories. For example, when a ma-
chinist contracted dermatitis, the focus was not upon machinists in
general, but upon a ship machinist working in areas where there
was a great amount of spun glass dust from insulation. 16 3 Simi-
larly, when an electrical maintenance worker contracted ischemic
neuritis, the focus was not upon electrical maintenance workers in
general, but upon one who had to work standing in cold water
during a flood. 164 In fact, in the latter case the only medical expert
testified, "It is not an occupational disorder. You do not find it
ordinarily in electricians."' 65  Nevertheless, compensation was
given on the basis of his further testimony that "the probable
cause was this working in cold waters, and having his feet con-
stantly cold during the period of his working day after day.'
66
Unfortunately, the Minnesota court in Parle v. Henor Boos Dental
Laboratories, Inc. 16 7 introduced confusion into this area by quoting
with approval language from a New York case that included the
statement, "There must be a recognizable link between the disease
and some distinctive feature of the claimant's job, common to alljobs
156. See parts (3)(b), (4)(a)(i), (4)(b). In addition, (1)(a)(i), (2), and (4)(a)(ii), all spec-
ify "employment."
157. See parts (l)(a)(i), (2)(b), and (4)(a)(ii).
158. See part (4)(a)(ii).
159. See id.
160. See part (3)(a) (emphasis added).
161. See part (3)(b) (emphasis added).
162. See notes 215-21 infa and accompanying text.
163. See Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 21 N.W.2d 612
(1946). The court said, "The mere fact that [employee] . . . did not contribute to the
production of the irritating material and did not actually work upon it does not negative
[employer's] . . . liability under the compensation act to compensate him for the disability
thus incurred." Id. at 221, 21 N.W.2d at 615-16.
164. Sinclair v. Frye, 18 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 93 (1954).
165. Id. at 96.
166. Id.
167. 278 Minn. 207, 153 N.W.2d 344 (1967).
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ofthat sort."'168 This language indicates that a relationship between
the disease and all similar jobs, rather than the individual worker's
specific job, will be required. This statement was not crucial to the
holding in either Parle or the New York case, both of which in-
volved contraction of tuberculosis from a coemployee in a large,
well-ventilated workplace. 69 As the Parle court noted, contraction
of the disease "might as readily have occurred outside [claimant's]
employment."'' 70 This consideration alone justified reversing the
compensation award in Parle.
But the statement was picked up and utilized by the compensa-
tion court in a case 17' in which it was crucial (albeit only on the
issue of reimbursing the employer from the special fund 72). In
Atkins v. Page Bros.,173 a business manager who suffered a heart
attack as a result of job stress was found not be have contracted an
occupational disease. The compensation court reasoned:
[W]e can find no "recognizable link between the disease and
some distinctive feature of the claimant's job, common to alljobs of
that sort." . . The alleged "link" was the stress of the job on
Atkins because of the failure of the business. This stress, how-
ever, was not common to all jobs of that sort except insofar as it
may be common to all jobs of all sorts.
174
168. Id. at 211, 153 N.W.2d at 346 (quoting Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., 298
N.Y. 285, 288, 82 N.E.2d 785, 786 (1946)) (emphasis added).
169. Compare Parle v. Henry Boos Dental Laboratories, Inc., 278 Minn. 207, 208, 153
N.W.2d 344, 344-45 (1967) with Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., 298 N.Y. 285, 287,
82 N.E.2d 785, 785 (1948).
170. 278 Minn. at 210, 153 N.W.2d at 346.
171. Atkins v. Page Bros., 24 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 503, 507 (1968).
172. See MINN. STAT. § 176.131 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
Under a former statute, special fund reimbursement was barred for occupational dis-
ease. Act of May 6, 1965, ch. 327, § 1(7), 1965 Minn. Laws 463, 464, provided, "Under
subdivisions I and 2, occupational disease shall not be deemed to be the personal (second)
injury." In 1973, this was amended to provide:
Under subdivisions 1 and 2, an occupational disease may be deemed to be
the personal (second) injury.
If the subsequent disability for which reimbursement is claimed is an occu-
pational disease, and if, subsequent to registration as provided by subdivisions 4
and 5, the employee has been employed by the employer in employment similar
to that which initially resulted in such occupational disease, no reimbursement
shall be paid to the employer.
Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 643, § 8, 1973 Minn. Laws 1591, 1591 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 176.131(7) (1978)).
In Atkins, compensability was conceded, see 24 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. at 504,
and the employee was found to have suffered a "personal injury." Id. at 507-08.
173. 24 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 503 (1968).
174. Id. at 507 (emphasis added). The compensation court distinguished compensa-
tion for firemen's coronary sclerosis (covered by the presumption discussed at notes 52-59
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This reasoning clearly conflicts with the approach of other Min-
nesota Supreme Court and compensation court decisions. The
compensation court in Atkins should have focused upon the partic-
ular conditions and incidents of Atkins' job, rather than rejecting
compensability on the basis that severe stress was not common to
all business managers. The Atkins approach would deny recovery
to an employee whose special assignment exposed him to ex-
trahazardous conditions unusual in the industry. 75 Atkins is an
anomaly among Minnesota decisions and should not be followed.
2. Increased Risk
The definition of occupational disease insists that the employ-
ment "increase the risk" of the disease by requiring:
(1) the disease to arise out of employment, 176
(2) the disease to be "peculiar to the occupation in which the
employee is engaged,"'
1 7 7
(3) the disease to be "due to causes in excess of the hazards
ordinary of employment,"
1 78
(4) an ordinary disease of life to which the general public is
equally exposed outside of employment to be from an "expo-
sure peculiar to the occupation,"' 179
supra; notes 443-59 tfra and accompanying text) on the ground that elements of emo-
tional and physical stress in the work of a fireman "are common to all firemen." Id. at 505
(emphasis in original).
175. Cf. Reierson v. Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc., 287 Minn. 179, 177 N.W.2d 301
(1970), in which the court upheld compensation for dermatomyositis, a disease "character-
ized by muscular weakness with a nonspecific eczematous skin eruption or urticaria." Id.
at 181, 177 N.W.2d at 303. The court upheld a finding that claimant contracted this
disease while cleaning a pit area that contained various types of grain and dust, dirt, dead
rats and mice, poisons, and other debris accumulated over many years. Id. at 180-83, 177
N.W.2d at 302-04. The place was so filthy employees could only work there for two hours
and had to come out from time to time. Id. at 180, 177 N.W.2d at 302.
176. See part (1)(a)(i).
In Minnesota, the "arising out of" requirement in the definition of "personal injury,"
MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1978), must be satisfied under either the increased-risk test or
the street-risk doctrine. See Auman v. Breckenridge Tel. Co., 188 Minn. 256, 259-60, 246
N.W. 889, 890 (1933). Diseases would not seem to fit under the street-risk doctrine as
"originating upon," "connected with," or "referable to the use of public ways." Se id.; I
A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 9.50 (1978).
177. See part (l)(a)(i).
178. See part (1)(a)(ii).
179. The Minnesota definition of "ordinary diseases of life" is much more liberal than
that of most other states with provisions specifically referring to such diseases. Apart from
when that kind of disease follows "as an incident of an occupational disease," see note 154
supra, most of those states purport to exclude absolutely "ordinary diseases of life to which
the general public is exposed." See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1314(a)(5)(iii) (1976); GA.
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(5) the disease to be "recognized as a hazard characteristic of
and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employ-
ment,"' 180 and
(6) the disease to result otherwise than "from a hazard to
which the worker would have been equally exposed outside of
the employment." 18'
CODE ANN. § 114-803 (1973); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-10(a) (Burns 1974) (adds "outside
of the employment"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-5a01(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979) ("[o]rdinary dis-
eases of life and conditions to which the general public is or may be exposed outside of the
particular employment") (emphasis added); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.067(1) (Vernon 1965)
(adds "outside of the employment"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(3) (1978); N.D. CEr.
CODE § 65-01-02(8)(a) (1960 & Supp. 1979) (same); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306,
§ 20 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (same); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978) (same); cf. ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23-901(9)(c) (Supp. 1971-1979) (omits "of life"); VA. CODE § 65.1-46 (1973)
(excludes except when disease is infectious or contagious disease contracted in course of
hospital, sanitarium, or public health laboratory employment).
Several states, however, accord with Minnesota in referring to ordinary diseases of life
to which the general public is equally exposed outside of employment. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-53(13) (1979); S.C. CODE § 42-11-10(4) (1977). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 418.401(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) ("[o]rdinary diseases of life to which the public is
generally exposed outside of the employment") (emphasis added).
Several states have provisions similar to part (2)(b)'s exception to the ordinary disease
of life exclusion "where the exposure peculiar to the occupation makes the disease an
occupational disease hazard." See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.151(2) (West 1966 & Cum.
Supp. 1980) (when "the incidence of the disease is substantially higher in the particular
trade, occupation, process, or employment than for the general public"); S.C. CODE § 42-
11-10(4) (1977) (when "there is a constant exposure peculiar to the occupation itself which
makes such disease a hazard inherent in such occupation").
Several states refer specifically to contagious, infectious, or communicable diseases.
See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1314(a)(5)(ii) (1976) (excludes "contagious or infectious dis-
ease, unless contracted in the course of employment in, or immediate connection with, a
hospital or sanitorium in which persons suffering from such disease are cared for or
treated"); S.C. CODE § 42-11-10 (1977) (excludes "contagious disease resulting from expo-
sure to fellow employees or from a hazard to whieh the workman would have been equally
exposed outside of his employment"); WYo. STAT. § 27-12-102(a)(xii) (1977) (excludes
"communicable disease unless the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the nature
of the employment"). See generally Note, Occupational Diseases and the Hospital Employee-A
Survey, 5 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REV. 368 (1975), repr tedin 3 WORKMEN'S COMP. L. REV.
443 (1976), wherein it is asserted:
The cases . . . reveal that the courts have been unable to divorce the "increased
risk" test from the ordinary diseases of life exclusion. Thus, if the risk of con-
tracting the disease is greater than that to which the general public is subjected,
and the causation is reasonably certain, the court most probably will hold the
disease compensable.
Id. at 372 (footnote omitted) (citing W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LrrLE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 275 (1974)), reprinted in 3 WORKMEN'S
COMP. L. REV. 443, 447 (1976).
180. See part (4)(a)(ii).
181. See part (4)(b).
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a. "Pecul'ar"
It might be contended that the definition adopts a standard
more stringent than "increased risk" by requiring that a compen-
sable disease be "pecul'ar to the occupation in which the employee
is engaged," 18 2 or result from an exposure "pecuhar to the occupa-
tion" if it is an ordinary disease of life to which the general public
is equally exposed outside of employment. 83 Thus, Professor Lar-
182. Part (l)(a)(i) (emphasis added); see part (4)(a)(ii) (must be "recognized as a haz-
ard characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment"), di-
cussed in notes 205-14 in7fa and accompanying text.
Many other states' provisions require either the disease or something about it to be
"peculiar" to the occupation. A few of these join Minnesota in requiring this of the "dis-
ease." See ALA. CODE § 25-5-110(1) (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-275(10) (West
1972 & Cum. Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-33 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4123.68(BB) (Page 1973 & Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1208(n) (Purdon Cum.
Supp. 1980-1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-8-1(4) (1978).
Most of these states require the disease to be due to "causes and conditions" charac-
teristic of and peculiar to the particular trade, occupation, process, or employment. See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-901(9)(c) (Supp. 1971-1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.151(2)
(West 1966 & Cum. Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-803 (1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:1031.1(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(3) (1978); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-34-1(c) (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1002 (1967); cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 418.401 (c) (Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) ("due to causes and conditions which are char-
acteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 281:2(V) (Supp. 1979) ("due to causes and conditions characteristic of, and peculiar to,
the particular trade, occupation or employment"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1979)
(substantially same). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-31 (West 1959) ("due to causes and
conditions which are or were characteristic of or peculiar to a particular trade, occupation,
process or employment, or which diseases are due lo the exposure of any employee io a cause thereof
arising out of and in the course of his employment" (emphasis added)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85,
§ 3(10) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) ("due to causes or conditions characteristic of or
peculiar to the particular trade, occupation, process or employment" (emphasis added)).
Several states require "hazards" of the disease to be characteristic of and peculiar to
the trade, occupation, process, or employment. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1314(a)(7)
(1976); IDAHO CODE § 72-102(17)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979); cf KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-
5a01(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979) ("peculiar hazard" of the disease must be attached to the
occupation, trade or employment).
South Carolina excepts from its ordinary disease of life exclusion if "there is a con-
stant exposure peculiar to the occupation itself which makes such disease a hazard inher-
ent in such occupation." S.C. CODE § 42-11-10(4) (1977).
183. Part (2)(b). This requirement is almost illusory, inasmuch as the provision only
excludes ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equaly exposed outside of
employment. See Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. 220, 84 N.W.2d 606 (1957). The
Gray court agreed with the claimant's contention that the law does not exclude
ordinary diseases of life, but only ordinary diseases of life to which thegeneralpubli
ir equally exposed outside of employment; that therefore a so-called ordinary disease
might very well be occupational if it meets the other requirements of the defini-
tion and if it can be shown that the general public was not equally exposed
outside of the employment to the particular disease under consideration.
Id. at 226, 84 N.W.2d at 610 (emphasis in original).
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son refers to the "peculiar-risk doctrine, which in the early dawn of
American compensation law was . . .the dominant rule" for de-
termining whether an injury arose out of employment, 84 as being
stricter than the increased-risk doctrine. Under the peculiar-risk
doctrine:
the claimant had to show that the source of the harm was in its
nature peculiar to his occupation. Accordingly, even if his
work subjected him to a tremendously increased quantitative
risk of injury by heat, or cold, or lightning, the claimant might
be turned away with the comment that "everyone is subject to
the same weather."18
By contrast, under the increased-risk doctrine, "the distinctiveness
of the employment risk can be contributed by the increased quanti-
ty of a risk that is quah'tatvely not peculiar to the employment."'
8 6
But "peculiar" need not be interpreted in a strict fashion. It
may be interpreted to mean that the risk of disease merely must be
"increased" by rather than "unique" to the occupation. The rele-
vant dictionary definitions of "peculiar"'' 87 show such an interpre-
tation is permissible.
Indeed, the Minnesota court seemingly equated "peculiar" risk
with "increased" risk in an injury case when it said:
Relators assert that respondent's injuries did not arise out of
the employment on the further ground that the hazard from
which the accident resulted was not "peculiar to the work," but
was "common to the neighborhood." . . . Caution must be
used in applying the words "peculiar to the work" so that they
do not become a mere verbal shield against liability. . . . A
hazard which is common to the neighborhood may nevertheless
become so localized and peculiar to the place and nature of the
employment that an employe is necessarily exposed to a differ-
ent and greater risk than if he had been pursuing his ordinary
personal affairs, and as a result any injury sustained therefrom
184. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 6.20 (1978).
Minnesota appears never to have embraced the peculiar-risk approach. See State ax
rel. Peoples Coal & Ice Co. v. District Court, 129 Minn. 502, 504, 153 N.W. 119, 119
(1915) (injury "need not ... be one peculiar to the particular employment").
185. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 6.20 (1978).
186. Id. § 6.30 (emphasis in original).
187. "[Blelonging exclusively or esp. to a person or group, .. tending to be characteris-
tic of one only: DISTINCTIVE,. .. different from the usual or normal: SINGLE, SPE-
CIAL, PARTICULAR ...... WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1663 (1976) (emphasis added).
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is incidental to the employment and compensable.' 8 8
"Peculiar" should be construed as referring to a risk "increased"
by the employment rather than a risk "unique" to the employ-
ment. Probably no disease is unique to a particular occupation,
and almost certainly no occupation involves a unique exposure to
an ordinary disease of life. Accordingly, the Legislature could not
have intended "peculiar" to mean "unique" in this context.189
Construing "peculiar" to refer to a risk "increased" by rather
than "unique" to the occupation avoids the conflict that otherwise
would exist between the requirements that the disease be peculiar
to the occupation and, in the case of an ordinary disease of life,
that the exposure be peculiar to the occupation.' 90 The risk of a
disease would be "increased" by the occupation if the exposure
was "peculiar" to (increased by) the occupation.
Thus, on several occasions the Minnesota court, like a number
of other state courts,i 9i has quoted the following from a Connecti-
cut case:
The phrase, "peculiar to the occupation," is not here used in
the sense that the disease must be one which originates exclu-
sively from the particular kind of employment in which the em-
ployee is engaged, but rather in the sense that the conditions of
that employment must result in a hazard which distinguishes it
in character from the general run of occupations .... 192
188. Olson v. Trinity Lodge No. 282, A.F. & A.M., 226 Minn. 141, 147, 32 N.W.2d
255, 259 (1948).
189. See MINN. STAT. § 645.17 (1978), which provides in part:
In ascertaining the intention of the legislature the courts may be guided by
the following presumptions:
(1) The legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of
execution, or unreasonable;
(2) The legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain
190. See MINN. STAT. § 645.26(1) (1978), which provides in part, "When a general
provision in a law is in conflict with a special provision in the same or another law, the two
shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both."
191. See, e.g., Bowman v. Twin Falls Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 312, 323, 581 P.2d 770, 781
(1978); Underwood v. National Motor Castings Div., 329 Mich. 273, 276, 45 N.W.2d 286,
287 (1951); Herrera v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 89 N.M. 245, 247, 550 P.2d 144, 146 (Ct. App.
1976); Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 473, 256 S.E.2d 189, 199 (1979);
State ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Krise, 42 Ohio St. 2d 247, 252, 327 N.E.2d 756, 759-60
(1975); cf. Young v. City of Huntsville, 342 So. 2d 918, 922 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (last part
of sentence); Ritter v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 178 Neb. 792, 794-95, 135 N.W.2d 470,
472 (1965) (paraphrase).
192. Glodenis v. American Brass Co., 118 Conn. 29, 40, 170 A. 146, 150 (1934) (quoted
with approval in Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. 220, 227, 84 N.W.2d 606, 611
(1957), Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 222, 21 N.W.2d 612,
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Professor Larson agrees that "peculiar" should not be construed to
mean "unique"'-in fact he calls it "a preposterous distortion of
the concept of occupational disease" to require a showing that the
disease is not found in other industries and occupations.
193
Minnesota case law supports Professor Larson's conclusion by
finding occupational disease coverage for diseases that plainly
were not uni'que to the employment-bursitis or synovitis suffered
by a "slagger,"' 194 dermatitis suffered by a machinist, 95 ischemic
neuritis suffered by an electrical maintenance man, 196 carpal tun-
nel syndrome suffered by a carpet layer, 97 and pulmonary emphy-
sema suffered by an auto dealer's car starter. 9198
Accordingly, the Alaska court correctly equated "peculiar" risk
with "increased" risk, saying, "these conditions were peculiar to
her employment-that is, the risk of her contracting contact der-
matitis was present to a greater degree than is found in employ-
ment and living conditions in general.'
99
The Alaska court's interpretation of "peculiar" is consistent with
Gillette v. Harold, Inc.,200 in which the Minnesota court, upholding
"personal injury"20' coverage for a sales clerk's aggravation202 of her
616 (1946), and Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co., 220 Minn. 318, 332, 19 N.W.2d 795, 802
(1945)).
193. lB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 41.33, at 7-369 n.38.
194. See Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co., 220 Minn. 318, 19 N.W.2d 795 (1945). "The
medical experts . . . testified that the disease was peculiar to any occupation wherein ei-
ther the knees or the elbows of a worker were required to come in constant contact with
cold, hard surfaces .... ." Id. at 331, 19 N.W.2d at 802 (emphasis added).
195. See Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 216, 21 N.W.2d
612, 613 (1946) (disease resulted from working in an area where there was a great deal of
spun glass dust from insulation installed by others).
196. See Sinclair v. Frye, 18 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 93, 94 (1954) (working in
cold water during a flood).
197. See Jensen v. Kronick's Floor Covering Serv., 309 Minn. 541, 542, 245 N.W.2d
230, 231 (1976) (per curiam) (repetitive minute trauma).
198. Scott v. Southview Chevrolet Co., 267 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1978) (exhaust
fumes).
199. Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769, 778 (Alaska 1966); see Note, supra note
16, at 79 n.13, in which it is stated:
The courts have described occupational diseases as those that are "incident to,"
. . . or "normally peculiar to,"... the occupation or employment. This is the
practical equivalent of saying that the disease must be the result of an increased
risk from the particular type of employment, but it does not mean that the dis-
ease must be one which originates exclusively from the particular kind of em-
ployment in which the employee is engaged.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
200. 257 Minn. 313, 101 N.W.2d 200 (1960).
201. See MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1978).
202. Aggravation resulted from sales clerk duties requiring her "to be on her feet
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preexisting foot condition, -observed that the preexisting condition
was not an occupational disease because there was "nothing in the
record to sustain a finding that this condition is peculiar to the
occupation of a saleslady. ' 20 3 Since the underlying condition was
a deteriorative disorder and "no evidence" indicated that it "was
in any way caused by her employment," 20 4 there was a plain lack
of proof that risk of the underlying condition was "increased" by
the occupation.
b. "Recogn'zed" as Characteristic and Pecul'ar Hazard
One might argue that the definition uses a stricter standard
than increased risk by requiring the disease to be "recognized as a
hazard characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation,
process, or employment. ' 20 5 But this does not appear to be the
case.
First, it is noteworthy that the provision does not require the
disease to be generally recognized as a hazard characteristic of and
peculiar to the employment. Thus, in three cases20 6 the Minnesota
court quoted with approval language from a Connecticut decision
saying:
If. . . a disease is the natural result of conditions which are
inherent in the employment and which attach to that employ-
ment a risk of incurring it in excess of that attending employ-
ment in general, an award of compensation is not precluded
because the risk is one which has not become generally recog-
standing and walking most of the time," 257 Minn. at 314, 101 N.W.2d at 202, and requir-
ing her to be constantly on her feet at least seven hours in each workday, walking approxi-
mately 18 miles during an average workday. Id. at 323, 101 N.W.2d at 207.
203. Id. at 316, 101 N.W.2d at 203.
204. Id. at 314-15, 101 N.W.2d at 202.
205. See part (4)(a)(ii) (emphasis added).
The "peculiar" concept is discussed in notes 182-204 supra and accompanying text.
What is said there applies also to "characteristic of." As noted in the third and fourth
paragraphs of note 182 supra, a number of states' statutes require either the "causes and
conditions" producing the disease or the "hazards" of the disease to be "characteristic of
and peculiar to" the employment. Maine, which requires the disease to be "due to causes
and conditions which are characteristic of a particular trade, occupation, process or em-
ployment," ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39, § 183 (1978), seems to have the only provision which
uses the term "characteristic" unaccompanied by the term "peculiar."
Only two states join Minnesota in using the phrase, "caused by a hazard recognized
as peculiar to a particular trade, process, occupation or employment." See ALA. CODE
§ 25-5-10 (1975); S.C. CODE § 42-11-10 (1977).
206. Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. 220, 227-28, 84 N.W.2d 606, 611 (1957);
Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 222, 21 N.W.2d 612, 616
(1946); Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co., 220 Minn. 318, 333, 19 N.W.2d 795, 802-03 (1945).
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nized .... 207
In one of these Minnesota cases, 208 the court quoted with approval
additional language from the same Connecticut case:
We cannot import into the conception of occupational disease
under our law the element that the disease must be a usual or
generally recognized incident of the employment . . . . Occu-
pational diseases result ordinarily in incapacity in a relatively
small proportion of the number of employees subjected to the
risk; indeed, if this were not so, economic considerations would
require an abandonment of the employment or a change in its
conditions to obviate the risk.
209
Further, in two of the Minnesota cases, 2 10 the court indicated
that after-the-fact recognition of the hazard is sufficient, by quot-
ing with approval the following from the same Connecticut deci-
sion:
When we referred in [prior cases] to disease as being a "natu-
ral" incident of the employment, we used that word in the sense
that we have used it in defining proximate causation; . . . it
imports not a forward look to determine what risks should have
been foreseen, but a tracing back from the results to the circum-
stances out of which [the disease] sprang.
2 11
The cases' results bear this out by granting occupational disease
compensation although tuberculosis is not general/y recognized as a
207. LeLenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 128 Conn. 499, 505, 24 A.2d 253, 256 (1942). This
language was also quoted with approval in Samels v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 317
Mich. 149, 156, 26 N.W.2d 742, 745 (1947); cf. Stepnowski v. Specific Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 18 N.J. Super. 495, 499, 87 A.2d 546, 548 (1952) (last part of sentence quoted with
approval); Wright v. Wyoming State Training School, 71 Wyo. 173, 191, 255 P.2d 211,
218 (1953) (same).
208. Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co., 220 Minn. 318, 332-33, 19 N.W.2d 795, 802 (1945).
209. LeLenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 128 Conn. 499, 504, 24 A.2d 253, 256 (1942). This
language was also quoted with approval in Bowman v. Twin Falls Constr. Co., 99 Idaho
312, 323, 581 P.2d 770, 781 (1978); State exrel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Krise, 42 Ohio St. 2d
247, 250-51, 317 N.E.2d 756, 758 (1975); cf Samels v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 317
Mich. 149, 156, 26 N.W.2d 742, 745 (1947) (last sentence quoted with approval); Sandy v.
Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 222, 21 N.W.2d 612, 616 (1946) (first
sentence quoted with approval).
210. Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. 220, 227, 84 N.W.2d 606, 611 (1957); Hunter
v. Zenith Dredge Co., 220 Minn. 318, 333, 19 N.W.2d 795, 802 (1945).
211. LeLenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 128 Conn. 499, 505, 24 A.2d 253, 256 (1942).
The occupational disease provisions of thirteen states-Arizona, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vir-
ginia, and West Virginia--specify that the disease need not "have been foreseen or ex-
pected," and all of those except Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia further specify
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hazard characteristic of and peculiar to employment as a police
officer assigned to squad car duty,2 12 pulmonary emphysema is
certainly not generally recognized as a hazard characteristic of and
peculiar to employment as an auto dealer's car starter, 21 3 and
ischemic neuritis is not generally recognized as a hazard character-
istic of and peculiar to employment as an electrical maintenance
man working in cold water during a flood. 214
It is appropriate that this "recognition" requirement has not
been strictly interpreted and applied. It should not be construed
as requiring widespread recognition. After-the-fact recognition of
the disease as a hazard of the employment should be sufficient.
c. Increased Over What?
Under the increased-risk test applicable to "personal inju-
212. See Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. 220, 84 N.W. 2d 606 (1957). It should be
noted that Gray's facts arose prior to Act of Apr. 5, 1955, ch. 340, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws
500, 500 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 251.051 (1978)), providing compensation to police
officers contracting tuberculosis after their duties bring them in contract with persons af-
flicted with tuberculosis. Cf lB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 41.40, at 7-394 ("Ordinarily
one would not think of tuberculosis as an occupational disease of telephone operators.")
(referring to Mason v. Y.W.C.A., 271 A.D. 1042, 68 N.Y.S.2d 510, leave to appeal demed, 297
N.Y. 1037, 74 N.E.2d 486 (1947)). In Mason, compensation was awarded for tuberculosis
contracted from using the same telephone mouthpiece as a tuberculous co-worker.
213. See Scott v. Southview Chevrolet Co., 267 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1978).
214. See Sinclair v. Frye, 18 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 93 (1954). In fact, the sole
medical witness "testified that during his forty years of practice he had never come across
a case like [this]; but by elimination of all other known causes, he reached the diagnosis of
ischemic neuritis and established causal relationship with the work the man had been
doing in his employment." Id. at 96.
Other jurisdictions also find occupational disease coverage for diseases not generaly
recognized as hazards characteristic and peculiar to the employment. For example, in
Bowman v. Twin Falls Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 312, 322, 581 P.2d 770, 780 (1978), the court
ordered occupational disease compensation for pulmonary emphysema contributed to by
a road construction employee inhaling dust at work notwithstanding medical testimony
that "certainly we do not, with any impresswie degree, fred heaoy equipment operators routinely devel-
oping emphysema. It's not that common a problem with them." Id. (emphasis in original).
In Stepnowski v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 18 N.J. Super. 495, 87 A.2d 546
(1952), a finding of occupational disease coverage was upheld for a chemical plant
worker's "effemination" and impotency caused by inhaling and absorbing stilbestrol dust
particles containing female sex hormones "without regard to whether the risk of the dis-
ease was generally known." Id. at 499, 87 A.2d at 548.
In State ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Krise, 42 Ohio St. 2d 247, 254, 327 N.E.2d 756,
761 (1975), the court upheld occupational disease compensation for histoplasmosis con-
tracted by a telephone repairman because of work exposing him to frequent contact with
pigeon droppings and dead pigeons.
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ries,"215 the Minnesota Supreme Court has required the employ-
ment to increase the risk of injury beyond that confronted by the
public generally 2 16 or the employee apart from work.
217
The occupational disease definition, on the other hand, requires
the risk of disease to be increased beyond "hazards ordinary of
employment ' 21 8 and beyond hazards "to which the worker would
have been equally exposed outside of employment. '21 9 Further, in
regard to an ordinary disease of life, the worker's exposure to the
disease must be increased beyond that of "the general public...
outside of employment.
'220
The definition's specification of norms apparently will not make
its increased-risk approach operate differently from the judicially
created increased-risk test used for personal injuries. Since em-
ployments are so varied, "hazards ordinary of employment" is not
really a more demanding norm than requiring greater risk than
that faced by the public generally or the employee apart from
work-the personal injury norms. As pointed out by Professor
Larson:
The infinite variety of conditions of other employment-rang-
ing from accounting to lead mining and from baby-sitting to
topping Douglas fir trees-is just as great as the variety of con-
ditions of nonemployment life, and has no more of a common
element than does "everyday life" to supply a measuring stick
215. See note 176 supra.
216. See Lickfett v. Jorgenson, 179 Minn. 321, 323, 229 N.W. 138, 138 (1930) ("not
. the same as the public generally"); State cx ret. People's Coal & Ice Co. v. District
Court, 129 Minn. 502, 503, 153 N.W. 119, 119 (1915) ("more than the normal risk to
which all are subject").
In Hough v. Drevdahl & Son Co., 281 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 1979) (per curiam), the
court upheld a determination that a truck driver's heart trouble from stress was not a
compensable personal injury or occupational dzsease because the compensation court could
find that the work stress "was not significantly different from the stress to which ordinary
living exposes everyone." Id. at 692.
217. See Snyder v. General Paper Corp., 277 Minn. 376, 385, 152 N.W.2d 743, 749
(1967) (greater "than if he had been pursuing his ordinary personal affairs"); Olson v.
Trinity Lodge No. 282, A.F. & A.M., 226 Minn. 141, 147, 32 N.W.2d 255, 259 (1948)
(same); Dunnigan v. Clinton Falls Nursery Co., 155 Minn. 286, 289, 193 N.W. 466, 467
(1923) (not "equally exposed to the same danger apart from his employment").
218. Part (1)(a)(ii) specifies, " 'Occupational disease' means a disease ... due to
causes in excess of the hazards ordinary of employment."
219. Part (4)(b) specifies, "An employer is not liable for compensation for any occupa-
tional disease . . .which results from a hazard to which the worker would have been
equally exposed outside of the employment."
220. Part (2) provides, with certain exceptions,"Ordinary diseases of life to which the
general public is equally exposed outside of employment are not compensable .... "
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by which to judge what is "ordinary" and what is distinctively
occupational in a particular employment.
221
Similarly, requiring the employee to show that employment in-
creased the risk beyond both that of employment in general and
himself apart from work (and, in case of an ordinary disease of life,
beyond that of the general public) probably would not be more
difficult than showing an increase beyond one of these norms.
3. Proximate Cause
The definition necessitates that the employment proximately
caused the disease by requiring:
(1) "a direct causal connection between the conditions under
which the work is performed" and the disease,222
(2) the disease to follow "as a natural incident of the work as
a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employ-
ment, ' 2 2 3 and
221. lB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 41.33, at 7-365.
222. Part (3)(a) specifies, "A disease arises out of the employment only if there be a
direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed
. .. Regarding the inferred addition of the words "and the disease," see note 148
supra.
Twelve states join Minnesota in requiring a "direct causal connection between the
conditions under which the work is performed" and the disease. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23-901.01(1) (Supp. 1971-1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-803(5)(a) (1973); IND.
CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-10(b) (Burns 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.067(1) (Vernon 1965);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-408(1) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.440(l)(b) (1977); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-3-32 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(9)(a) (Supp. 1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 50-1101(6) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-2-26 (1974); VA.
CODE § 65.1-46 (1973); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978).
Five other states also refer to "direct" causation. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-110(1) (1975)
(disease must be "caused . ..as a direct result of exposure over a period of time to the
normal working conditions of such trade, process, occupation or employment"); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 8-41-108(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (disease must result "directly from the em-
ployment or the conditions under which work was performed"); IowA CODE ANN. § 85A.8
(West Cum. Supp. 1979) (disease must "have a direct causal connection with the employ-
ment"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-7 (1972) (must be "a direct causal connection between
the work performed and the occupational disease"); S.C. CODE § 42-11-10 (1976) (disease
must be "caused . .. as a direct result of continuous exposure to the normal working
conditions" of the employment and must "result directly and naturally from exposure in
this State to the hazards peculiar to the particular employment").
223. Part (3)(b) specifies, "A disease arises out of the employment only ... if the occu-
pational disease follows as a natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure occa-
sioned by the nature of the employment."
A number of states' provisions are quite similar in requiring that the disease be a
natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the
employment. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-901-01(2) (Supp. 1971-1979); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 8-41-108(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-803(5)(b) (1973) (disease
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(3) the disease to be traceable "to the employment as a di-
rect and proximate cause."
224
The personal injury definition, 225 by contrast, requires only an
injury "arising out of" employment. The Minnesota court re-
marked upon this in a 1941 case, Hanson v. Robzishek-Schnezder
must have "followed as a natural incident of exposure by reason of the employment");
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-10(b) (Burns 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85A.8 (West Cum.
Supp. 1979) (disease "must have followed as a natural incident [to the employment] from
injurious exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment"); Kv. REV. STAT.
§ 342.620(2)(a) (1977) (substantially same); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.067(1) (Vernon 1965);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-408 (1979); NEV. REv. STAT. § 617.440(l)(c) (1977); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-3-32 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(9)(b) (Supp. 1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 50-1101(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (substantially same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-
2-26 (1974); VA. CODE § 65.1-46 (1973); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978).
A number of the provisions already cited further require the disease to appear "to
have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that
source as a natural consequence." See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-901.01(6) (Supp. 1971-
1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-803(5)(e) (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-2-26 (1974); VA.
CODE § 65.1-46 (1973); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978); cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1101(5)
(Cum. Supp. 1979) (substantially same). The Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah
provisions specify that the disease must appear "after its contraction" and, together with
the Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia provisions, add that the disease "need not
have been foreseen or expected."
A number of states' provisions, similar except in referring to "rational" instead of
"natural consequence," specify that the disease need not "have been foreseen or expected
but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the
employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence." See IND.
CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-10(b) (Burns 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.067(1) (Vernon 1965);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8)(a) (Supp. 1979); cf ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.36(d)
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979) (same except origin "or aggravation"); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 85A.8 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (same except "resulted" from that source as an "incident
and rational consequence"); KY. REV. STAT. § 342.620(2)(a) (1977) (same except "be re-
lated to" instead of "have had its origin in"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-5a01 (b) (Cum. Supp.
1979) ("The disease must appear to have had its origin in a special risk of such disease
connected with the particular type of employment and to have resulted from that source
as a reasonable consequence of the risk.").
224. Part (4)(a)(i) specifies, "An employer is not liable for compensation for any occu-
pational disease which cannot be traced to the employment as a direct and proximate
cause ....
Twelve states' provisions similarly require that the disease "can be fairly traced to the
employment as the proximate cause." Ste ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-901.01(3) (Supp.
1971-1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-41-108(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 22-3-7-10(b) (Burns 1974); KY. REV. STAT. § 342.620(2)(a) (1977); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 287.067(1) (Vernon 1965); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-408(3) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 617.440(1)(d) (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-32 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1101
(Cum. Supp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-2-26 (1974); VA. CODE § 65.1-46 (1973); W.
VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978); cf. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 386-3 (1976) (disease must be "proxi-
mately caused by or resulting from the nature of the employment") (emphasis added);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.08.140 (1962) (disease must arise "naturally and proxi-
mately out of employment").
225. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1978).
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C0.226:
It is significant that in defining compensable accident the
workmen's compensation law makes no mention of cause or
causation as such. Impliedly, it thereby rejects or at least modi-
fies the standard of proximate causation determinative in tort
litigation. Therefore, care must be exercised lest long judicial
habit in tort cases allows judicial thought in compensation
cases to be too much influenced by a discarded or modified fac-
tor of decision.
It is apparent that the new standard "arising out of and in
the course of" employment does not require that the latter be
the proximate cause of injury. If the legislature had meant that
it would have said so . . . . The phrase "out of" expresses a
factor of source or contribution rather than cause in the sense of
being proximate or direct.
227
Two years later, the Legislature put into the occupational dis-
ease definition precisely what the Hanson court noted was inten-
tionally left out of the injury definition. 228 The Hanson court
observed that if the Legislature had meant to include proximate
cause, which the court clearly tied to tort law, the Legislature
would have said so. The 1943 Legislature, presumably cognizant
of this judicial interpretation,2 2 9 phrased the new occupational dis-
ease definition in terms of proximate cause. Arguably, the Legisla-
ture would not have added to the already excessive verbiage of the
occupational disease definition if its actual intent had been a non-
tort form of proximate causation. Based upon this premise, the
argument that the Legislature intended to incorporate tort princi-
ples of proximate cause in occupational disease is impressive.
230
226. 209 Minn. 596, 297 N.W. 19 (1941) (upholding determination that employee's
injury by robbers arose out of employment involving night work in high-crime area).
227. Id. at 598-99, 297 N.W. at 21; see Barlau v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Imple-
ment Co., 214 Minn. 564, 9 N.W.2d 6 (1943). In Barlau, the court, upholding compensa-
tion for injury from employee falling because of an epileptic seizure, said:
The accident arose out of the employment if there was a causal connection
between the employment and the injury. . . . By "causal connection" is meant
not proximate cause as that term is used in the law of negligence, but cause in
the sense that the accident had its origin in the hazards to which the employ-
ment exposed the employee while doing his work.
Id. at 578, 9 N.W.2d at 13 (citations omitted).
228. See Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 633, § 3, 1943 Minn. Laws 969, 970. This law was
enacted 22 days after the decision in the Barlau case, discussed in note 227 upra.
229. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
230. Compare the following from a Washington case:
The legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the meaning of "proxi-
mate cause" as used by the courts, and that being so, when they defined as an
[Vol. 6
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Like courts in most other jurisdictions with occupational disease
provisions requiring proximate cause, 231 the Minnesota court has
devoted very little attention to the proximate cause requirement.
In the 1945 case of Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co., 232 reversing a denial
of compensation for a shipyard worker's disability from bursitis or
synovitis caused by working with his knee on cold steel plates as he
operated an air gun, the court noted, "Both medical experts testi-
fied that there was a direct causal connection between the disease
and the employment. 2 33 In the 1946 case of Sandy v. Walter Butler
Shipbuilders, Inc.,234 holding as a matter of law that the occupa-
tional disease definition covered a machinist's dermatitis from
working in areas permeated with spun glass insulation dust, the
court stated that "the glass dust was the 'direct and proximate
cause' of his ailment. '2 35 In the 1957 Gray v. City of Si. Paul23 6 case,
upholding the definition's application to a police officer's contrac-
tion of tuberculosis from doing eight squad car shifts with a tuber-
culous fellow officer, the court observed, "Here the conditions of
occupational disease those diseases or infections as arise naturally and proxlmately
out of extrahazardous employment, it would follow that they meant that the
condition of the extrahazardous employment must be the proximate cause of the
disease for which claim for compensation is made, and that the cause must be
proximate in the sense that there existed no intervening independent and suffi-
cient cause for the disease, so that the disease would not have been contracted
but for the condition existing in the extrahazardous employment.
Simpson Logging Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 32 Wash. 2d 472, 479, 202 P.2d
448, 452 (1949) (emphasis in original), quoledb7 Sacred Heart Medical Center v. Carrado,
20 Wash. App. 285, 287, 579 P.2d 412, 413 (1978), rev'don other grounds sub nom., Sacred
Heart Medical Center v. Department of Labor & Indus., 92 Wash. 2d 631, 600 P.2d 1015
(1979); Favor v. Department of Labor & Indus., 53 Wash. 2d 698, 705, 336 P.2d 382, 386
(1959); Ehman v. Department of Labor & Indus., 33 Wash. 2d 584, 602, 206 P.2d 787, 797
(1949).
231. Some opinions from the jurisdictions whose statutes are referred to in notes 222-24
supra refer to the proximate cause requirement, see, e.g., Fukuoka v. Dodo, 43 Hawaii 337,
343 (1959); Bannister v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 154 W. Va. 172, 175-
76, 174 S.E.2d 605, 607 (1970), but only a few opinions have undertaken to analyze the
requirement. See, e.g., Simpson Logging Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 32 Wash.
2d 472, 479, 202 P.2d 448, 452 (1949), quoted in note 230 supra (legislature intended ap-
proach "used by the courts"-"but for" causation and absence of "intervening indepen-
dent and sufficient cause"); McKinnon v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation
Bureau, 71 N.D. 228, 232, 299 N.W. 856, 858 (1941) ("there must be a chain of causation
which, both as to time, place, and effect, is so closely related to the [employment] that the
[disease] can be said to be proximately caused thereby").
232. 220 Minn. 318, 19 N.W.2d 795 (1945).
233. Id. at 331, 19 N.W.2d at 801.
234. 221 Minn. 215, 21 N.W.2d 612 (1946).
235. Id. at 223, 21 N.W.2d at 616.
236. 250 Minn. 220, 84 N.W.2d 606 (1957).
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the employment proximatey caused Gray to become infected with
tuberculosis and therefore his disease was under the circumstances
and in fact a natural incident of his employment. ' 237 The court
also adopted the following three-part formulation:
The purpose and intent of the legislature must have been to
liberalize the approach in consideration of occupational dis-
eases intending to cover those (1) arising out of the employ-
ment, (2) where there is found to be a direct causal connection
between- the conditions under which the work is performed and
the disease, and (3) that if the disease follows as a natural inci-
dent of the work and as a result of the exposure occasioned by
the nature of the employment, it may be classed as an occupa-
tional disease.
238
Finally, in the 1963 Schwartz v. City of Duluth2 39 case, upholding a
finding that the definition (and the presumption for certain dis-
eases contracted by firefighters and peace officers240 ) applied to a
firefighter's coronary sclerosis, 24' the court noted that the statute
provides "that a disease arises out of employment only 'if there be
a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the
work is performed and if the occupational disease follows as a nat-
ural incident of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by
the nature of the employment.' ",242
After upholding the finding that the firefighter's coronary scle-
rosis was an occupational disease, the Schwartz court upheld com-
pensation for his death from coronary thrombosis suffered while on
a vacation from his fire department duties, saying:
The relators press the claim that the legal cause of death was
237. Id. at 234, 84 N.W.2d at 615 (emphasis added).
238. Id. (emphasis added). This was substantially identical to the formulation sug-
gested by the plaintiff in Sandy. See Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilers, Inc., 221 Minn. at
219-20, 21 N.W.2d at 615.
239. 264 Minn. 514, 119 N.W.2d 822 (1963).
240. The presumption, see notes 52-59 supra; notes 432-46 'nfra and accompanying text,
applied because physical examinations indicated the firefighter did not have coronary
sclerosis when he was hired. See 264 Minn. at 516 & n.2, 119 N.W.2d at 823-24 & n.2.
241. The court upheld the compensation court's crediting claimant's experts' testi-
mony "that the extreme and hurried efforts involved in answering fire alarms, the climb-
ing of ladders, the inhalation of fumes and smoke, the ever-present risks and uncertainties,
and the lack of uninterrupted rest are all conditions conducive to development of" coro-
nary sclerosis, rather than the employer's expert's testimony "that coronary sclerosis devel-
ops in people of all walks of life regardless of occupation and that it cannot be said that
the particular hazards or conditions involved in the work of a fireman would give rise to
that disability." Id. at 517, 119 N.W.2d at 824.
242. Id. at 517-18, 119 N.W.2d at 824.
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the coronary thrombosis resulting from the exertion of hunting
and that there is no causal connection between the coronary
thrombosis and whatever disability he may have sustained by
reason of his employment as a fireman. We have recognized
that causal connection exists if the employment, by reason of its
nature, obligations, or incidents, may reasonably be found to be
the source of the injury-producing hazard. "By 'causal connection'
is meant not proximate cause as that term i's used in the law of negligence,
but cause in the sense that the accident had its origin in the hazards to
which the employment exposed the emploje while doing his work ...
In Nelson v. City of St. Paul, . . . we said: ". . . The causal
connection of source is supplied if the employment exposes the
employee to a hazard which originates on the premise as a part
of the working environment, peculiarly exposes the employee to
an external hazard whereby he is subjected to a different and a
greater risk than if he had been pursuing his ordinary personal
affairs. In other words, if the injury has its origin with a hazard
or risk connected with the employment, and flows therefrom as
a natural incident of the exposure occasioned by the nature of
the work, it arises out of the employment.
'24 3
It might be argued that the language just quoted refers to the
causation needed for occupational disease, in effect equating the
proximate cause requirement with the increased-risk test used for
"arising out of employment" under the personal injury defini-
tion.2 44 Reading it this way would respond to Professor Larson's
point:
[P]roximate cause or legal cause is out of place in compensation
law because, as developed in tort law, it is a concept that is
itself thoroughly suffused with the idea of fault; that is, it is a
theory of causation designed to bring about a just result when
243. Id. at 518-19, 119 N.W.2d at 825 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting
Nelson v. City of St. Paul, 249 Minn. 53, 55, 81 N.W.2d 272, 275 (1957)).
244. See notes 215-24 supra and accompanying text.
If the Schwartz language should be read as equating the occupational disease defini-
tion's proximate cause requirement with the extremely lenient "increased risk" approach,
it might be urged that the Legislature adopted that approach by acquiescence. See note
123 supra and accompanying text. Although the Legislature amended the occupational
disease provision three times since the February 8, 1963 Schwartz decision, it made no
change in the causation language. See Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 29, 1979 Minn. Laws
Ex. Sess. 1256, 1270 (extending presumption to forest officers of Department of Natural
Resources; substituting "the" for "such" at two points in second sentence) (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 176.011(15) (1978 & Supp. 1979)); Act of June 4, 1969, ch. 936, § 2, 1969
Minn. Laws 1804, 1805 (extending presumption to sheriffs and full-time deputy sheriffs);
Act of May 6, 1963, ch. 497, § 1, 1963 Minn. Laws 730, 731 (extending presumption to
members of game warden service and state crime bureau).
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starting from an act containing some element of fault.245
But the language quoted from the Schwartz opinion actually
seems to have been speaking of the causal connection between the
disease and the death, rather than between the employment and
the disease.246 Although the court did not refer to it, the act then
included a provision providing compensation when "death is
caused by a compensable occupational disease. 2 47 The same re-
sult would follow under the statute defining "personal injury" to
include "personal injury caused by occupational disease."
248
It should be noted that the Schwartz arising-out-of-employment
approach for death (or injury) caused by occupational disease is
less demanding than the direct-and-natural-consequence approach
usually applied to determine whether the employer is liable for
subsequent nonemployment consequences of a previous compensa-
245. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 6.60, at 3-8 (1978); see Riesenfeld, supra note 32, at
531 (since workers' compensation "is social insurance and not tort liability.., none of the
traditional restrictive tort doctrines such as. . . 'proximate causation'. . . should ever be
relied upon in compensation cases"); cf Green, The Causal Relatin Issue in Negligence Law,
60 MICH. L. REv. 543, 549 (1962) (arguing that in tort cases the issue of causal relation
between the actor's conduct and the harm should be resolved before the issue of whether
the actor's conduct was wrongful).
246. The court did not refer to the occupational disease provision in this part of the
opinion, or to that provision's exclusion of liability "for any occupational disease which
cannot be traced to the employment as a direct and proximate cause" anywhere in the
opinion. Neither Barlau nor Nelson, nor any of the other cases cited in this part of the
opinion, see Anderson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435 (1960); Rosvold
v. Independent Consol. School Dist. No. 102, 251 Minn. 297, 87 N.W.2d 646 (1958); Niess
v. Superior Packing Co., 249 Minn. 263, 81 N.W.2d 773 (1957); Golob v. Buckingham
Hotel, 244 Minn. 301, 69 N.W.2d 636 (1955), involved the occupational disease provision.
247. Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 633, § 4(2), 1943 Minn. Laws 969, 971 (repealed 1973)
provided:
If an employee is disabled or dies and his disability or death is caused by a
compensable occupational disease, he or his dependents are entitled to compen-
sation for his death or for the duration of his disability according to the provi-
sions of this act, except as otherwise provided in this act.
248. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1978).
This would apply to death caused by occupational disease because the Minnesota
court has implicitly held death to be a "personal injury." See, e.g., Epp v. Midwestern
Mach. Co., 296 Minn. 231, 208 N.W.2d 87 (1973) (per curiam). Notwithstanding the fact
that MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1) (1978) refers to personal injury and death separately in
imposing compensation liability for "personal injury or death . . . arising out of and in
the course of employment," the court has subjected claims for death from employment to
the provision regarding the definition of personal injury that appears only in MINN. STAT.
§ 176.011(16), that the employee is not covered "except while engaged in, on, or about the
premises where his services require his presence as a part of such service at the time of the
injury and during the hours of such service." See Bronson v. Joyner's Silver & Electroplat-
ing, Inc., 268 Minn. 1, 4, 127 N.W.2d 678, 680 (1964); Kelley v. Northwest Paper Co., 190
Minn. 291, 292, 251 N.W. 274, 274 (1933).
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Assuming the occupational disease definition's requirement of
proximate causation means something beyond the increased-risk
test used for arising-out-of-employment under personal injury, it
may be useful to consider the various respects in which the proxi-
mate cause requirement used in common-law negligence cases
250
may be more demanding than the increased-risk test, and whether
each aspect of common-law negligence proximate cause should ap-
ply to the compensation law's occupational disease definition.
a. Foreseeabi'h'y
Professor Larson asserts that "arising out of" should not be con-
strued to require proximate causation because, inter ah'a, the latter
"would demand that the harms be foreseeable as a hazard of this
kind of employment."'25' Although some states' negligence cases
249. See Hendrickson v. George Madsen Constr. Co., 281 N.W.2d 672, 675 (Minn.
1979) (reversing award for death from heart attack caused by stress of compensation hear-
ing regarding compensable shoulder injury); Wallace v. Judd Brown Constr. Co., 269
Minn. 455, 459, 131 N.W.2d 540, 544 (1964) (reversing award for fracturing femur in non-
employment fall when evidence showed fracture was more likely because knee had been
immobilized in treating previous work injury) (questionable result); Eide v. Whirlpool
Seeger Corp., 260 Minn. 98, 102, 109 N.W.2d 47, 50 (1961) (upholding award for aggrava-
tion of compensable back injury caused by effect on posture from leg cast required to treat
leg injury sustained while playing badminton subsequent to compensable back injury). See
generaly I A. LARSON, supra note 18, §§ 13.00-23 (1978).
250. See generally H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 126-276 (1959); R.
KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1963); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 236-90 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-461
(1965); Green, supra note 245.
251. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 6.60, at 3-6 (1978). Professor Larson develops his
point as follows:
[W]hat relevance has foreseeability if one is not interested in the culpability of
the actor's conduct? There is nothing in the theory of compensation liability
that cares whether the employer foresaw particular kinds of harm or not. The
only criterion is connection in fact with the employment, whether it is foresee-
able in advance, or apparent only in retrospect. This criterion cannot in any
logical sense be made to depend on foreseeability. For example, suppose that a
wheel flew off a high speed machine, and splashed molten metal from a vat onto
the controls of a sprinkler system, which, in turn, set off the sprinklers, which wet
a hot light bulb, which exploded just as claimant was yawning, with the result
that claimant swallowed a piece of glass. Any such set of improbabilities, of the
sort familiar to first-semester tort students, would at an early stage pass out of the
bounds of foresecability, if the work has any connection with reality at all. And
yet, if claimant was working at his job, there can be no doubt that he is entitled
to compensation, for the injury was clearly connected with his work, although
the causal sequence was unforeseeable.
Id. at 3-8 to -9.
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require foreseeability of the resultant harm,252 Minnesota, in ac-
cord with the Restatement (Second) of Torts,253 does not. 254 Similarly,
in 1943 when the Legislature adopted the occupational disease
definition, Minnesota did not deem proximate causation to require
foreseeability of the extent of the harm or the manner in which it
occurred. 255 Accordingly, the definition's proximate cause require-
ment cannot be taken to demand such foreseeability.
256
b. Extraordinary Harm
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "The actor's con-
duct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where
252. See W. PROSSER, supra note 250, at 251. See generally H. HART & A. HONORE,
supra note 250, at 231-60.
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(1) (1965) provides: "If the actor's con-
duct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor
neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it
occurred does not prevent him from being liable."
254. See Schulz v. Feigal, 273 Minn. 470, 476, 142 N.W.2d 84, 89 (1966) (not necessary
that defendant "could have anticipated the particular injury which did happen"); Dellwo
v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 456, 107 N.W.2d 859, 862 (1961) ("trial court erred in making
foreseeability a test of proximate cause" because "negligence is tested by foresight but
proximate cause is determined by hindsight").
255. See Thomsen v. Reibel, 212 Minn. 83, 86, 2 N.W.2d 567, 569 (1942) (defendant
may be liable "although he could not have anticipated the particular injury which did
happen"); Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. L.R.R., 76 Minn. 90, 91, 78 N.W. 965, 965 (1899)
(negligent wrongdoer "responsible, even though he could not have foreseen the particular
results which did in fact follow"); Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 67 Minn.
94, 97, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1896) (negligent defendant "liable for all [of act's] natural and
probable consequences, whether he could have foreseen them or not").
Strangely enough, the court has referred to foreseeability in a non-disease compensa-
tion case. In Weidenbach v. Miller, 237 Minn. 278, 291, 55 N.W.2d 289, 296 (1952), the
court, in upholding a denial of benefits for a truck driver's death from trying to rescue a
person who had fallen through ice in a lake, reasoned that it could not "have been con-
templated by reasonable persons that [the truck driver] would expose himself to the risk of
[the rescue attempt] as an incident to the employment in which he was engaged." This
was apparently directed to the "in the course of" rather than the "arising out of" require-
ment; the opinion's next sentence referred to "scope of the employment," and the court
earlier in the opinion quoted with approval Horovitz, The Litigous Phrase "Arising out of'
Employment, 3 NACCA L.J. 15, 39 (1960), stating, iter aia, that "it is not necessary that
the injury be one which ought to have been foreseen or expected" and "[t]he risk insured is
not only the foreseeable one." Id. at 282, 55 N.W.2d at 291.
Foreseeability does not seem to be an appropriate concept for either "arising out of"
or "in the course of" analysis.
256. The occupational disease provisions of thirteen states-Arizona, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vir-
ginia, and West Virginia-specify that the disease need not "have been foreseen or ex-
pected," and all of those except Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia further specify
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after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's neg-
ligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it
should have brought about the harm. '257 Although the Minne-
sota court has not specifically called for exemption of "highly ex-
traordinary" results, it has indicated that liability extends only to
the "natural and probable consequences" of negligence.
258
The Minnesota court generally has not excluded "personal in-
jury" compensation because it was highly extraordinary for the
employment to have brought about the injury.259 The closest it
has come has been to hold, like other jurisdictions, 260 that seeking
personal comfort is not covered if the method chosen is highly un-
usual or unreasonable.
26'
As indicated in the discussion of the definition's requirement for
the disease to be a "recognized" hazard, 262 Minnesota cases have
allowed occupational disease compensation when it was fairly ex-
traordinary for the employment to have brought about the disease.
In one case, 263 it will be recalled, the compensation court granted
compensation for ischemic neuritis sustained by an employee
working in cold water during a flood although the sole medical
expert "testified that during his forty years of practice he had
257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965).
258. See Aides v. St. Paul Ball Club, Inc., 251 Minn. 440, 442, 88 N.W.2d 94, 96
(1958).
The Minnesota court has embraced the "hindsight" approach of RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965). See Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400,
405, 165 N.W.2d 259, 263 (1969) ("negligence is tested by foresight but proximate cause is
determined by hindsight"); Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 456, 107 N.W.2d 859, 862
(1961).
259. See, e.g., Beach v. American Steel & Wire Div., 248 Minn. 11, 17, 78 N.W.2d 371,
376 (1956) (upholding compensation for chemist's death from poison chemist may have
"taken for the purpose of relieving a distressed feeling in the belief that it was something
else"); Wold v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 147 Minn. 17, 179 N.W. 219 (1920) (upholding
compensation for employee auto passenger's death from bullet fired by peace officer trying
to hit tires of the auto mistakenly thought to be stolen).
260. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 21.81 (1979).
261. See Kerpen v. Bill Boyer Ford, Inc., 305 Minn. 47, 232 N.W.2d 21 (1975) (per
curiam) (upholding denial to employee injured by coemployee's "amateur chiropractic"
massage of his back); Elfelt v. Red Owl Stores, 296 Minn. 41, 206 N.W.2d 370 (1973)
(upholding denial to employee who while leaving for supper jumped to touch rafter and
caught finger between bolts, resulting in loss of finger) (questionable result). But the
Weidenbach court's quotation from the Horovitz Article, see note 255 supra, included the
statement that "[e]ven unusual or extraordinary consequences of the employment may
well be compensable." 237 Minn. at 282, 55 N.W.2d at 291.
262. See notes 205-14 supra and accompanying text.
263. Sinclair v. Frye, 18 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 93 (1954).
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never come across a case like [this]. ' 264 Thus, under the Minne-
sota occupational disease provision, the extraordinary harm factor
probably will not prevent finding the employment to have proxi-
mately caused the disease.
c. Substantial Factor
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 431 (a) requires the negligent
conduct to be "a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.
'265
Comment a proceeds to explain:
The word "substantial" is used to denote the fact that the de-
fendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as
to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word
in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of
responsibility, rather than in the so-called "philosophic sense,"
which includes every one of the great number of events without
which any happening would not have occurred. Each of these
events is a cause in the so-called "philosophic sense," yet the
effect of many of them is so insignificant that no ordinary mind
would think of them as causes.
266
Section 433 goes on to provide:
The following considerations are in themselves or in combi-
nation with one another important in determining whether the
actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm
to another:
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in produc-
ing the harm and the extent of the effect which they have in
producing it;
(b) whether the actor's conduct has created a force or series
of forces which are in continuous and active operation up to the
time of the harm, or has created a situation harmless unless
acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsi-
ble;
(c) elapse of time.
26 7
The Minnesota court has adhered to the substantial-factor ap-
proach in a number of negligence cases.
268
264. Id. at 96.
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a) (1965).
266. Id., Comment a. Comment b's discussion distinguishes "substantial" from
"merely negligible" or "negligible." See id., Comment b.
267. Id. § 433.
268. See, e.g., DeCourcy v. Trustees of Westminster Presbyterian Church, 270 Minn.
560, 563, 134 N.W.2d 326, 328 (1965); Johnson v. Evanski, 221 Minn. 323, 328, 22 N.W.2d
213, 216 (1946); Smith v. Carlson, 209 Minn. 268, 272, 296 N.W. 132, 134 (1941); Peterson
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With respect to workers' compensation, the Minnesota court has
not spoken of a general substantial-factor requirement for arising-
out-of issues in the personal injury context. 269 But it has stated
that work activity must be a "substantial contributing cause" of a
heart attack in order to produce compensability., In Klapperich v.
Agape Halfway House, Inc. ,270 the court observed:
27 1
[T]he establishment of medical causation from a work-related
activity does not in and of itself establish legal causation for
purposes of awarding workers' compensation benefits. This is
so because such medical causation might be so insignificant or
happenstance that the work-related activity cannot be said to
be a substantial contributing cause of the heart attack.
272
This language should be taken to refer only to cases involving ag-
gravation of a nonwork condition, rather than to indicate a gen-
eral substantial-factor requirement for arising-out-of issues. In a
law review article cited by the Klapperich court, Professor Larson
would impose the substantial-factor requirement only in aggrava-
tion of nonwork condition situations:
[W]hen the employee contributes some personal element of
risk-e.g., by having a personal enemy who assaults him, or a
personal disease which figures causally in his injury-the em-
ployment must contribute something substantial to increase the
risk. The reason is that the employment risk must offset the
v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360, 364, 256 N.W. 901, 903 (1934). See also 4 MINNESOTA PRAC-
TICE JIG II, 140 G-S (2d ed. 1974).
269. It has, however, in a case controlled by the increased-risk test, said that the em-
ployment "must be more than the occasion" for the injury. See Sivald v. Ford Motor Co.,
188 Minn. 463, 472, 247 N.W. 687, 691 (1933) (reversing award for death from assault); cf
Sieger v. Knox & Peterson, 160 Minn. 185, 189, 199 N.W. 573, 574 (1924) (reversing de-
nial when the employment was "much more than the mere occasion for the assault"). As
stated in the text accompanying notes 279-80 infia, the increased-risk test would seem to
satisfy any substantial-factor requirement.
270. 281 N.W.2d 675 (Minn. 1979).
271. After concluding that an award for a heart attack allegedly caused by employ-
ment stress could not stand because both sides' experts testified that only significant or
unusual mental stress would cause the infarction and the evidence did not support a find-
ing that the employee was exposed to significant or unusual mental stress, the court stated,
"Having disposed of the case, we need not consider whether the test of legal causation was
satisfied." Id. at 680.
272. Id. (dictum). The court added, "See, also Kleman v. FordMotor Co., 307 Minn. 218,
239 N.W.2d 449 (1976)." It is not clear why the court cited Kleman, a 5-4 affirmance of an
award for a death from a heart attack. Perhaps it was because the doctors' testimony in
that case was in terms of whether the employment was "a substantial causal factor in
employee's death," Kleman v. Ford Motor Co., 307 Minn. 218, 221, 239 N.W.2d 449, 451
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causal contribution of the personal risk.
273
The Minnesota court has not directly addressed the application
of the substantial-factor approach to occupational disease recovery
but in Scott v. Southview Chevrolet Co., 2 74 upholding occupational dis-
ease compensation for pulmonary emphysema suffered by an auto
dealer's car starter, the court noted that a medical expert "opined
that the characteristics of Scott's employment 'had quite a bit to
do with his lung disease,' and were a substantial causative fac-
tor." 2 75  Moreover, after quoting from the occupational disease
definition, italicizing the words "[a] disease arises out of the em-
ployment only if there be a direct causal connection between the
conditions under which the work is performed and if the occupa-
tional disease follows as a natural incident" and "[a]n employer is
not liable for compensation for any occupational disease which
cannot be traced to the employment as a direct and proximate
cause," 2 76 the court reiterated that the medical expert "was of the
opinion that there was a substantial relationship between Scott's
illness and the conditions of his employment. ' 2 77 The court fur-
ther observed:
Judge Walsh asked the doctor point blank whether he believed
Scott's exposure to exhaust fumes to have been a substantial
factor in causing Scott's lung problem. The doctor stated that
exhaust was one of several important concurrent factors, but he
declined to specify the contributing role of exhaust fumes in
terms of a percentage.
278
The increased-risk test 279 would seem to satisfy any substantial-
273. Larson, The "Heart Cases" n Workmen's Compensation: An Anaoyszs and Suggested Solu-
tion, 65 MICH. L. REV. 441, 469-70 (1967) (footnotes omitted), cited in Klapperich v.
Agape Halfway House, Inc., 281 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Minn. 1979). Professor Larson pref-
aced this by stating:
As to situations which do not involve any personal risk element, the better rule
goes beyond the old rule, which demanded that the employment contribute an
increased or peculiar risk, and accepts actual risk, or even positional risk. The
reason is that there is no competing personal risk to overcome. Any employment
contribution, even merely putting the employee in the place where the injury
from a neutral force occurred, is enough, because it is greater than the zero em-
ployee contribution.
Larson, supra, at 469.
274. 267 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1978).
275. Id. at 187 (footnote omitted).
276. Id. at 187-88.
277. Id. at 188.
278. Id.
279. See notes 215-17 supra and accompanying text.
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factor requirement.2 8 0 If something about the employment in-
creased the employee's risk of harm beyond that of the public gen-
erally or the employee apart from work, the employment would be
a substantial factor bringing about the harm. Since increased risk
is the only arising-out-of test appropriate for disease situations,28 ' a
substantial-factor requirement would not add anything beyond
what is already required by the arising-out-of test.
d Emotional Disturbance
i Negligence Cases
Section 436A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts precludes liabil-
ity for negligence (as opposed to intentional or reckless conduct 28 2)
that results in "emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm
or other compensable damage. '283 The Comment explains the
three reasons usually given by the courts for this rule:
One is that emotional disturbance which is not so severe and
serious as to have physical consequences is normally in the
realm of the trivial, and so falls within the maxim that the law
does not concern itself with trifles. It is likely to be so tempo-
rary, so evanescent, and so relatively harmless and unimpor-
tant, that the task of compensating for it would unduly burden
the courts and the defendants. The second is that in the ab-
sence of the guarantee of genuineness provided by resulting
bodily harm, such emotional disturbance may be too easily
feigned, depending, as it must, very largely upon the subjective
testimony of the plaintiff; and that to allow recovery for it
might open too wide a door for false claimants who have suf-
fered no real harm at all. The third is that where the defendant
has been merely negligent, without any element of intent to do
280. See Professor Larson's discussion in note 273 supra and accompanying text.
281. See note 176 supra and accompanying text.
282. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 46-47 (1965).
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) states: "If the actor's conduct
is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional
disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily
harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional distur-
bance." Section 456 provides for liability for emotional disturbance resulting from negli-
gently caused physical harm. Section 436 provides for liability for physical harm resulting
from negligently caused emotional disturbance. Compare Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282
Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969) (illness requiring five-day hospitalization, pains, and
personality change) and Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892)
(miscarriage and subsequent illness) with Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn.
1980) (Okrina and hurcell apply only when plaintiff was within zone of danger of physical
injury and reasonably feared for own safety).
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harm, his fault is not so great that he should be required to
make good a purely mental disturbance.
284
Minnesota's common law is in accord with section 436A in bar-
ring liability for negligence that results solely in emotional dis-
turbance, unaccompanied by any bodily harm or other
compensable damage.
In an 1894 case, the court overturned a verdict for mental
anguish resulting from defendant telegraph company's failure to
transmit a message from plaintiff's wife regarding her willingness
to reconcile. 28 5 An 1885 statute provided for liability for failure to
transmit or deliver telegraph messages. 28 6 Although plaintiff al-
leged that the defendant's failure was negligent, 28 7 the court said:
This action is not one of tort, but on contract; its gist and
gravamen being the breach of the contract, the duties and obli-
gations growing out of which are regulated by the statute,
which itself becomes a part of it ....
We are therefore left to determine the question here
presented according to the rules of the common law applicable
.to actions for damages for breach of contract. In such actions,
can damages be recovered for mental suffering resulting from a
breach of the contract?
288
The court answered this question in the negative, primarily be-
cause "such damages are more sentimental than substantial. 2 8 9
In a 1907 case, the court held that a plaintiff could not recover
damages for mental pain and anguish caused by defendant rail-
road's misrouting of plaintiff's child's corpse.2 9 0 Finding that the
complaint charged "at most, a negligent failure to perform the
contract," the court ruled that the case was governed by the just-
mentioned telegram case. 29 1
In 1963 the court reversed a wife's dram shop recovery for
mental anguish over her husband's injuries.292 The court held that
this was not injury to her person within the meaning of the dram
284. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A, Comment b (1965).
285. Francis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 59 N.W. 1078 (1894).
286. Ste Act of Mar. 7, 1885, ch. 208, 1885 Minn. Gen. Laws 278 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 609.775 (1978)).
287. 58 Minn. at 258, 59 N.W. at 1078.
288. Id. at 261, 59 N.W. at 1080.
289. Id.
290. Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907).
291. Id. at 55, 114 N.W. at 356.
292. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d 36
(1963) (court upheld wife's loss of "means of support" recovery).
[Vol. 6
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In 1979 the court struck down an insured's recovery for emo-
tional distress from defendant insurer's wrongful refusal to pay no-
fault benefits with knowledge that the nonpayment would cause
severe financial hardship.
294
Finally, in 1980, the court upheld a summary judgment against
parents seeking recovery for emotional distress from witnessing an
accident in which defendants' truck struck their young son. 295 The
court held that even when the emotional distress produced physi-
cal symptoms, recovery was barred inasmuch as plaintiffs were not
within the zone of danger of physical impact and reasonably fear-
ful for their own safety.
2 96
Thus, the Minnesota court has refused to join those jurisdictions
that grant recovery for negligent conduct resulting in emotional
disturbance unaccompanied by physical harm.
297
hi. Personal Inj'ur Compensation Cases
A majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue grant
workers' compensation to victims of "personal injury" for work-
related emotional disturbance unaccompanied by physical
harm.298 According to Samuel Horovitz, "Grasping at the com-
mon-law ruling that nervous shock without a flesh wound or external
trauma was not a basis of liability, insurance carriers fought to
infuse the same doctrine into compensation acts. Successful in a
few states, they went down to defeat in England and in most
293. Id. at 367, 122 N.W.2d at 41; cf. Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 404,
165 N.W.2d 259, 262 (1969) (physical injury sustained as a result of fear).
294. Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 277 N.W.2d 648
(Minn. 1979).
295. Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980).
296. Id. at 553.
297. See Allen v. Jones, - Cal. App. 3d -, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980) (reversing dis-
missal of suit for mental distress from mortuary negligently causing loss of plaintiff's
brother's cremated remains); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (re-
versing summary judgment for defendant in suit brought on behalf of young boy who
sustained nervous shock and psychic injury from seeing stepgrandmother killed by negli-
gently driven automobile); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140
(1973) (reversing dismissal of mother's suit for mental anguish at seeing her child killed
because of defendant's negligent conduct); Sinn v. Burd, - Pa. -, 404 A.2d 672 (1979)
(overruling demurrer to mother's suit for mental suffering from seeing her child killed by
negligently driven automobile).
298. lB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 42.23; see Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Public
Safety, 404 A.2d 1014 (Me. 1979); Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d 161 (1980). See generally 53 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 731 (1977); 34 LA. L. REv. 846 (1974); 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1128.
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American jurisdictions. ' '299
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has upheld personal
injury compensation when a physical work injury produced emo-
tional effects, 3° ° and when emotional stress at work produced phys-
ical effects, 30' it has not yet confronted the issue of personal injury
compensability when emotional stress at work produces only emo-
tional effects.
299. S. HOROVITZ, supra note 28, at 75 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Horovitz goes on to say, "A worker who has a nervous collapse, without physical impact,
after helping carry a fellow worker who was crushed by a timber prop and bleeding from
the ears and head, and thereupon needs medical care himself and loses substantial time
from work, receives a compensable 'personal injury.' " Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote
citing Yates v. South Kirkby, &c. Collieries, Ltd., [19101 2 K.B. 538.
300. See Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 243 Minn. 264, 67 N.W.2d 656 (1954)
(traumatic neurosis--described by an intern as "compensation neurosis"-from physical
work injuries made employee impotent and walk with a limp and produced total disabil-
ity); Rystedt v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 186 Minn. 185, 242 N.W. 623
(1932) ("hysterical paralysis" from physical strain at work made employee, not organically
disabled, unable to use an arm); Welchlin v. Fairmont Ry. Motors, 180 Minn. 411, 230
N.W. 897 (1930) (traumatic neurosis from physical work injury made employee limp and
produced temporary partial disability); cf. Mitchell v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 290 N.W.2d
753 (Minn. 1980) (traumatic neurosis from being struck by customer); Dahler v. DeZurik
Corp., No. 477-40-7106 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1979) (compensation for
disability caused solely by depression and neurosis from a work-related heart attack). Re-
garding traumatic neurosis generally, see IB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 42.22; Blinder,
The Defense of Claims of Psychic Trauma and Psychiatric Disabih, 12 FORUM 934 (1977). Re-
garding physical work injury producing emotional effects in general, see IB A. LARSON,
supra note 18, § 42.22.
301. See Aker v. State, 282 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1979) (emotional stress from handling
badly decomposed bodies and transporting them considerable distance by canoe produced
heart attack); Anderson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435 (1960) (worry
about truck accident that injured pedestrian caused psychotic depressive reaction result-
ing in suicide); Clark v. Bituminous Roadways, Inc., 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 1
(1980) (extremely sensitive employee's being told he would have to work with company
president with "volcanic type personality" who had subjected employee to abuse on previ-
ous occasions was substantial contributing cause of heart attack); Mack v. Pilgrim Lu-
theran Church, 32 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 534 (1980) (stress from schism within
church was substantial contributing cause of pastor's fatal heart attack); cf. Cooley v. Con-
struction Laborers Local Union No. 405, 25 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 12 (1969), affd
per curiam, 287 Minn. 559, 178 N.W.2d 697 (1970), in which compensation was denied on
the apparent ground that the depression resulting in suicide was not from worry about the
job, but rather caused by a nonwork-related heart attack, possible job loss, and charges of
defalcation. Query whether this distinction is sound. The employee in Anderson had ex-
pressed concern not only about the possibility of losing his job because of the truck acci-
dent but also about the possibility of the accident victim dying. Anderson v. Armour &
Co., 257 Minn. at 283, 101 N.W.2d at 437 (1960); cf. Olson v. F.I. Crane Lumber Co., 259
Minn. 248, 107 N.W.2d 223 (1960) (compensation for suicide resulting from depression
about work-related heart attack).
For a general discussion of work-related emotional stress producing physical effects,
see IB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 42.21.
[Vol. 6
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The compensation court has done so, however, and has awarded
personal injury compensation. In the 1976 case of Connoy v. Henne-
pin County General Hospit'lal,30 2 the compensation court awarded
medical and disability benefits to an employee who suffered a ner-
vous breakdown following a performance review at work, saying:
[W]e. . . conclude that there was a significant and substantial
change in employee's mental and emotional condition as of
July 29, 1974 and immediately thereafter to constitute a per-
sonal injury, and that said change was causally related to and
precipitated by presentation to and discussion of employee's
performance report on July 29, 1974 ....
With respect to . . . employee's hospitalization of November
5, 1974 and need for medical treatment and care thereafter, we
also conclude on the evidence that this was occasioned by a
depressive reaction which was a sequalae of and attributable to
her emotional condition precipitated by the employment per-
formance report and review of July 29, 1974 ...
[T]he compensation act does not apply to those only who are
strong in body. Neither is it limited to those who are normal.
Those who are below normal, have a weakness or disease, are
also within its protection.
It appears from the record that the performance report and
review thereof was a substantial contributing factor to em-
ployee's nervous breakdown and the precipitating factor of it.
It need not be the sole cause.
30 3
The supreme court should follow the compensation court's lead
when presented with the opportunity and find a personal injury to
be compensable when emotional stress at work produces only emo-
tional effects. The reasons for the common law's failure to impose
liability for negligence resulting only in emotional disturbance
30 4
have little, if any, application to this workers' compensation issue:
(1) The concern about burdening the system with too-trivial
cases is rendered inapplicable by the compensation act's cover-
ing only cases in which there is medical treatment reasonably
required, 30 5 disability persisting more than three days,306 or
302. No. 474-56-5368 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Bd. Jan. 9, 1976).
303. Id., slip op. at 2 (citations omitted). Compare id. with McKinzie v. Dayton-Hudson
Corp., 32 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 559 (1980) (anxiety neurosis was caused by per-
sonal problems; alleged work stress was not a significant contributing factor).
304. See notes 285-96 supra and accompanying text.
305. See MINN. STAT. § 176.135(1) (Supp. 1979).
306. See id. § 176.121 (1978).
1980]
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death. 3
0 7
(2) The concern about spurious claims "in the absence of the
guarantee of genuineness provided by resulting bodily
harm,' 30 8 entitled to little weight in any event, 30 9 is largely
ameliorated by the fact that reasonably required medical treat-
ment, disability exceeding three days, and death are "guaran-
tees of genuineness," as well as the fact that compensation is not
given for pain and suffering.
(3) The contention that negligence, as opposed to intent to
do harm, is not so great a fault as to require making good a
purely mental disturbance has no relevance in a system that
compensates harm not because it was caused by culpable con-
duct, 310 but because it arose out of and in the course of employ-
ment 311 and should be considered a cost of industry to be
passed on to those who enjoy industry's benefits.
31 2
307. See id. § 176.111 (1978 & Supp. 1979); cf id. § 65B.43(7) (1978) (no-fault act)
(defines "loss" as not including noneconomic detriment but as including economic detri-
ment caused by pain and suffering or physical or mental impairment).
308. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A, Comment b (1965), quoted in text
accompanying note 284 supra.
309. The Minnesota court has generally not seen fear of spurious claims as a sufficient
reason to deny a remedy for harm. See Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372, 173
N.W.2d 416, 419 (1969) (abolishing interspousal immunity for tort actions although
"[c]ollusion in making spurious claims is an undeniable temptation where a member of
the family is insured"); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 441, 161 N.W.2d 631, 637
(1968) (abolishing parental immunity in negligence actions with certain exceptions) ("the
fraud-collusion-perjury argument . . .does not warrant denial of a remedy to the child"),
overruled in part, Anderson v. Stream, No. 49520 (Minn. July 3, 1980) (abolishing excep-
tions and adopting "reasonable parent" standard); Baits v. Bats, 273 Minn. 419, 431, 142
N.W.2d 66, 73 (1966) (abolishing parent-child tort immunity) ("the judicial system is ade-
quate to accomodate itself to threats of collusion and ...the injustice of continued im-
munity outweighs the danger of fraud"); cf IB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 42.24, at 7-
654, speaking to the concern about distinguishing those suffering traumatic neurosis from
malingerers: "In the last analysis, the problem of malingering is one of fact, which must
be left to the skill and experience of medical and psychiatric experts, and of compensation
administrators, who usually manage in time to develop considerable facility in detecting
malingerers at the fact-finding level."
310. See MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1) (1978), specifying the employer's liability for com-
pensation "in every case of personal injury or death of his employee arising out of and in
the course of employment without regard to the question of negligence, unless the injury
was intentionally self-inflicted or when the intoxication of the employee is the proximate
cause of the injury."
311. See id.
312. See note 245 supra and accompanying text; cf. 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 731, 736-37
(1977), noting that courts that "applied the tort rule of physical impact to compensation
cases involving mental injury . ..disregarded the fact that the procedures and criteria
utilized in granting a workmen's compensation award are vastly different from the
processes implemented in negligence cases for determining liability and damages." In
Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637
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Moreover, as pointed out by Professor Larson:
[Tihere is no really valid distinction between physical and "ner-
vous" injury. Certainly modern medical opinion would sup-
port this view, and insist that it is no longer realistic to draw a
line between what is "nervous" and what is "physical." It is an
old story, in the history of law, to observe legal theory con-
stantly adapting itself to accomodate new advances and knowl-
edge in medical theory. Perhaps, in earlier years, when much
less was known about mental and nervous injuries and their
relation to "physical" symptoms and behavior, there was an ex-
cuse, on grounds of evidentiary difficulties, for ruling out recov-
eries based on such injuries, both in tort and in workmen's
compensation. But the excuse no longer exists.
3 13
It would be inconsistent to allow compensation when emotional
stress at work produces physical effects but deny it when similar
emotional stress produces only emotional effects. 3 14 For example,
in the 1960 case of Anderson v. Armour & Co., 3 15 the court upheld
death benefits when a truck driver's worry about having hit a pe-
destrian caused a psychotic depressive reaction resulting in suicide.
The court hardly could have denied medical and disability bene-
fits if the truck driver had been able to curb his "uncontrollable
impulse ' 3' 6 toward suicide and required hospitalization for his
mental disorder. Similarly, in Aker v. State,3 17 the court upheld
(1975), upholding compensation to an employee who had to be hospitalized for acute
depressive reaction caused by the discovery of her supervisor's body lying in a pool of
blood after he had committed suicide, the court said, "Workmen's compensation, as dis-
tinguished from tort liability which is essentially based on fault, is designed to shift the risk
of loss of earning capacity caused by industrial accidents from the worker to industry and
ultimately the consumer." Id. at 508, 330 N.E.2d at 605, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
313. lB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 42.23(a), at 7-632; see id. at 7-636 (quoting Indem-
nity Ins. Co. v. Loftis, 103 Ga. App. 749, 751, 120 S.E.2d 655, 656 (1961)), which states:
The human body consists of bones, flesh, ligaments, and nerves, controlled
by the brain. The law does not state which of these particular elements must
produce the disability. If a disability exists, whether or not it is psychic or
mental, if it is real and is brought on by the accident and injury, this being a
humane law and liberally construed, it is nevertheless compensable.
Id; cf 53 CHI.-KENT L. RE V. 731, 738 n.38 (1977) (psychiatric techniques have advanced
to point where it can be determined with reasonable amount of certainty whether or not
mental distress is in fact real).
314. See 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1128, 1137.
315. 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435 (1960).
316. In response to the employer's claim that the employee intended to kill himself, see
generally MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1) (1978) (excluding "intentionally self-inflicted" inju-
ries), the court upheld the compensation court's finding based on psychiatric testimony
that the employee "had an uncontrollable impulse to end his life." 257 Minn. at 288-89,
101 N.W.2d at 439-40.
317. 282 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1979).
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death benefits when a Department of Natural Resources em-
ployee's emotional stress from handling badly decomposed bodies
and transporting them some miles by canoe produced a heart at-
tack that, in turn, caused a fatal second heart attack two weeks
later.3'8 It is hard to believe that the court would have denied
medical and disability benefits if the "ordeal" 31 9 of handling and
transporting the bodies had resulted in a nervous breakdown in-
stead of a heart attack. Accordingly, New York's highest court has
aptly observed:
[A]s noted in the psychiatric testimony there is nothing in the
nature of a stress or shock situation which ordains physical as
opposed to psychological injury. The determinative factor is
the particular vulnerability of an individual by virtue of his
physical makeup. In a given sitution one person may be sus-
ceptible to a heart attack while another may suffer a depressive
reaction. In either case the result is the same-the individual is
incapable of functioning properly because of an accident and
should be compensated under the Workmen's Compensation
Law. 320
ill. Occupational Disease Compensation Cases
A 1977 Georgia case3 2i held that Georgia's occupational disease
provision (requiring, inter aha, a "direct causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is performed and the dis-
ease" 322) could apply 32 3 to a young man who, employed for two
years as a counselor at an institution for boys with social and be-
318. The court noted:
Even though employee's second and fatal myocardial infarction of August
28, 1976, occurred when he was at home, if it was established that the first myo-
cardial infarction was work related, the requisite causation was established be-
cause the second infarction occurred in the vicinity of the first infarction and the
first infarction would have weakened employee's heart.
Id. at 535 n.2.
319. The widow used the term "ordeal" to describe the employee's description to her
of removing the bodies, and the employee had told a supervisor that it was "the damndest
thing he ever had to do in his years as an Officer." Id. at 535.
320. Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 330 N.E.2d 603, 606,
369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 641 (1975).
321. Sawyer v. Pacific Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. 298, 233 S.E.2d 227 (1977).
322. See GA. CODE ANN. § 114-803 (1973) (emphasis added). The statute provides in
relevant part:
Whenever used in this Chapter, the term "occupational disease" shall in-
clude only those diseases hereinafter listed in this section and shall be construed
to mean only such listed disease which is due to causes and conditions which are
characteristic of and peculiar to the particular trade, occupation, process, or em-
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havioral problems, developed paranoid schizophrenia because of
"deep preoccupations in the areas of religion (the institution had,
according to the psychiatric expert witness, a pronounced religious
orientation which affected the claimant) and homosexuality (relat-
ing to his interpretation of his feelings toward the younger boys in
his charge). '"324 His condition required hospitalization, elec-
troshock, and psychiatric treatment. 325 After upholding a ruling
that this was not an injury by "accident" 326 because the evidence
did not "delineate particularized traumatic occurrences, ' ' 327 the
court said:
There is, however, another valid approach to the problem in
this case. The evidence is undisputed that the claimant suf-
fered from an acute psychotic attack diagnosed as paranoid
schizophrenia, a mental illness characterized by loss of percep-
tion of reality, which may be, and in the opinion of the psychia-
trist was, initiated by the job influences to which the claimant
was exposed. This is, according to the expert testimony "a dis-
ease process."
The evidence here strongly suggests that a disease (acute
psychotic character disorder diagnosed paranoid schizophre-
ployment in which the employee is exposed to such disease (excluding all ordi-
nary diseases of life to which the general public are exposed), to wit:
5. Other occupational diseases providing the employee or the employee's
dependents first prove to the satisfaction of the State Board of Workmen's Com-
pensation (or the Medical Board if the matter in controversy is referred to it
under the provisions of section 114-819) all of the following:
(a) A direct causal connection between the conditions under which the
work is performed and the disease;
(b) That the disease followed as a natural incident of exposure by reason
of the employment;
(c) That the disease is not a character to which the employee may have
had substantial exposure outside of the employment;
(d) That the disease is not an ordinary disease of life to which the general
public is exposed;
(e) That the disease must appear to have had it[s] origin in a risk con-
nected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a natural
consequence.
Id.
323. The court held that the matter should be referred to the Medical Board to deter-
mine whether it did apply. See note 328 infra.
324. Sawyer v. Pacific Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. at 299, 233 S.E.2d at 229.
325. Id. at 299, 233 S.E.2d at 229.
326. Id. at 301, 233 S.E.2d at 230; cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 114-102 (1973) (" 'Injury' and
'personal injury' shall mean only injury by accident .... "). Regarding Minnesota's pre-
1953 "accident" requirement, see notes 34-41 supra and accompanying text.
327. Sawyer v. Pacific Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. at 300, 233 S.E.2d at 230.
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nia) resulted from pressures of the claimant's job environment
(close long term association with and responsibility for a group
of disturbed men) resulting in a disability to himself.
32 8
Courts in two other jurisdictions have held open the question
whether emotional effects of emotional stress at work may be com-
pensated under occupational disease provisions.329 The statutes in
these jurisdictions, however, do not specify that there must be "di-
rect" or "proximate" causation.
330
The Minnesota occupational disease provision's proximate
cause requirement should not prevent occuptional disease cover-
age when emotional stress at work produces emotional effects. As
328. Id. at 301, 303, 233 S.E.2d at 230, 231 (1977). The Sawyer court continued:
This is a medical question which should properly be referred to the Medical
Board for investigation under the provisions of Code § 114-819. That board
would have for decision whether such diagnosis is correct, whether it was job-
related, and whether the conditions of Code § 114-803(5) have been met.
Id. at 303, 233 S.E.2d at 231. The court denied a motion for rehearing, saying:
Movant urges that since it is admitted that this employee suffers from schizo-
phrenia there is no medical question in controversy. He then states, "The issue
was causality, and that, if we must remind the Court, is a question of fact!" We
agree with this statement as it is not controverted that the defendant now suffers
from this disease but whether or not such disease resulted from his employment
is a medical question and it is the crux of this lawsuit.
Id. at 303, 233 S.E.2d at 231-32.
Regarding Minnesota's short-lived medical board provision, see note 47 supra.
329. See Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960) (para-
noid schizophrenia from emotional pressures caused by inability to keep up with assembly
line and foreman's berating for improper procedure in attempting to do so). The court
said that its upholding compensation under the personal injury provision rendered unnec-
essary any discussion of the occupational disease provision's applicability. Id. at 593, 106
N.W.2d at 113. In Frazier v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 368 S.W.2d 955, 959 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963) (disabling neck pain from severe work pressures increasing over a year's time),
the court held that because the disorder was not "traced to an incident occurring at a
definite time and place," it was not an "injury" but a "disease," and said, "We are not
called upon to decide whether such disease is compensable under our statute because such
claim was not and is not made."
Cf Marable v. Singer Business Machs., 92 N.M. 261, 586 P.2d 1090 (1978), in which
the court held as a matter of law that " 'severe neurotic mental depression' allegedly devel-
oped by continued mental and physical harassment by male employees on the loading
dock who objected to a female dock employee" was not an occupational disease because it
was not a natural incident of the particular employment, it was not linked with the pro-
cess used by the employer, and it was not peculiar to claimant's occupation.
330. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.401 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (" 'Personal injury'
shall include a disease or disability which is due to causes and conditions which are char-
acteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer and which arises out of and in the
course of the employment."); TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1979) (" 'Personal Injury' . . . shall be construed to mean damage or harm to the
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indicated above,33' the reasons for the common law's failure to im-
pose liability for negligence resulting in emotional disturbance
alone have little, if any, application to workers' compensation sys-
tems that are not based upon fault principles and compensate only
such relatively objective matters as medical care, disability, and
death, but not pain and suffering. "Proximate cause" under the
occupational disease provision need not be equated with common-
law proximate cause in every respect, and should not be when the
reasons for the common-law feature of proximate cause do not ap-
ply to workers' compensation.
Further, the rule that if negligence "results in. .. emotional dis-
turbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable dam-
age, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance, '332 is
not really a rule of noncausation; it is a rule of nonliability, despite
the Restatement's placing it in the chapter on "causal relation."
333
This is obvious from the fact that the rule posits that negligence
"results" in emotional disturbance and concludes in terms of non-
liability rather than in terms of noncausation. Furthermore, the
reasons for the rule334 do not relate to lack of causation but to
policies allegedly supporting nonliability, such as triviality of the
harm.
At any rate, it may be that the type of triviality contemplated
by the Restatement would be lacking in many, if not all, cases in-
volving reasonably required medical treatment, disability, or
death necessary for workers' compensation to apply. The Com-
ment to the Restatement rule states that it "applies to all forms of
emotional disturbance, including temporary fright, nervous shock,
nausea, grief, rage, and humiliation" even when these disturbances
are accompanied by "transitory, non-recurring physical phenom-
ena, harmless in themselves, such as dizziness, vomiting, and the
like," when such phenomena "are in themselves inconsequential
and do not amount to any substantial bodily harm. ' '335 But, sig-
nificantly, the Comment goes on to say:
On the other hand, long continued nausea or headaches may
amount to physical illness, which is bodily harm; and even long
331. See notes 305-12 supra and accompanying text.
332. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) (emphasis added).
333. See id., ch. 16, entitled "The Causal Relation Necessary to Responsibility for Neg-
ligence."
334. See td., Comment b, quoted in text accompanying note 284 supra.
335. Id., Comment c.
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continued mental disturbance, as for example in the case of re-
peated hysterical attacks, or mental aberration, may be classi-
fied by the courts as illness, notwithstanding their mental
character. This becomes a medical or psychiatric problem,
rather than one of law.
3 36
The Comment just quoted deems "illness" to go beyond the
"emotional disturbance alone" specified by the Restatement. This
indicates that meeting the "disease" requirement 337 of the Minne-
sota occupational disease definition would alone, apart from the
other considerations mentioned above, 338 preclude an objection
that "emotional disturbance alone" does not meet the definition's
proximate cause requirement.
Accordingly, the Minnesota occupational disease provisions
should apply to all consequences of emotional disturbance proxi-
mately caused by the employment, if the disease provisions other-
wise are satisfied.
e. Superseding Cause
By requiring proximate cause in the occupational disease defini-
tion, the Minnesota Legislature may have intended to incorporate
the concept of "superseding cause. ' 339 As stated in a Washington
case:
The legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the
meaning of "proximate cause" as used by the courts, and that
being so . . .it would follow that they meant that the condi-
tion of the. . . employment must be the proximate cause of the
disease for which claim for compensation is made, and that the
cause must be proximate in the sense that there existed no in-
tervening independent and sufficient cause for the disease
340
The Minnesota court has stated that a cause supersedes liability
for negligence if:
(1) its harmful effects occurred after the original negligence;
(2) it was not brought about by the original negligence;
336. Id. (emphasis added).
337. See notes 362-78 zifla and accompanying text.
338. See notes 331-36 supra and accompanying text.
339. See genera~ W. PROSSER, supra note 250, at 270-89; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
TORTS §§ 440-453 (1965).
340. Simpson Logging Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 32 Wash. 2d 472, 479,
202 P.2d 448, 452 (1949); see note 230 supra.
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(3) it actively worked to bring about a result which would
not otherwise have followed from the original negligence; and
(4) it was not reasonably foreseeable by the original wrong-
doer. 
341
This formulation could be modified to apply to the workers'
compensation occupational disease setting by specifying that a
cause supersedes occupational disease compensability if:
(1) its harmful effects occurred after those of whatever it was
about the employment that increased the risk of the disease;
342
(2) it was not brought about by anything about the employ-
ment;
343
(3) it actively worked to bring about the disease344 that would
not otherwise have followed from whatever it was about the employ-
ment that increased the risk of the disease;345 and
(4) it was not reasonably foreseeable by the employer.
346
Number (3) is probably the most important, since it prevents an
intervening cause from superseding if it merely aggravates or
heightens the effects of a disease that would have resulted from the
employment without the intervening cause.
34 7
The operation of such an approach may be illustrated by Honer
v. Nicholson,348 a 1936 common-law negligence case. In Honer the
court found as a matter of law that a defendant's negligence was
not the proximate cause of decendent's fatal pneumonia. Dece-
dent's shoulder was sprained and he was otherwise bruised in a
collision between the car in which he was riding and defendant's
car.349 He missed work for a week and thereafter complained of
341. Cahill v. Peterson, 277 Minn. 26, 30, 151 N.W.2d 258, 260-61 (1967); Roberts v.
Donaldson, 276 Minn. 72, 82, 149 N.W.2d 401, 408 (1967); Kroeger v. Lee, 270 Minn. 75,
78, 132 N.W.2d 727, 729-30 (1965); see Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289, 1292 (8th Cir.
1975) (applying Minnesota law); 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE JIG II, 142 G-S (2d ed. 1974).
342. See discussion of "the employment" and "increased risk" in notes 156-221 supra
and accompanying text.
343. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442(c) (1965), referring to the interven-
ing force "operating independently of any situation created by the actor's negligence."
344. The reference is to "the disease" rather than "a result" because the court has held
that a compensable result of an occupational disease need only arise out of, and need not
be proximately caused by, the occupational disease. See notes 243-46 supra and accompa-
nying text.
345. See discussion of "the employment" and "increased risk" in notes 156-221 supra
and accompanying text.
346. If the employer is an artificial entity, the reference is to someone in the position of
the employer.
347. See note 344 supra.
348. 198 Minn. 55, 268 N.W. 852 (1936).
349. Id. at 55, 268 N.W. at 852.
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soreness and fatigue. 350 Five weeks and three days after the acci-
dent, he was exposed for about an hour to severe cold while the car
in which he was riding to work was being repaired.3 5 1 Although
the attending. physician opined that the pneumonia and death in
no way resulted from the injury because the injury was "too far
away in time," two other doctors opined that the accident weak-
ened the decedent's resistance to the pneumonia germ and was a
contributing cause of death.352 Reversing a judgment of liability,
the court reasoned:
Taking the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses at full face
value, as a matter of law it does not show connection as proxi-
mate cause between the accident complained of and the death
of the plaintiffs intestate. . . . The accident was too remotely
connected with the death to be considered as a material factor
in its connection therewith.
[I]f weakened resistance alone satisfied the requirement of prox-
imate causation, the plaintiff should recover irrespective of the
lapse of any time short of that of the statute of limitations.
That, we think, shows the practical flaw in the thesis that justi-
fies recovery for lowered resistance alone. That doctrine as-
sumes intervention of a cause succeeding the original wrong but
antecedent to the operation, as contributing cause, of the low-
ered resistance. If that intervening cause be dependent on his
wrong, the first wrongdoer remains liable. But if it is indepen-
dent of his wrong, as it must have been here of defendant's neg-
ligence, it is settled law that there can be no recovery.
353
If the occupational disease definition's proximate cause require-
ment incorporates the common law's superseding cause concept,
the Honer court's approach regarding a negligence claim against a
tortfeasor would apply to a workers' compensation claim against
an employer. Thus, compensation would be granted if pneumonia
resulted directly from weakened resistance to pneumonia germs
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 56, 268 N.W. at 852.
353. Id. at 57-59, 268 N.W. at 853-54. For cases upholding common-law liability in
which no cause, such as the exposure to severe cold as in Honer, intervened between the
negligent conduct and the disease, see Anderson v. Anderson, 188 Minn. 602, 248 N.W. 35
(1933) (decedent became ill immediately after accident and died from pneumonia 52 days
later); Healy v. Hoy, 115 Minn. 321, 132 N.W. 208 (1911) (death from pulmonary tuber-
culosis eight months after very severe injury); Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. L.R.R., 76
Minn. 90, 78 N.W. 965 (1899) (death from articular rheumatism four and one half months
after spraining ankle because of defendant's negligence).
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caused by a stint of exhausting work354 substantially 355 increasing
the risk of contracting pneumonia beyond that of the general pub-
lic. 356 If, however, the employee would not have contracted pneu-
monia without a non-work one-hour exposure to severe cold five
weeks later,357 the hour's exposure would have superseded occupa-
tional disease compensability because:
(1) its harmful effects occurred after those of the exhausting
work;
(2) it was not brought about by anything about the employ-
ment;
3 5 8
(3) it actively worked to bring about the pneumonia that
otherwise would not have followed from the exhausting work;
and
(4) it was not reasonably foreseeable by the employer.
359
This approach is to be contrasted with that used for arising-out-
of issues. For example, in Hanson v. Robishek-Schneider Co., 360 up-
holding death benefits for an employee's night time assault by rob-
bers near his place of employment in a high crime part of the city,
the court said:
Because of the intervening wrongful act of third parties or
some such extrinsic contribution, the employment may not be
the proximate cause. But it may be nonetheless so much source
of the event that the latter in a very real and decisive sense
arises out of the employment, much as a plant arises from the
soil, although growth would have been impossible but for the
seed.
3 6 1
354. For a discussion of the approach that might have been used if the pneumonia
resulted from a "personal injury" at work, see note 249 supra and accompanying text.
355. See notes 266-81 supra and accompanying text.
356. See notes 176-221 supra and accompanying text.
357. See notes 341 and 344 supra and accompanying text.
358. A normal commuting trip to work as in Honer would not be considered an inci-
dent of the employment. See Satack v. Department of Pub. Safety, 275 N.W.2d 556, 557
(Minn. 1978); Kelley v. Northwest Paper Co., 190 Minn. 291, 292-93, 251 N.W. 274, 274-
75 (1933); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 15.11 (1978).
359. For a discussion of foreseeability of intervening cause, see Knutson v. Nielsen, 256
Minn. 506, 514-15, 99 N.W.2d 215, 220-21 (1959); Ferraro v. Taylor, 197 Minn. 5, 7-11,
265 N.W. 829, 831-32 (1936); W. PROSSER, supra note 250, at 272-75; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 442A (1965). See generaly H. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 250,
at 232-34, 248-56.
360. 209 Minn. 596, 297 N.W. 19 (1941).
361. Id. at 599, 297 N.W. at 21.
Regarding a criminal act as an intervening cause, see Hilligoss v. Cross Cos., 304
Minn. 546, 547, 228 N.W.2d 585, 586 (1975) (per curiam), and authorities cited therein.
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. Dzsease
To be covered by the occupational disease definition, the condi-
tion for which the employment increased the risk and that it proxi-
mately caused must be a "disease." Notwithstanding its
superabundance of detail regarding the term "occupational," the
Minnesota statute does not define, and has not defined, the term
"disease." Nor do other states' statutes, except that a few add a
term of inclusion by providing that "occupational disease" means
(occupational) "disease or illness, '362 "disease or infection,"363 or
"ailment or disease." 364
Professor Larson states simply, "The term 'disease' is construed
in its broadest dictionary meaning of any 'serious derangement of
health' or 'disordered state of an organism or organ.' "365 Encyclo-
pedia Britannica also defines disease simply, as a "departure from
the normal physiological state of a living organism sufficient to
produce overt signs, or symptoms. '366 Webster's Dictionary is to
the same effect, albeit at more length:
an impairment of the normal state of the living. . . body or of
any of its components that interrupts or modifies the perfor-
mance of the vital functions, being a response to environmental
factors (as malnutrition, industrial hazards, or climate), to spe-
cific infective agents (as worms, bacteria, or viruses), to inherent
defects of the organism (as various genetic anomalies), or to a
combination of these factors .... 367
Similarly, medical dictionaries define disease as "[a]ny alteration
or separation from health . . . . An abnormal state of the body
which interrupts or disturbs the vital functions" 36 8 and "an inter-
ruption, cessation, or disorder of body functions, systems, or or-
gans. . . . A disease entity, characterized usually by at least two of
these criteria: a recognized etiologic agent (or agents); an identifi-
able group of signs and symptoms; consistent anatomical altera-
362. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1031. 1(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1980); OKLA STAT. ANN.
tit. 85, § 3(10) (West Gum. Supp. 1979-1980).
363. OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802(1)(a) (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.08.140
(1962).
364. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § I (West 1971).
365. 1B A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 41.40, at 7-388 (quoting POCKET OXFORD DIc-
TIONARY (1926 ed.)).
366. 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA MACROPAEDIA Disease 837 (1974).
367. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE UNABRIDGED 648 (1976).








In line with these broad definitions, Minnesota's occupational
disease definition has been held applicable to disorders caused by
trauma, 370 stress, 37 1 noise,3 7 2 dust, 373 and fumes, 3 74 as well as to
those caused by temperature extremes
375 and germs. 37 6
The Minnesota court, in explaining why applying time limita-
tions to occupational disease cases had presented continuous diffi-
culty and why the nature of occupational disease is repugnant to
definite time limitations, drew the following distinction: "[U]nlike
accidental injury with its sudden onset of disability, occupational
disease is insidious in nature, generally involving a long and grad-
ual period of development and varying degrees of disability.
'377
369. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 401 (4th unabridged lawyers' ed. 1976).
370. See Jensen v. Kronick's Floor Covering Serv., 309 Minn. 541, 245 N.W.2d 230
(1976) (per curiam) (carpal tunnel syndrome caused by repetitive minute trauma in han-
dling carpets). Carpal tunnel syndrome is pain and numbness in the hand caused by
compression of the median nerve. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1380 (4th una-
bridged lawyers' ed. 1976).
371. See Schwartz v. City of Duluth, 264 Minn. 514, 119 N.W.2d 822 (1963) (coronary
sclerosis caused by stress of firefighting). But cf Hough v. Drevdahl & Son Co., 281
N.W.2d 690, 692 (Minn. 1979) (upholding denial for truck driver's heart trouble from
stress because compensation court could find work stress "not significantly different from
the stress to which ordinary living exposes everyone").
372. See Fehling v. Dayton Rogers Mfg. Co., 28 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 35 (1975)
(hearing loss caused by factory noise).
373. See Reierson v. Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc., 287 Minn. 179, 177 N.W.2d 301
(1970) (dermatomyositis from exposure to dust); Fitch v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal
Ass'n, 274 Minn. 234, 143 N.W.2d 192 (1966) (bronchial asthma and pulmonary emphy-
sema from grain and flour dust and insect fumigants); cf. Sandy v. Walter Butler
Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 21 N.W.2d 612 (1946) (machinist's dermatitis from
spun glass insulation dust); Ulmaneic v. Aaron Carlson Co., 28 Minn. Workmen's Comp.
Dec. 462 (1976) (woodworker's lung disease from sawdust); Wiskerchen v. Armour & Co.,
26 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 419 (1972) (packing house worker's dermatitis from
sensitivity to pork); Norwood v. State, 15 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 369 (1948) (hos-
pital worker's dermatitis from sensitivity to certain soap). But see Morgan v. State, 281
N.W.2d 710 (Minn. 1979) (upholding denial because of failure to prove employee was
exposed to enough asbestos in employment to cause asbestosis).
374. See Scott v. Southview Chevrolet Co., 267 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1978) (pulmonary
emphysema from exhaust fumes); Boldt v. Josten's, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 82, 83 (Minn. 1977)
(Goodpasture's Syndrome, "a rare disease which attacks the basement membrane of the
kidneys and the alveolar lining cells of the lungs," from working with heated diploma
glue); Meyer v. A.B. McMahan Co., 269 Minn. 73, 130 N.W.2d 46 (1964) (pulmonary
fibrosis from chemical fumes).
375. See Sinclair v. Frye, 18 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 93 (1954) (ischemic neuritis
caused by working in cold water).
376. See Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. 220, 84 N.W.2d 606 (1957) (tuberculosis
caused by patrol car duty with a tuberculous fellow police officer).
377. Notch v. Victory Granite Co., 306 Minn. 495, 501, 238 N.W.2d 426, 430 (1976).
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Similarly, the compensation court, in finding hearing loss from
factory noise to be an occupational disease, noted that occupa-
tional disease "is generally something that develops gradually over
a long period of time instead of suddenly and violently.
'378
V. COMPENSATION UNDER THE PERSONAL INJURY
DEFINITION
The foregoing discussion has indicated that the only respect in
which the occupational disease definition is more demanding than
the personal injury definition is that it requires proximate causa-
tion. 3 79 Now that the Legislature has omitted the "caused by acci-
dent" requirement from the personal injury definition, 38 0  a
claimant should be able to avoid the necessity of meeting the occu-
pational disease definition's proximate cause requirement by pro-
ceeding (solely or in the alternative) under the statute's personal
injury definition. 381 That definition specifies in relevant part:
"Personal injury" means an injury arising out of and in the
course of employment and includes personal injury caused by
occupational disease, but does not cover an employee except
while engaged in, on, or about the premises where his services
require his presence as a part of such services at the time of the
injury and during the hours of such service.
3 2
As with the occupational disease definition,38 3 the personal in-
jury definition has -been held applicable to disorders caused by
The apparent reason for the court's referring to "accidental" injury despite the Legisla-
ture's 1953 removal of the words "by accident" from the "personal injury" definition, see
note 50 supra and accompanying text, is that the Act still imposes a time limitation run-
ning "from the date of the accident." MINN. STAT. § 176.151(1) (1978).
378. Fehling v. Dayton Rogers Mfg. Co., 28 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 38 (1975)
(citing Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lynch, 63 Ga. App. 530, 11 S.E.2d 699 (1940)).
379. See notes 148-378 supra and accompanying text.
380. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
381. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1978).
382. Id. It goes on to provide:
Where the employer regularly furnished transportation to his employees to and
from the place of employment such employees are subject to this chapter while
being so transported, but shall not include an injury caused by the act of a third
person or fellow employee intended to injure the employee because of reasons
personal to him, and not directed against him as an employee or because of his
employment.
Id.
383. See notes 370-76 supra and accompanying text.
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trauma, 38 4 stress, 3 85 fumes, 3 86 temperature extremes, 38 7 and
germs. 388 Personal injury coverage has also been upheld for her-
nia 38 9 or heart attack 39° caused by exertion. Additionally, and
very significantly, the court has specified that work-related aggra-
vation of a preexisting disease (as well as a preexisting injury) con-
stitutes a "personal injury" under the statute:
It is well recognized that a preexisting disease or infirmity of
the employee does not disqualify a claim arising out of employ-
ment if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined
with the disease or infirmity to produce disability for which
compensation is sought. Common examples include hyper-
trophic arthritis . . . ; cancer or malignant tumor. . . ; degen-
erative process involving the brain . . . ; paresis accelerated by
injuries to the head . . . ; and innumerable phases of heart dif-
ficulties . .. .91
384. See Lakics v. Lane Bryant Dep't Store, 263 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. 1978) (cancer in
sinus from injury to bony structure of nose); Barcel v. Barrel Finish, 304 Minn. 536, 232
N.W.2d 13 (1975) (carpal tunnel syndrome); Fuller v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co.,
271 Minn. 470, 136 N.W.2d 307 (1965) (knee cancer from crate falling on knee); Pittman
v. Pillsbury Flour Mills, Inc., 234 Minn. 517, 48 N.W.2d 735 (1951) (breast cancer from
body of electric drill hitting breast).
385. See Aker v. State, 282 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1979) (heart attack caused by mental
stress of having to handle and transport badly decomposed bodies); cf. Nederostek v. Min-
nesota Mining & Mfg. Co., No. 188-16-0763 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. May 15,
1979) (heart attack from "a combination of mental and physical stress").
386. See Adler v. Interstate Power Co., 180 Minn. 192, 230 N.W. 486 (1930) (gas
poisoning caused by inhalation of coal fumes).
387. See Ueltschi v. Certified Ice & Fuel Co., 201 Minn. 302, 276 N.W. 220 (1937)
(heatstroke caused by working on three very hot days); State ex rel. Rau v. District Court,
138 Minn. 250, 164 N.W. 916 (1917) (sunstroke from hot afternoon's work). See generally
IB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 38.40.
388. See State ex rel. Rau v. District Court, 137 Minn. 435, 163 N.W. 755 (1917) (gon-
orrheal infection from germs introduced when a particle that cut employee's eyeball was
removed); cf. Pechavar v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 196 Minn. 558, 265 N.W. 429 (1936)
(eye ulcer caused by infection either from particle that caused inflammation of employee's
eye at work or treatment of eye). See generally IB A. LARSON, supra note 18, §§ 40.20-.50;
W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, supra note 179, at 254-62.
389. See Balow v. Kellogg Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 248 Minn. 20, 78 N.W.2d 430
(1956).
390. SeeJerabek v. City of Rochester, 281 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. 1979); Roszak v. United
States Steel Corp., 309 Minn. 471, 245 N.W.2d 196 (1976); Wever v. Farmhand, Inc., 309
Minn. 42, 243 N.W.2d 37 (1976); Kleman v. Ford Motor Co., 307 Minn. 218, 239 N.W.2d
449 (1976); Murphy v. St. Paul Goodwill Indus., 283 Minn. 496, 168 N.W.2d 505 (1969);
Prax v. Standard Constr. Co., 280 Minn. 555, 158 N.W.2d 860 (1968); Peterson v. Ruber-
oid Co., 261 Minn. 497, 113 N.W.2d 85 (1962); Rosvold v. Independent Consol. School
Dist. No. 102, 251 Minn. 297, 87 N.W.2d 646 (1958); Golob v. Buckingham Hotel, 244
Minn. 301, 69 N.W.2d 636 (1955); Stephen v. Miles Constr. Co., 240 Minn. 307, 60
N.W.2d 801 (1953); Kemling v. Armour & Co., 222 Minn. 397, 24 N.W.2d 842 (1946);
Hiber v. City of St. Paul, 219 Minn. 87, 16 N.W.2d 878 (1944).
391. Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 323, 101 N.W.2d 200, 204 (1960) (cita-
tions omitted) (upholding personal injury coverage for aggravation of preexisting deterio-
rative foot disorder by sales clerk's work requiring her to be constantly on her feet seven
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The law is clear that a claimant may proceed under the personal
injury definition for any of the foregoing disorders, notwithstand-
ing the fact that some of them also could be characterized as occu-
pational diseases.
This overlap has been recognized explicitly on several occasions.
In Fehh'ng v. Dayton Rogers Manufacturing Co., 392 the compensation
court found the longer time-for-notice provision 393 applicable to
hearing loss from factory noise because it was an occupational dis-
ease rather than Oust?) a personal injury. 394 Reasoning that occu-
pational loss of hearing had most of the characteristics of
occupational disease and more logically fell within that classifica-
tion, 395 the court noted, "Needless to say, of course, there will be
factual situations that may be logically called a 'personal injury' or
'occupational disease.' "396
In Jensen v. KroncK's Floor Covering Servi'ce,397 the Minnesota
Supreme Court, upholding occupational disease coverage for a
carpet layer's carpal tunnel syndrome from repetitive minute
trauma, quoted the occupational disease definition and stated:
The statutory definition does not set out criteria from which
one can exclusively classify the impairment resulting from re-
petitive minute trauma as either personal injury or occupa-
tional disease.3 98  Although the compensation board has
heretofore treated this type of impairment as a personal in-
jury,399 there is no sound basis in law or logic for reversing its
hours a day); cf Cunnien v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 27 Minn. Workmen's Comp.
Dec. 141 (1973) (compensation for work injury's aggravation of preexisting alcoholism
condition); Payne v. Hagstrom Constr. Co., 16 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 148 (1950)
(compensation for work injury's aggravation of previously dormant syphilis).
392. 28 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 35 (1975).
393. See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text.
394. The compensation court stated:
In determining whether or not the employee's claim is barred, it must be
determined whether he suffered a "personal injury" or an "occupational dis-
ease." Minn. St. 176.141 [the shorter time-for-notice provision] does not apply to
occupational diseases. In regard to occupational diseases, Minn. St. 176.151,
Par. (7) [now (4)] is applicable.
28 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 36.
395. See text accompanying note 147 supra.
396. 28 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 40 n.3.
397. 309 Minn. 541, 245 N.W.2d 230 (1976) (per curiam).
398. Footnote by the court: "The overlap of the two categories of impairment where
disability results from repetitive minute trauma has been recognized in other jurisdictions.
See, generally, 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation, § 39.60." Id. at 543 n.1, 245 N.W.2d
at 232 n.l.
399. Footnote by the court: "See, Barcel v. Barrel Finish, 304 Minn. 536, 232 N.W.2d
(Vol. 6
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classification pursuant to the expert medical testimony and fac-
tual findings of this case.
40 0
In Young o. Ammerman Co., 40  upholding a pretrial order dis-
missing certain insurers because there was no showing that the em-
ployee's pulmonary condition originated during the time they
were insuring the risk, but refusing to dismiss subsequent employ-
ers and insurers on the ground that apportionment might be ap-
propriate, 40 2 the compensation court said:
It should be noted that employee's condition may be both a
personal injury and an occupational disease, or mixed. The na-
ture of the lung condition, when it was contracted, or when it
became disabling, and the issue of apportionment all require
holding Ammerman Company and Employers Mutual Casu-
alty Company and all subsequent employers and their insurers
in. If the condition is either a personal injury or a mixed condi-
tion which can be designated either as a personal injury or oc-
cupational disease, [Minnesota Statutes section 176.66(3)]
would not apply.
40 3
A former statute provided that "[n]either the employe nor his de-
pendents shall be entitled to compensation for disability or death
resulting from disease unless the disease ... [was] contracted...




Thus the compensation court in Young was saying that if an em-
13 (1975); Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 101 N.W.2d 200 (1960)." Id. at 543 n.2,
245 N.W.2d at 232 n.2.
400. Id. at 543, 245 N.W.2d at 232 (1976).
401. No. 477-40-0568 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. June 18, 1979), reargument de-
med, No. 477-40-0568 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. July 9, 1979), vacated ipart on other
grounds after remand, No. 477-40-0568 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1980).
402. See id., slip op. at 3. Act of Mar. 15, 1921, ch. 82, § 67(5), 1921 Minn. Laws 90,
127, as amended by Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 633, § 4(5), 1943 Minn. Laws 969, 971-72
(repealed 1973), provided for apportionment among employers of compensation for occu-
pational disease. Regarding these severe limitations on the extent to which equitable ap-
portionment may be available after the 1973 repeal, see Robin v. Royal Improvement Co.,
289 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. 1979); Michels v. American Hoist & Derrick, 269 N.W.2d 57
(Minn. 1978); Jensen v. Kronick's Floor Covering Serv., 309 Minn. 541, 245 N.W.2d 230
(1976) (per curiam); Swenson v. Industrial Sandblasting Metal Works, 31 Minn. Workers'
Comp. Dec. 601 (1979); Evers v. Lundin Constr. Co., 31 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 325
(1979).
403. Young v. Ammerman Co., No. 477-40-0568, slip op. at 1-2 (Minn. Workers'
Comp. Ct. App. July 9, 1979), denying reargument to, No. 477-40-0568 (Minn. Workers'
Comp. Ct. App. June 18, 1979); cf. Gilmore v. Little Jack's Steak House, 32 Workers'
Comp. Dec. 4 (1979), affdon other grounds, 292 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 1980) (bartender's der-
matitis from water, ice, detergents, fruit juices, and other irritants is both occupational
disease and personal injury).
404. Act of Mar. 15, 1921, ch. 82, § 67(3), 1921 Minn. Laws 90, 127 (repealed 1973).
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ployee's condition came within the personal injury definition, the
claimant could proceed entirely under that provision and not be
bound by the stricter provisions regulating workers who proceed
under the occupational disease definition.
If the Young decision was correct as to the former provision bar-
ring compensation for an occupational disease not contracted
within twelve months before disablement, the same approach must
be applied to the definition's provision that "[a]n employer is not
liable for compensation for any occupational disease which cannot
be traced to the employment as a direct and proximate cause." 4 5
A worker who cannot show that the employment proximately
caused the disease should be able to proceed under the personal
injury provision.
Accordingly, it remains only to determine what diseases appro-
priately may be characterized as "personal injuries." As indicated
above, certain diseases caused by trauma, stress, fumes, tempera-
ture extremes, germs entering through wounds, 40 6 or exertion are
clearly capable of such characterization, 407 as are work-related ag-
gravations of preexisting diseases.
408
More broadly, any disease may be characterized as a "personal
injury." Professor Larson's black letter definition of "personal in-
jury" is "any harmful change in the body" that "may include such
injuries as disease.' 40 9 Similarly, Encyclopedia Britannica defines
405. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
406. Regarding diseases from germs entering otherwise than through wounds, see An-
dreason v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Utah 561, 563-64, 102 P.2d 894, 895 (1940) ("If the
inhalation of gas. . . is an injury, is there any reason why the inhalation or swallowing of
germs is not an injury?"); IB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 40.30 ("the majority of cases
hold the unexpected contraction of infectious disease to be an injury by accident"); W.
MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, supra note 179, at 256-62; cf Pechavar v. Oliver Iron
Mining Co., 196 Minn. 558, 265 N.W. 429 (1936) (infection of eye that was inflamed but
not bleeding when particle entered it).
407. See notes 383-90 supra and accompanying text.
408. See note 391 supra and accompanying text.
409. lB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 42.00 (emphasis added), which states in relevant
part, " 'Personal injury' includes any harmful change in the body. It need not involve
physical trauma, but may include such injuries as disease, sunstroke, nervous collapse,
traumatic neurosis, hysterical paralysis, and neurasthenia." See 4 A. LARSON, supra, at 643
(1980) (" 'Injury' means any harmful change in the human organism arising out of and in
the course of employment, including damage to or loss of a prosthetic appliance, but does
not include any communicable disease unless the risk of contracting such disease is in-
creased by the nature of the employment." (footnote omitted)) (quoting COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, MODEL WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT § 2(a) (1974)); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 342.620(1) (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1980) (substantially identical); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 27-12-102(a)(xii) (1977) (substantially identical except specifies "other than nor-
[Vol. 6
78
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss3/3
COMPENSATION FOR DISEASE
injury as "any damage done the body, particularly by an outside
force."'4 10 (A risk-increasing facet of the employment would qual-
ify as an outside force.) The Minnesota court has quoted with ap-
proval the Iowa court's statement, "The injury to the human body
. . . must be something. . . that acts extraneously to the natural
processes of nature, and thereby impairs the health, overcomes, in-
jures, interrupts, or destroys some function of the body, or other-
wise damages or injures a part or all of the body.
'41 1
In 1946 when the "caused by accident" requirement was still
included in the personal injury definition, the Minnesota court
recognized that disease is injury by saying, "Compensation liabil-
ity follows whenever the employe sustains an injury, whether acciden-
tal or occupational, if it arises out of and in the course of his
employment.' 4 12  In light of the statutory development at the
time, the court was necessarily referring to "accidental injury" and
"occupational disease injury," the latter recognizing disease as in-
jury.
Many states' compensation statutes recognize that diseases are
injuries by defining "injury" or "personal injury" specifically to
include occupational disease.413 California's statute is even more
straightforward by specifying that " 'Injury' includes any injury or
mal aging"); cf. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980)
("damage or harm to the physical structure of the body"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.01(c)
(West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) ("mental or physical harm to an employe caused by acci-
dent or disease").
410. V ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA MICROPAEDIA Injury 357 (1974); see WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED
1164 (1976) ("hurt, damage, or loss sustained"); cf. B. MALOY, THE SIMPLIFIED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY FOR LAYWERS 323 (2d ed. 1951) ("A hurt suffered by a person or a thing; a
hurt or damage sustained, as a severe injury. A hurt of any sort; a wound; a maim, a
lesion."); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 709 (4th unabridged lawyers' ed. 1976)
("Damage; trauma; an accidental or inflicted wound.").
411. Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 320, 101 N.W.2d 200, 206 (1960) (quoting
Almquist v. Shenandoah Nurseries, Inc., 218 Iowa 724, 731, 254 N.W. 35, 39 (1934)).
412. Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 218, 21 N.W.2d 612,
614 (1946) (emphasis added).
413. See ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.265(13) (1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-901(9)(c)
(Supp. 1971-1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1302(d) (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-41-
108(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979); Pub. Act. No. 79-540, § 1, 1979 Conn. Pub. Acts 812, 812; DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301(11) (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.620(1) (1977 & Gum. Supp.
1980); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 418.401(c) (Gum. Supp. 1980-1981); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 281:2(V) (1978 & Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8)(a) (Supp. 1979);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 3(7) (West Gum. Supp. 1979-1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-
902(4) (Cum. Supp. 1980); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 65.1-7 (1980); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978).
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disease arising out of employment. '4 14 Minnesota's statute speci-
fies that disease is injury in at least one context-the special fund
provision includes a subdivision stating that "an occupational dis-
ease may be deemed to be the personal (second) injury."
4 15
Another way to view the matter is to recognize that, whether or
not disease zs injury, disease can cause injury. The Minnesota stat-
utes specifically recognize that occupational disease can cause injury,
by specifying, " 'Personal injury' . . . includes personal injury
caused by bccupational disease, '416 and by providing different
time-for-notice limitations "[i]n the case of injury caused by . . .
occupational disease."' 4 17 If occupational disease can cause injury,
so can other disease. If injury caused by disease arose "out of and
in the course of employment" while the employee was "engaged
in, on, or about the premises where his services require his presence
as a part of such service at the time of the injury and during the
hours of such service, ' 41 8 the employee should be able to disregard
the fact that the injury was caused by disease and focus merely
upon the fact that the injury met the statute's requirements for
coverage as a "personal injury."
Some might object that allowing a claimant to seek compensa-
tion for a disease under the personal injury definition would con-
travene a legislative intent that disease be compensated only upon
meeting the occupational disease definition, indicated by the Leg-
islature's keeping the occupational disease definition in force after
414. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); Cf. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152,
§ 1 (7A) (Michie/Law. Coop. 1976) ("'Personal injury' includes infections or contagious
diseases if the nature of the employment is such that the hazard of contracting such dis-
eases by an employee is inherent in the employment.").
415. MINN. STAT. § 176.131(7) (1978). This section states that under subdivisions 1
and 2, providing for reimbursement of an employer whose employee incurs personal in-
jury and suffers disability that is substantially greater, because of a preexisting physical
impairment, than what would have resulted from the personal injury alone, occupational
disease may be deemed to be the personal (second) injury. According to the statute:
If the subsequent disability for which reimbursement is claimed is an occu-
pational disease, and if, subsequent to registration as provided by subdivisions 4
and 5, the employee has been employed by the employer in employment similar
to that which initially resulted in such occupational disease, no reimbursement
shall be paid to the employer.
Id.
This provision's predecessor, in effect from 1965 to 1973, provided, "Under subdivi-
sions I and 2, occupational disease shall not be deemed to be the personal (second) in-
jury." Act of May 6, 1965, ch. 327, § 1(7), 1965 Minn. Laws 463, 464 (amended 1973).
416. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1978).
417. Id. § 176.151(4), quoted n note 145 supra.
418. Id. § 176.011(16).
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omitting the "caused by accident" requirement from the personal
injury definition. But there are a number of responses to this ob-
jection.
First, it may be that the Legislature in 1953 did not take the
time to contemplate in full detail the consequences of omitting
"caused by accident" for "personal injury" coverage of disease. 419
Second, at the same time as it adopted the occupational disease
definition in 1943, the Legislature expressly provided:
Nothing in this section [providing compensation for disabil-
ity or death from occupational disease] affects the rights of an
employee to recover compensation in respect to a disease to
which this section does not apply if the disease is an accidental
personal injury within the meaning of the other provisions of
this act.
420
This provision, which remained in effect until 1973,421 clearly
showed that the Legislature did not intend to restrict disease cov-
erage to the occupational disease definition. It also constituted
legislative recognition that disease can fall within the "personal
injury" definition, by recognizing that it could fall within the
stricter "personal injury caused by accident" definition of the for-
mer statute.
This contrasts sharply with those state legislatures that have ex-
cluded disease from injury or personal injury coverage.422 Far
from taking a restrictive approach toward the definition of per-
sonal injury, the Minnesota Legislature has taken a very expansive
approach by making Minnesota one of the first states, and still one
of only eight states, to dispense with the requirement that personal
419. For example, it was not until 20 years later that the Legislature repealed a provi-
sion referring to "accidental personal injury," see Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 643, § 12, 1973
Minn. Laws 1584, 1594 (repealing the provision quoted in text accompanying note 420
infa), and changed a provision to have disablement resulting from an occupational dis-
ease regarded as a "personal injury" rather than "the happening of an accident." See id.
§ 11, 1973 Minn. Laws at 1594. Further, MINN. STAT. § 176.151(1) (1978) still sets a time
limit "not to exceed six years from the date of the accident," although section 176.151(2)
specifies "six years from the date of injuty" and section 176.141 (quoted in note 146 supra)
makes time for notice run "from the occurrence of the bynuty." (emphasis added).
420. Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 633, § 4(8), 1943 Minn. Laws 969, 973 (repealed 1973).
421. See Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 643, § 12, 1973 Minn. Laws 1584, 1594.
422. See IDAHO CODE § 72-102(14)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 85.61(5)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1021(6) (West
Cum. Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.020(3) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980); MoNT.
CODE ANN. § 39-71-119 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
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injury be "caused by accident. '423
Finally, interpreting "personal injury" to include disease does
not deprive the occupational disease definition of all significance.
It still has the following consequences that can explain the Legisla-
ture's having kept it in force after omitting the personal injury def-
inition's caused-by-accident requirement:
(1) Since the occupational disease definition includes no lan-
guage like that in the personal injury definition specifying that
it "does not cover an employee except while engaged in, on, or
about the premises where his services require his presence as a
part of such service at the time of the injury and during the
hours of such service,"'424 the occupational disease definition
may apply when the disease only arose in the course of employ-
ment, as opposed to occurred in the course of employment. As
Professor Larson has noted, " 'Arising' connotes origin, not
completion or manifestation. '425 Thus, a claimant whose dis-
ease was caused by the employment but did not occur at work
would want to proceed, at least in the alternative, under the
occupational disease definition.
(2) A claimant has a much longer time within which to give
notice of injury if the injury was caused by occupational dis-
ease. 426 Thus, a claimant who has failed to give notice within
180 days427 would want to show that the injury was caused by
occupational disease in order to be permitted to give notice
anytime "within three years after the employee has knowledge
of the cause of such injury and the injury has resulted in disa-
bility."
'428
423. See note 50 supra.
424. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1978).
425. IA A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 29.22, at 5-378 (1979).
426. See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text.
427. See MINN. STAT. § 176.141 (Supp. 1979), quotedin note 146 supra.
428. MINN. STAT. § 176.151(4) (1978), quoted in note 145 supra, cf. Villarreal v. Albert
Lea Electro Plating, Inc., 281 N.W.2d 883, 884 (Minn. 1979) (remanded because compen-
sation court's findings failed to differentiate between personal injury and occupational
disease); Fehling v. Dayton Rogers Mfg. Co., 28 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 35, 36-37
(1975) (because hearing loss held to be occupational disease, worker's notice was timely),
discussed in text accompanying notes 144-47 supra.
It should be noted that the compensation court has ruled that the shorter time period
for notice of injuries generally does not commence running until the employee has knowl-
edge of the "probable compensable character" of the injury. See Kitt v. McGlynn Baker-
ies, Inc., 30 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 213, 215 (1977). Although the employee in Kit
had a heart attack in November, 1975, he did not learn of its probable work-related na-
ture until June, 1976. The compensation court held that he had 90 (now 180) days from
June of 1976 in which to give notice. Id. at 214-15.
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(3) The three-year time-for-notice provision also applies to
commencement of proceedings when the injury was caused by
occupational disease,4 29 rather than the normal personal injury
provisions governing time for commencement of proceed-
ings.
4 30
(4) "Second injury" reimbursement to the employer from the
special fund is precluded in certain circumstances "[i]f the sub-




The last sentence of the occupational disease provision specifies:
If immediately preceeding the date of his disablement or death,
an employee was employed on active duty with an organized
fire or police department of any municipality, as a member of
the Minnesota highway patrol, conservation officer service,
state crime bureau, as a forest officer by the department of nat-
ural resources, or sheriff or full time deputy sheriff of any
county, and his disease is that of myocarditis, coronary sclerosis,
429. See MINN. STAT. § 176.151(4) (1978), quoted in note 145 supra,
430. MINN. STAT. § 176.151 (1978) provides in part:
The time within which the following acts shall be performed shall be lim-
ited to the following periods, respectively:
(1) Actions or proceedings by an injured employee to determine or recover
compensation, three years after the employer has made written report of the
injury to the commissioner of the department of labor and industry, but not to
exceed six years from the date of the accident.
(2) Actions or proceedings by dependents to determine or recover compen-
sation, three years after the receipt by the commissioner of the department of
labor and industry of written notice of death, given by the employer, but not to
exceed six years from the date of injury, provided, however, if the employee was
paid compensation for the injury from which the death resulted, such actions or
proceedings by dependents must be commenced within three years after the re-
ceipt by the commissioner of the department of labor and industry of written
notice of death, given by the employer, but not to exceed six years from the date
of death. In any such case, if a dependent of the deceased, or any one in his
behalf, gives written notice of such death to the commissioner of the department
of labor and industry, the commissioner shall forthwith give written notice to the
employer of the time and place of such death. In case the deceased was a native
of a foreign country and leaves no known dependent within the United States,
the commissioner of the department of labor and industry shall give written no-
tice of the death to the consul or other representative of the foreign country
forthwith.
(3) In case of physical or mental incapacity, other than minority, of the
injured person or his dependents to perform or cause to be performed any act
required within the time specified in this section, the period of limitation in any
such case shall be extended for three years from the date when the incapacity
ceases.
Id.
431. See note 415 supra and accompanying text.
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pneumonia or its sequel, and at the time of his employment
such employee was given a thorough physical examination by a
licensed doctor of medicine, and a written report thereof has
been made and filed with such organized fire or police depart-
ment, with the Minnesota highway patrol, conservation officer
service, state crime bureau, department of natural resources, or
sheriffs department of any county, which examination and re-
port negatived any evidence of myocarditis, coronary sclerosis,
pneumonia or its sequel, the disease is presumptively an occu-
pational disease and shall be presumed to have been due to the
nature of his employment.
432
In the 1941 case of Kellerman v. City of St. Paul,433 the Minnesota
court upheld the validity of this provision's predecessor that was
applicable only to firefighters, 434 saying:
The apparent high percentage of occurrence of coronary sclero-
sis among firemen demonstrates that the legislature was not ar-
bitrary in providing for them as a class. Relator asserts that
other occupations were shown to be susceptible to coronary
sclerosis. The legislature "is free to recognize degrees of harm,
and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where
the need is deemed to be clearest. As has been said, it may
'proceed cautiously, step by step,' and 'if an evil is specially ex-
perienced in a particular branch of business' it is not necessary
that the prohibition 'should be couched in all-embracing
terms.' "435
In Ogren v. City of Duluth, 4 36 the court described the operation of
the presumption in the provision's predecessor as follows:
It is well settled that a presumption is not evidence, but is
rather a rule of law dictating decision on unopposed facts and
shifting the burden of going forward with the evidence ...
The presumption obtains until substantial proof to the contrary
is introduced. Then it ceases and vanishes from the case. The
432. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(15) (1978 & Supp. 1979). For the historical development
of this provision, see notes 52-59 supra and accompanying text.
In Jensen v. City of Duluth, 269 Minn. 241, 247-48, 130 N.W.2d 515, 519 (1964), the
court held that this presumption did not apply to a firefighter's cerebral arteriosclerosis.
433. 211 Minn. 351, 1 N.W.2d 378 (1941).
434. Act of Apr. 30, 1939, ch. 306, 1939 Minn. Laws 429.
435. 211 Minn. at 355-56, 1 N.W.2d at 380-81 (quoting State v. Fairmont Creamery
Co., 162 Minn. 146, 149, 202 N.W. 714, 716 (1925), rev'don othtr grounds, 274 U.S. 1, 11
(1927)); cf Ondler v. Peace Officers Benefit Fund, 289 N.W.2d 486 (Minn. 1980) (striking
down as equal protection violation exclusion of death as result of heart attack from entitle-
ment to $50,000 statutory award for peace officer or firefighter killed in the line of duty).
436. 219 Minn. 555, 18 N.W.2d 535 (1945).
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case is then to be decided by the trier of the fact the same as if
the presumption had never existed.
437
This approach, consistent with Minnesota's approach to presump-
tions generally,4 38 has been confirmed in cases arising under the
current provision. Thus, the court stated in 1977, "We have fre-
quently characterized this statutory presumption as a rule of evi-
dence. It is not evidence. It is rather, 'a rule of law dictating
decision on unopposed facts.' 439
Compensation has been denied for a police chiefs coronary scle-
rosis on the ground that the presumption was rebutted,440 and has
been awarded for firefighters' coronary sclerosis only on the basis
that medical evidence sufficiently linked the employment with the
disease.44 1 The presumption itself does not appear to have been a
basis for compensation in reported cases.
If the Minnesota Legislature wanted the presumption to have
more effect, as such presumptions do in other states, 4 4 2 it should
have specified a shifting of the burden of proof, as it did regarding
the defenses of employee intoxication and intentional self-infliction
of injury, 443 or a conclusive presumption, as it did regarding depen-
437. Id. at 564, 18 N.W.2d at 540.
438. See MINN. R. EVID. 301. See generally 11 P. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE
§§ 301.01-.03 (1979); Thompson, Presumptions and the New Rules of Evidence in Minnesota, 2
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 167 (1976).
439. Jerabek v. Teleprompter Corp., 255 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Minn. 1977) (citing Ogren
v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 564, 18 N.W.2d 535, 540 (1945) and Jensen v. City of
Duluth, 269 Minn. 241, 245, 130 N.W.2d 515,518 (1964)), award upheldafter remandsub nom.
Jerabek v. City of Rochester, 281 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Minn. 1979); see Anderson v. City of
Minneapolis, 258 Minn. 221, 227-28, 103 N.W.2d 397, 401-02 (1960); Roope v. City of
Austin, 23 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 9, 15 (1963).
440. See Roope v. City of Austin, 23 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 9, 15 (1963).
441. See Schwartz v. City of Duluth, 264 Minn. 514, 518-20, 119 N.W.2d 822, 825-26
(1963); Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 258 Minn. 221, 227-28, 103 N.W.2d 397, 401-02
(1960); Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 563-66, 18 N.W.2d 535, 539-41 (1945);
Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, 354-55, 1 N.W.2d 378, 380 (1941); cf. Jer-
abek v. City of Rochester, 281 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Minn. 1979) (coronary sclerosis presump-
tion rebutted but medical evidence sufficiently linked firefighter's employment with heart
attack).
442. See lB A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 41.72(a); cf. MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPEN-
SATION STUDY COMMISSION, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE AND GOVER-
NOR 20 (1979) (statutes similar to Minnesota's construed to have greater effect)
[hereinafter cited as STUDY COMM'N].
443. See MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1) (1978); cf. Olson v. Felix, 275 Minn. 335, 337, 146
N.W.2d 866, 867 (1966) (employer did not prove intoxication was proximate cause);
Beach v. American Steel & Wire Div., 248 Minn. 11, 15-16, 78 N.W.2d 371, 375 (1956)
(employer did not prove intentional self-infliction).
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dency of spouses and young children to be eligible for benefits. 44 4
But the Legislature should not endeavor to increase the pre-
sumption's effect. Rather, as suggested by the Minnesota Workers'
Compensation Study Commission,445 it should remove the pre-
sumption. There is no adequate reason for treating the few speci-




Victims of work-related disease seldom were compensated by
the common law. Placing this burden upon the individual worker
was perceived to be an unjustified consequence of industrializa-
tion, more properly placed upon industry as a cost of its product
and passed on to consumers. Accordingly Minnesota, like other
Anglo-American jurisdictions, evolved a statutory scheme to com-
pensate workers victimized by work-related disease.
The excessive length of Minnesota's occupational disease defini-
tion appears to make a disease compensable only when a labyrinth
of multiple factors are satisfied. In spite of its length, however, all
444. See MINN. STAT. § 176.111 (1) (Supp. 1979); cf London & Lancashire Indem. Co.
v. District Court, 139 Minn. 409, 410-11, 166 N.W. 772, 773 (1918) (spouse); Pederson v.
East Cent. Elec. Ass'n, 281 Minn. 424, 425-26, 161 N.W.2d 615, 616 (1968) (child). As to
constitutionality, see Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1976)
(clinical evidence of complicated black lung disease created irrebuttable presumption of
miner's total disability).
A "prima facie" provision, such as that specifying "[clhildren 18 years of age, or over
18 when physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, are prima facie considered
dependent," MINN. STAT. § 176.111(2) (1978), would probably not produce any greater
effect than a simple presumption. SeeJannetta v. Milwaukee W. Fuel Co., 225 Minn. 318,
322, 30 N.W.2d 683, 685 (1948) (provision as to incapacitated child completely rebutted
by showing employee provided nothing of consequence by way of support for years); John-
son v. Munsingwear, Inc., 222 Minn. 540, 544-45, 25 N.W.2d 308, 311 (1946) (provision as
to child of certain age partly rebutted by showing employee provided only part of child's
support). TheJohnson court did not specifically refer to the prima facie effect vanishing in
the face of substantial contrary proof, but it referred to the provision as a rebuttable pre-
sumption, see z. at 544, 25 N.W.2d at 311, and it cited the Ogren case, see notes 436-37
supra and accompanying text.
Johnson also cited Wojtowicz v. Belden, 211 Minn. 461, 1 N.W.2d 409 (1942), in
which the court had held that the prima facie case of negligence created by violation of a
traffic statute "prevails in the absence of evidence invalidating it" and said "if there is
such evidence, the issue is for the jury." Id. at 465, 1 N.W.2d at 410-11.
445. See STUDY COMM'N, supra note 442, at 20.
446. Cf Solomons, supra note 47, at 224 ("Nonspecific diseases such as stress-induced
heart disease or emotional disorders can be dealt with by shifting the burden of proof of
causal relationship from the employee to the employer,").
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the definition really requires is that the employment increase the
risk of and proximately cause the disease. Injured workers also
have the option to seek compensation for disease under the per-
sonal injury provision of the Minnesota workers' compensation
law.
A claimant should be allowed to recover compensation for med-
ical treatment, disability, or death from disease under the personal
injury definition without having to satisfy the proximate causation
requirements of the occupational disease provision.4 47 If the
claimant has difficulties under the personal injury definition be-
cause of that definition's premises and hours-of-service require-
ments448 or because of time-for-notice or time-for-commencement-
of-proceedings considerations, 449 the claimant should be allowed to
proceed, solely or in the alternative, under the occupational dis-
ease provision with its proximate cause requirement.
450
The occupational disease provision justifiably exacts proximate
cause in return for dispensing with the premises and hours require-
ment.45 1 As stated by Professor Larson,
[T]he "course of employment" and "arising out of employ-
ment" tests. . . should not be, applied entirely independently;
they are both parts of a single test of work-connection, and
therefore deficiencies in the strength of one factor are some-
times allowed to be made up by strength in the other.
4 5 2
Whether requiring proximate cause is the best way to enhance the
occupational disease causation requirement is questionable.
453
The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation
Laws, 4 5 4 the Council of State Governments, 455 and some states'
statutes456 take the position that "arising out of" is a sufficient cau-
447. See notes 379-431 supra and accompanying text.
448. See note 424 supra and accompanying text.
449. See notes 426-30 supra and accompanying text.
450. See notes 222-361, 424-30 supra and accompanying text.
451. See notes 424-25 supra and accompanying text.
452. IA A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 29.00 (1979).
453. See note 245 supra and accompanying text.
454. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT
50 (1972) (Recommendation 2.14) ("We recommend that the 'arising out of and in the
course of employment' test be used to determine coverage of injuries and disease.").
455. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND REHA-
BILITATION LAw § 2(a) (1974), repwtztedt 4 A. LARSON, supra note 18, at 643 (1980) ("'In-
jury' means any harmful change in the human organism arising out of and in the course of
employment . . . but does not include any communicable disease unless the risk of con-
tracting such disease is increased by the nature of the employment.").
456. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
19801
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sation requirement for disease. But if the proximate cause concept
is applied appropriately, 457 it should be satisfactory as long as the
claimant has the option of dispensing with it by meeting the per-
sonal injury definition's premises and hours requirements for com-
pensating the disease as a personal injury.
458
These considerations justify keeping the occupational disease
definition in the statute. But they do not justify the definition be-
ing so long and cumbersome when all it really requires is that the
employment increase the risk of and proximately cause the dis-
ease.459 Nor do these considerations justify a presumption offering
special treatment for diseases contracted by public officers. 460 The
Legislature should remove the occupational disease presumption
and amend the definition to specify simply, "'Occupational dis-
ease' means bodily or mental harm461 that is proximately caused
by and the risk of which is increased by the employment. '46
2
§ 2301(4) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.36(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 102.03(2)(3) (West 1973); cf. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265(13) (1972) ("arises
naturaly out of the employment" (emphasis added)); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 36-501 $ 13
(West 1968) (same); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 22(a) (1979) ("due to the nature of the
occupation or process"); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 149, § 1 (West 1971) ("caused by the
nature or circumstances of the employment"); Wyo. STAT. § 27-12-102(a)(xii) (1977)
("arising out of" except communicable disease "unless the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the nature of the employment").
457. See notes 222-361 supra and accompanying text.
458. See notes 379-431 supra and accompanying text.
459. See notes 152-221 supra and accompanying text.
460. See notes 432-46 supra and accompanying text.
461. See notes 362-78 supra and accompanying text; cf. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.01(2)(c)
(West Supp. 1979) (" 'Injury' means mental or physical harm to an employee caused by
accident or disease .... ").
It should be noted that by specifying "bodily or mental harm" rather than "disease,"
this would more clearly apply to "delayed action" injury situations, see IA A. LARSON,
supra note 18, §§ 29.21-.22 (1979), producing effects not commonly regarded as diseases.
In Hed v. Brockway Glass Co., 309 Minn. 73, 244 N.W.2d 28 (1976), the Minnesota court
upheld compensation in what seems to be a "delayed action" situation without indicating
that it perceived any unusual "course" problem and without referring to the premises and
hours requirements. The employee received compensation for injuries caused by his driv-
ing into a tree after driving about a mile on his trip home from the plant, apparently after
falling asleep or blacking out from fatigue caused by working three strenuous, abnormally
long days. Id. at 74-76, 244 N.W.2d at 29. The only apparent alternative to a "delayed
action" rationale is to conclude that the employee's fatigue at work was a "personal in-
jury" on the premises and during the hours, and that the car accident was a "direct and
natural consequence" of the "personal injury." See note 249 supra and accompanying text.
462. Another appropriate approach would be to delete simultaneously the personal
injury definition's premises and hours requirements and repeal the occupational disease
definition. Few states accord with Minnesota in specifying premises or hours requirements
in addition to an "in the course" requirement. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-19
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(1978); WYo. STAT. § 27-12-102(a)(xii) (1977); 4 A. LARSON, supra note 18, at 511-23
(1980). Many states' statutes include disease or occupational disease within their "injury"
or "personal injury" definitions, see notes 413-14 supra and accompanying text, and a
number of states as well as the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation
Laws and the Council of State Governments consider "arising out of" to be a sufficient
causation requirement for disease. See notes 454-56 supra and accompanying text.
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